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*Dedicated to the Father of the Nation  
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*

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## Foreword

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Since its inception in 1999, National Defence College has been relentlessly presenting time - befitting academic curricula that testify the viability of the academic system that has contributed to this leading institution in gaining reputation of excellence at home and abroad. As the highest-level national institution in Bangladesh, the National Defence College has always concentrated on conducting research on contemporary issues of national and international significance that have an impact on national security and development. Being a leading Education 4.0 Institution of the country, National Defence College felt necessity to publish an international standard E-Journal, to meet the demand of the time.

*NDC E-JOURNAL* is a double-blind peer reviewed academic and professional journal that aims to be one of the leading journals of the country and the region in the field of security and development. The journal provides a platform for the publication of empirical and policy-oriented research and review articles on all aspects related to Security and Development, Leadership and Management, Strategy, Policy, and Governance, Defence Studies, International Relation, Social Science, Military Science and Technology, History, philosophy, Ethics of War etc.

I am happy that we are going to publish the very first issue of *NDC E-JOURNAL*. I am sanguine that the Articles included in this journal covering varied range of topics would be of great interest to the academia, researchers, and the ordinary readers as well. *NDC E-JOURNAL* website is structured to allow easy, convenient searches, making it a source of essential, content-rich, accessible information, and knowledge for researchers and readers.

I congratulate all authors who contributed to the very first issue of *NDC-E JOURNAL*. I appreciate the sincere efforts of Research and Academic Wing and acknowledge the hard work of editorial board to publish this journal online within a very short time. I wish every success of *NDC E-JOURNAL*.



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**Lieutenant General Sheikh Mamun Khaled, SUP, rcds, psc, PhD**  
*Commandant, National Defence College, Dhaka, Bangladesh*  
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## The Editor in Chief's Note

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The *NDC E-JOURNAL* is a bi-annual publication of the National Defence College, Bangladesh. The *NDC E-JOURNAL* provides an outstanding opportunity to discuss, debate, and comment on national and international security and development issues, not only from the traditional perspective but also from the non-traditional spectrum of governance and security. The articles are selected through a rigorous process of blind review to ensure epistemic value, high standard, and originality to debates and discourses on a diverse range of inquiries.

The *NDC E-JOURNAL* is a platform where readers can engage with the evolving theories, policies, strategies, and discourses pertaining to security, development and beyond. The journal has a notable reach with a significant impact on security and strategic frameworks. We rely on our international network of authors, advisory boards, academia, NDC faculty, reviewers, and readers to help in identifying and exploring new areas of security and strategic studies scholarship. Hence, the submissions to the journal have seen significant growth and reach over the year.

We have an experienced and intellectually vibrant Editorial Board, Editorial Advisors of global repute, a respectable and animated International Advisory Board comprised of revered academicians and eminent personalities, and a dedicated Editorial team comprising Section and Language editors. With the continued support of the boards, advisors, and teams mentioned above, we seek to maintain high standards in all aspects of this journal's management, credibility, and outreach.

Henceforth, with such a broad base of support, we have published this inaugural open access e-volume, titled as the *NDC E-JOURNAL*, for a wider pool of readers and researchers. This inaugural volume has included scholarly and original articles focusing on strategic leadership, national security outlook, post-Covid security paradoxes, cybersecurity, skilled human resources, and military involvement in humanitarian intervention. We expect to receive more evidence-based and intriguingly inquisitive and analytical articles for the next volume.

We look forward to working with all of you, as we continue to make the *NDC E-JOURNAL* a success. We welcome submissions, as well as feedback from authors, readers, and reviewers of the journal.



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**Professor Shahab Enam Khan**  
*Editor in Chief, NDC E-JOURNAL*

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# Index

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Articles	Pages
1. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP THROUGH CRISIS <i>Lieutenant General Sheikh Mamun Khaled, SUP, rcads, psc, PhD</i> <i>National Defence College, Dhaka, Bangladesh.</i>	01-16
2. BANGLADESH NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK IN THE 21 <sup>ST</sup> CENTURY <i>Major General Md Abdur Rouf, OSP, ndc, afwc, psc (retd)</i> <i>Former Faculty Member of National Defence College, Mirpur, Dhaka, Bangladesh.</i>	17-30
3. RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY: POST-CXIX DILEMMAS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS <i>Shahab Enam Khan</i> <i>Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh.</i>	31-49
4. THE DYNAMICS OF CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL POWER: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE <i>Khaled M. Khan</i> <i>Department of CSE, College of Engineering, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.</i>	50-67
5. NEED BASED SKILLED HUMAN RESOURCES FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT <i>Brigadier General Md Shahedul Islam, hdmc, psc</i> <i>National Defence College, Mirpur, Dhaka, Bangladesh.</i>	68-87
6. AN APPROACH TO HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY FORCE: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE <i>Colonel A. B. M. Faruquzzaman, afwc, psc, G</i> <i>Headquarters Logistics Area, Dhaka, Bangladesh.</i>	88-106
7. THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) CHARTER <i>Lieutenant Colonel Md Kamrul Hassan, afwc, psc</i> <i>Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters, Dhaka, Bangladesh.</i>	107-124



## STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP THROUGH CRISIS

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**Abstract:** In the traditional sense of the term, ‘leadership’ refers to the act of leading through different administrative functions on the way to organizational success. In the present era of dynamic competition marked by rapid technological advancement as well as global crises, the role of leaders has increased substantially, necessitating the adoption of Strategic Leadership – leadership that helps sustain and achieve competitive advantages in turbulent situations. The aim of this paper is to identify the future challenges of strategic leadership in crisis management and suggest measures to surmount them. The paper also attempts to identify the leadership environment, which is necessary, besides putting forward some suggestions, for leading effectively in the VUCA world or in the realm of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

**Keywords:** *Strategic Leadership; Crisis; Environment; Challenges.*

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### INTRODUCTION

The global pandemic as well as the concomitant financial crisis has brought about a wave of extraordinary challenges for the world’s economic and political order. Leaders across the globe in business, government and the not-for-profit sectors are struggling to lead through the crisis while also preparing their organizations for the uncertain future. In the past, studies generally investigated the factors that impacted on organizational success and how it was affected by various types of leadership such as participative, autocratic, democratic, and so on. Today, every situation is unique and critical. The current pace of change is way beyond what leaders can manage. The changes that are taking place at an unprecedented speed will affect the decision-makers and leaders of tomorrow significantly. One of the key challenges for leaders of today and tomorrow will be to effectively deal with and constructively manage this hyper-change. The Covid-19 pandemic is a case in point. Hardly could anyone predict its consequences at the initial stage. Little wonder, the whole world has been reeling under its cataclysmic impacts for months on end.

Changes and social disruptions as well as conflicts and dislocations are inevitable. The onslaught of such Black Swan events is becoming the new normal in the 21st

century (*Taleb, & Chandler, 2007*). Multi-tasking, delegating and even using algorithms and analytics are no longer enough. Therefore, future-ready strategic leadership is the demand of the time. This calls for a revolution in thinking, a steady stream of strategies and unexpected solutions. Leaders have to come up not just with ideas, but how to nurture them, test them, pitch them, and ultimately make them real and profitable. During turbulent times, leadership is one of the key factors that can make a difference, through farsightedness and skill.

Leadership has always been considered to be the conventional act of leading a group of individuals through various managerial functions. But today, the role of a leader has enhanced multi-folds and requires a leader not only to lead, but also to transform his followers into future-ready leaders. Such a transformation among sub-ordinates is possible when the leadership role is performed strategically, by making the subordinates develop a feeling of belongingness within the group and in turn the organization, by making maverick decisions in the area of needs which have not been met before, by siding with the truth even in the face of opposition and being able to face any consequences emanating therefrom. The broad objective of this paper, therefore, is to identify the future challenges of strategic leadership in crisis management and suggest the way-out. The specific objectives are to identify the necessary environment and the ways for effective and early preparedness, against the backdrop of which, strategic leadership is expected to sustain the complex challenges of the present and future and uphold the expectations of concerned organizations. During any crisis they must take the opportunity to cultivate and culture the leadership quality, to prove their worth and to contribute to the society in general and to the subordinates in particular.

## **TURBULENT TIMES BUILD GREAT LEADERS**

The word ‘crisis’ has very interesting etymology. In the early 15th century, the word ‘krisis’ – which meant to decide - was used in Greek literature. So, the word ‘crisis’ afterwards meant a critical situation that warrants or calls for a decision. Gradually the word ‘krisis’ was used in medical dictionaries to refer to a ‘turning point’ in a disease. At such a critical moment, the condition of the patient could get better or worse. In modern parlance, the word ‘crisis’ means a low probability, high impact event which calls for immediate action.

Taleb and Chandler (*2007*) in their book “Black Swan” discussed the low probability and high impact events. The crisis can be likened but the Black Swan is not always a crisis. It could even be something positive. But predominantly Black Swan events are used and branded in a derogatory sense. So, leading through crisis is a kind of leading propagated by Lao Tzu, who emphasized “A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves” (*Seamon, 2016*). That is, a leader should lead in a way that everybody will feel having accomplished the mission

themselves. As Nelson Mandela said, “It is better to lead from behind and to put others in front, especially when you celebrate victory when nice things occur. You take the front line when there is danger.”

Sharma (2010) in his book “The Leaders Who Had No Title” mentioned in the second principle that “turbulent times build great leaders”. Leadership in a crisis is not different from leadership at any other time. But a true measure of leadership can manifest itself only during a crisis. Brian Tracy, the famous motivational speaker said, “the true test of leadership is how well you function in a crisis.” His words have not resonated more than they do today. There is a popular English proverb that says “cometh the hour, cometh the man” – the idea that the right leaders will come to the fore during times of crisis. So, leaders really prove their worth by leading through crisis, and not by leading at ordinary times. According to John C. Maxwell, “leadership is a verb, not a noun” (Austin, 2020). What this means is that leadership is the act of doing, it is not a static entity. Leadership is taking the followers through the crisis. Most of the leaders who are recognized in history proved their worth by leading through crisis, and they emerged during crises.

## **LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES DURING CRISIS IN DAY TO DAY WORK**

While performing routine tasks even highly competitive, successful organizations can and do face crises, defined as low-probability, high-impact events that threaten the viability of the organization and are characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly (Pearson & Clair, 1998; p. 60). Leaders are faced with various paradoxical situations as follows:

- **How to be an inspirational leader while continuing to push for performance.** Setting deadlines for employees is easy but keeping them engaged along the way is the real difference that a leader can make. Depending on leadership, either staff burn out can set in or employees may feel hungry for more. The right performance on the part of the leadership remains inspirational for employees.
- **How to respond to countless questions from subordinates when no clear answers exist.** There will be many queries for clarification inasmuch as there will be fake news and social media propaganda that will generate further queries, more doubts, more stress and more uncertainty. Hence, a leader should pass on authentic information to the people he or she leads, so that they know the fact. It is imperative that the information be presented in a cut and thrust manner so that the subordinates or followers know what the truth is.
- **How to maintain visibility and influence in the organization with**

**limited interaction opportunities.** Studies have highlighted the importance of visibility in the workplace for informal interaction that can be used as a measurement for productivity (*Motamed et al., 2013*). Leaders have to make an effort to be visible to sub-ordinates and peers alike, notwithstanding the fact that they are often constrained by regulations and procedures.

- **How to keep building personal brand within the organization without appearing self-centred.** Personal branding is a way of establishing and consistently reinforcing who we are and what we stand for in our career and life. Leaders have their own personality, and they should strive to develop a personal brand that lives in the minds of the ones they lead.
- **How to keep the team engaged while working remotely.** While working remotely has its fair share of benefits, like saving time and money on commutes and encouraging better work-life balance, it also has some drawbacks. McGregor and Doshi (*2020*) showed that employees who work remotely are less motivated, because of lack of personal engagement. So, a leader must engage the team effectively by defining goals for remote workers, improving the overall internal communication strategy, and encouraging continuous involvement however they can.

## **CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP DURING CRISIS**

Crisis situations can overwhelm even the most experienced leaders, presenting unexpected and complex scenarios that evolve at a fast pace and in several directions:

- **Detecting incoming issues in a fast-changing situation.** The rapid pace of change often gives rise to a new set of challenges, as in a VUCA-situation. The acronym VUCA stands for volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Originating from the United States Army War College, the term has been widely used to describe the conditions resulting from the Cold War (*Lau, 2020*). There is a growing need for leaders to be aware of VUCA situations, which could be managed with VUCA vision, understanding, clarity and agility. So, it is important that leaders be equipped with these skills to effectively deal with a VUCA situation.
- **Making sense of a dynamic threat with limited information.** The pace, nature and implications of COVID-19 have proved to be frustratingly difficult to comprehend. There are reasons, but there is not

enough information. Moreover, there is hardly any agreement on the escalation of rates, or on the effects of measures taken so far. The simulation attempts that make use of controversial input variables are focused on apparently drastic forecasts. As a result, leaders are navigating in semi-darkness.

- **Making life-or-death decisions.** There will be times when a leader has to assign people for any administrative or training jobs where they could be exposed to risks. Sometimes, the leader has to make very crucial decisions, balancing the risks to which those decisions can expose an individual or subordinates against organizational functions and goals.
- **Ensuring strategic coordination.** In a global crisis such as COVID-19, many governmental, private, and societal institutions will have to do their part. As the credibility and efficiency of the overall response is strongly contingent on them sharing their individual responses, they must work together. For residents, all of whom are willing to volunteer, the same is true. There is a great deal of social resilience on offer, but a license to function by clear facilitation, public cooperation and regulatory stability need to be granted.
- **Keeping worried personnel on side.** Crisis communication 'best practice' is remarkably simple and consistent. It stresses the need to provide trustworthy channels of simple, timely, consistent, and replicated messaging and actionable advice. Yet how much crisis coordination turns out to be an Achilles' heel to crisis management remains shocking. Leaders also struggle to communicate and may be distant from the perspectives of people. In resisting panic among people, they can even be too vigilant and thus fail to share the entire reality.

## **STRATEGIC LEADERS IN VUCA WORLD**

During unfavorable times, volatile and intensely contested markets or macro-economic crises, leaders in the VUCA world show the features of successful leadership. Historically, when fighting the enemy on the battlefield, VUCA was used in military campaigns around the world, where things were uncertain, chaotic, and there was a shortage of knowledge on which to base decisions. Nevertheless, effective strategic leaders are always able to ascertain the prospects and make decisions accurately to lead their people forward and gain momentum in the current situation.

In the current operating environment, the dynamics need strategic leaders to make deliberate decisions during turbulent situations in order to manage and develop agile organizations despite the uncertainty. In the operating environment, changes often determine and impact how choices are made to prosper and manage uncertainty. This needs a strong view of where we are now, and a sense

of intent. Where will we go? And how are we getting there? These are critical questions to solve uncertainty and clear confusion (ambiguity) within the organizations or political landscape. The response to these questions is that we need to be clear about where we are going and be flexible about how we are going to get there. Leaders need to formulate concrete action plans about how to get there, such as short-term and long-term priorities and goals. The second important thing after defining priorities is to build communication techniques that need to be synchronized to get buy-in and impact followers or team members to get them to the desired future.

Leaders are expected to clearly express the current situation, the progress that needs to be made, the time frame at their disposal to cross the river, possible threats, and the advantage of intervening now in order to facilitate action among individuals. It is crucial that everyone feels and shares the same risk of probabilities to enable everyone to do outstanding work, with a high degree of diligence to achieve the objectives or target set that could eventually contribute to the creation of an agile organization. The significant events faced by many companies, large and small, are: a significant decrease in market results, such as volumes of sales/production, which can affect companies in terms of high operating costs, competitiveness and profitability, and which can generate potential uncertainties. Leaders, however, ought to make important decisions with high levels of cautionary judgment and exercise. Most corporations have been impacted by external factors, such as current global, regional, and local economic vulnerabilities. However, decisions taken at the strategic level must always represent the interests of different stakeholders. Successful leaders typically devise a semi-risk potent strategy integrating flexibility frameworks that empower the company to pursue different opportunities, optimize new technologies, and utilize their professional workforce's core competencies. The nature of their workers, direct or indirect rivalry, the political landscape (government policies) and the general regulatory structure must be recognized by leaders in the VUCA world. This helps leaders make smart choices when dealing with difficult business survival circumstances.

## **HOW TO MAXIMIZE THE LEADERSHIP IMPACT IN A VUCA WORLD**

Today's leaders must have an appetite to embrace VUCA. They do not have a choice. They either prepare themselves to lead effectively in the midst of chaos or they simply fall prey and become victims. Here are three leadership principles that will help leaders lead successfully in a VUCA world:

- **Principle 1:** Leaders must have an unquenchable appetite to learn. They need to have a large appetite for learning in an ever-changing world. Futurist and philosopher Alvin Toffler once wrote: "The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who

cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn.”

- **Principle 2:** Leaders must have a resolute mindset to embrace change. A VUCA setting is all about transformation. These improvements are imposed on us, whether we like them or not. Successful leaders may not avoid transformation.
- **Principle 3:** Leaders must have an unwavering commitment not to compromise values. They must do what is right. They never compromise their faith to fit in. They do not conform to the ways of the world or condone sin.

## **STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION**

The 21st century is characterized by a coalescence of artificial and human intelligence. Leaders so far have been dealing with the VUCA environment. But now with ever-evolving technology and new processes, leaders and organizations are facing ever-stronger challenges than they were even five years ago. The concept of digitizing everything is becoming a reality. Automation, artificial intelligence, internet of things (IoT), machine learning and other advanced technologies can quickly capture and analyze a wealth of data that gives previously unimaginable amounts and types of information to work from. In order to generate value from the results obtained through advanced technology, the challenge moves to the next level, changing how to think, train and work with data. Industry 4.0 is the fourth in a sequence of technological revolutions marked by their potential, through the implementation of new technologies and processes, to change economies, employment and even society itself.

The first industrial revolution began mechanization in the late 18th century with the introduction of steam power and the invention of the power loom, and drastically altered the production of products. Electricity and assembly lines made mass manufacturing feasible in the late 19th century, giving rise to the second revolution. The third revolution was thought to have taken place in the 1970s, when advances in computing allowed people to program machines and networks, powering automation.

Professor Klaus Schwab, the Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, has published a book entitled ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution’ in which he describes how this fourth revolution is fundamentally different from the previous three, which were characterized mainly by advances in technology (*Schwab, 2017*). Definitions for Industry 4.0 abound, but the convergence of physical and digital technology such as analytics, artificial intelligence, cognitive technologies and IoT is the primary transition it brings to its heart. This physical and digital union enables a digital organization to be built that is not only integrated, but also capable of making more comprehensive,



educated decisions. Data obtained from physical structures in a digital organization is used to push intelligent behaviour back into the physical world. These feedback loops are the possibilities that create ample prospects for new goods and services, improved ways of servicing consumers, new types of work, and completely new business models.

The effect of these changes has the potential to ripple through industries, companies, and cultures, as in the previous industrial revolutions, impacting not just how we operate, but also how we live and relate to each other. But this time, the revolution is progressing at incredible pace, powered by the exponential rate of technological growth. Amongst changing demographics and unparalleled global connectivity, either technical, social, or economic, Industry 4.0 can herald greater opportunities than any that came before it. Future leaders will need to adapt to these environmental changes.

## **HOW TO MAXIMIZE THE LEADERSHIP IMPACT IN THE WAKE OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION**

There will be enormous strategic leadership challenges as the impact of technology and the disruption that comes with it will result in an exogenous force over which leaders would have little or no control at times. However, it is the role of leaders to guide their teams and to be mindful of these forces when making business decisions that would impact on the sustainability of their organizations. They should thus grasp the opportunity and power so as to shape the Fourth Industrial Revolution and direct it toward a future that reflects the organizational values and success. Though some traditional leadership capabilities still remain critical, the following leadership principles will help leaders lead successfully in the digital era:

- **Principle 1 - Mindsets not skillsets**
  - A lack of expertise is not what makes leadership inefficient in today's economy. It is the mixture of a constantly evolving world combined with a mental attitude transfixed (being stuck in non-changing patterns of thought)
  - The co-creative collective culture takes for granted a high degree of learning versatility. People have to be able to adapt constantly and rapidly.
- **Principle 2 - Focus on what works**
  - In the economic environment, looking at the learning ecosystem, it is easy to see that it is not centered especially on new ways of work and leadership.
  - It will leave a huge impact on the organization by turning the

emphasis on achieving sustainable progress, generating progress in innovative design systems, and motivating people to bring improvements together.

▪ **Principle 3 - Prioritize differently**

- People who critically analyse their feelings and reactions without assessment fail to comprehend the old patterns of thought that still influence them. The brain has been conditioned in one direction and will function in the same direction until it is retrained consciously.
- In order to be able to form relationships – both new and current ones, it is advised to first focus on one's own personality.

Change is important, but when leading in a VUCA and digital world, good leaders must know what should not be changed. In reality, it can be argued that it is as necessary to know what does not change as to know what needs to change. Modern companies in the 21st century deal with various problems that have evolved rapidly. In Bangladesh, the situation is no different. Therefore, in the constantly evolving organizational climate and economic model, proper leadership is essential for organizations to succeed. The level of transition is the driving force, while one of the essential reasons for corporate progress is good leadership. Company leaders today need to have an appetite to accept VUCA and the new world, so we are either planning to lead successfully in the midst of uncertainty or only being casualties. Strategic leadership and the appropriate investment in human resources development, particularly the leadership development program, are factors that contribute to the creation of an agile company.

## **LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD**

To secure a better future, strategic leaders must seek out experiences and opportunities to learn and apply 10 new skills:

- **Maker instinct:** Ability to take advantage of the inner drive to create and develop stuff, as well as to interact with others in the making.
- **Clarity:** Willingness to see a future despite messes and inconsistencies that cannot yet be seen by some.
- **Dilemma flipping:** Ability to turn dilemmas into rewards and opportunities that, unlike problems, cannot be solved.
- **Immersive learning capacity:** Capacity to immerse oneself and learn from them in a first-person way in unfamiliar environments.
- **Bio-empathy:** Capable of seeing stuff from the point of view of nature-to consider, appreciate and learn from the patterns of nature.

- **Constructive depolarization:** Having the ability to stay calm in stressful environments where disagreements dominate, and contact has broken down and leads people to constructive interaction from divergent cultures.
- **Quiet transparency:** Capable of being transparent and genuine-without advertising oneself on what matters to us.
- **Rapid prototyping:** Expertise in the development of rapid early innovation versions, with the assumption that early failures would be needed for later success.
- **Smart mob organization:** Skilled in developing, engaging, and cultivating purposeful networks for business or social change through the intelligent use of electronic or other media.
- **Commons creating:** Has the ability to seed, cultivate and grow common assets that can help other players and often encourage higher-level competition.

## **LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS TO MANAGE CRISIS**

For moving forward in a crisis, leaders need to cultivate four behaviors in themselves and their teams. They must decide with speed over precision, adapt boldly, deliver reliably, and engage for impact.

- **Decide with speed over precision.** The situation is changing by the day — even by the hour. The best leaders quickly process available information, rapidly determine what matters most, and make decisions with conviction. Leaders must break through the inertia to keep the organization trained on business continuity today while increasing the odds of mid to long-term success by focusing on the few things that matter most. They should decide with speed over precision because if leaders delay and keep thinking and get into analysis —paralysis then their decision is so much so late that perhaps it will be counterproductive.
- **Adapt boldly.** Leaders should get ahead of changing circumstances. They seek input and information from diverse sources, are not afraid to admit what they do not know and bring in outside expertise when needed.
- **Deliver reliably.** Leaders should take personal ownership in a crisis, even though many challenges and factors lie outside their control. Leaders should stay alert to and aligned on a daily dashboard of priorities. They should set KPIs and other matrices to measure performance, and keep mind and body in fighting shape.
- **Engage for impact.** In times of crisis, no job is more important than

taking care of the team. Effective leaders are understanding of their team's circumstances and distractions, but they find ways to engage and motivate, clearly and thoroughly communicating important new goals and information. Leaders should:

- Connect with individual team members.
- Dig deep to engage the team.
- Ask for help as needed.
- Collect and amplify positive messages.

## **LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES FOR MANAGING CRISIS**

Leaders managing their organizations through crisis show six distinctive capabilities:

- **Calm.** All the while, effective leaders are able to remain calm and maintain a sense of perspective. According to Gene Klann (2003), author of the book *Crisis Leadership*, "During a crisis, your goal is to reduce loss and keep things operating as normal as possible. The leaders should project a sense of calmness through this difficult and uncertain situation. Panic is contagious. It will infect the subordinates. If we feel uncomfortable but pretend that we are calm, that will also be transmitted amongst peers, or subordinates.
- **Confidence.** The leader should project confidence that he is going to be able to see this through successfully. Whatever direction he is giving, he should stick to it. If it warrants change, he should change. The fickleness again gets people a little worried as to whether they will comply with the instruction whole heartedly or they should still wait and see.
- **Communication.** The leader must create a sense of order in which to communicate decisions and priorities. He should communicate with authenticity and veracity and communicate continuously with each other across the board.
- **Collaboration.** The leader should call on the resources and capabilities of all his team members and bring them together. A crisis like COVID-19 cannot be fought independently. It requires collaboration between the health department and a host of other departments and organizations, which will have to synergize their collective efforts with a view to overcoming the challenges of COVID-19.
- **Community.** The leader should set an example and model behaviors that are community friendly and supportive. The measures that we take or the action that we prescribe must involve the community and seek support therefrom.

- **Compassion.** Compassion at a time of crisis is a very important manifestation of leadership. We can hardly overemphasize the need for compassion. Leaders have to be empathetic; leaders have to be compassionate. They should demonstrate that they bear the same risk as their followers do and they are fighting together. Only then can leaders win over the hearts of their followers and motivate them to put their best efforts for a common cause.

## **SUGGESTIONS TO LEAD EFFECTIVELY DURING A CRISIS**

Leaders can step up to lead effectively and turn their teams' attention back to the challenges of meeting the goals. Here are some of the actions the best leaders take during the times of crisis – some ideas for aspiring managers and leaders as they look to strengthen their leadership muscle to prepare for an unknown and unpredictable world.

- **Take own energy seriously.** Leaders should surround themselves with positive minded people. Should they often have pessimists around them, they tend to get infected and worried, thereby jeopardizing their ability to lead.
- **Put individuals ahead of organizations.** Conflicts occur when differences exist between the needs, values, and interests of individuals or groups and those of the leaders of the organization. It is important to create a win-win situation to balance the dominating needs of the organization with those of the individuals in order to retain satisfied employees and meet organizational goals.
- **Cultivate hope not just confidence.** Confidence is important but there must be hope that there is light at end of the tunnel.
- **Reduce risk to Zero.** If possible, leaders should avoid taking any risk that is not worth taking. In other words, they should try to minimize the risk.
- **Do not be vulnerable and be empathetic.** Leaders should share their experience with everybody. There is no sparing anyone.
- **Do the unexpected.** Leaders could sometimes do unexpected things that help them win people's heart.
- **Focus on the small things.** When people are stressed, just giving a call or small things like that can be immensely helpful.
- **Point to credibility.** In the age of social media, fake news and propaganda are rampant. Leaders must make sure whatever information they are providing is credible and authentic. In other words, leaders must use credibility to build trust.

- **Cater to the least fortunate.** That is what the priority is. Leaders must be able identify those who are least fortunate or most affected. The most affected are the ones who need to be given priority because they have the minimum capacity to support themselves.
- **Manage stress.** Stress management is important not only in a crisis situation but also in normal times.

## CONCLUSION

The world is changing at a much faster pace than before and leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to deal with. This is further exacerbated by the fact that each circumstance is unique, requiring a different set of measures. One of the key challenges for leaders of today and tomorrow will therefore be to effectively deal with and practically manage this hyper-change. Multi-tasking, delegating, and even employing algorithms and analytics will no longer suffice. Future-ready strategic leadership is the need of the hour. Today's leaders will not only lead, but also transform their followers into future leaders. Such a transformation among sub-ordinates is possible when the leadership role is performed strategically. Amid emergency they must take the opportunity to nurture and culture the leadership quality, to prove their worth and to contribute to the organization in general and to the subordinates in particular.

In day to day business, even highly competitive and successful organizations face crises. A crisis situation can potentially overwhelm even the most experienced leaders, presenting unexpected, complex scenarios that evolve at a fast pace and in several directions. During unfavorable times, volatile and intensely contested markets or macro-economic crises, leaders in the VUCA world show the features of successful leadership. In the current operating environment, the dynamics need strategic leaders to make deliberate decisions during turbulent situations in order to manage and develop agile organizations despite the uncertainty. Leaders are expected to clearly express the current situation, the progress that needs to be made, the time frame at their disposal to cross the obstacle, possible threats, and the advantage of intervening now, in order to facilitate action among individuals.

Leaders so far have been dealing with VUCA environment. But now with ever evolving technology and new processes, leaders and organizations are facing ever stronger challenges than they were even five years ago. The Fourth Revolution is characterized primarily by advances in technology. Analytics, artificial intelligence, cognitive technologies and IoT are the primary transition it brings to its heart. The revolution is progressing at an incredible pace, powered by the exponential rate of technological growth. Future leaders will need to adapt to these environmental changes.

Strategic leaders must seek out experiences and opportunities to learn and apply new skills to secure a better future. They should have the ability to take advantage

of the inner drive to create and develop stuff, as well as to interact with others in the making. They should have willingness to see a future despite messes and inconsistencies that cannot yet be seen by some. They should be able to turn dilemmas into rewards and opportunities that, unlike problems, cannot be solved. Leaders should grow capacity to immerse themselves and learn from them in a first-person way in unfamiliar environments and have the ability to stay calm in stressful situations where disagreements dominate and contact has broken down and leads people to constructive interaction from divergent cultures. They should be transparent and genuine. They should be expert in the development of rapid early innovation, skilled in developing, engaging and cultivating purposeful networks, talented to seed, cultivate and grow common assets.

Today's leaders must have an appetite to embrace VUCA. They must have an unquenchable appetite to learn, a resolute mindset to embrace change, and have an unwavering commitment not to compromise values. Strategic leadership must grasp the opportunity and power so as to shape the Fourth Industrial Revolution and direct it toward a future. Leaders must follow the suggested principles to deal with the challenges. Change is important, but when leading in a VUCA and digital world, good leaders must know what should not be changed. Strategic leadership and appropriate investment in leadership development programs are essential for creating an agile organization. Finally, the best leaders must know how to manage stress both during a crisis and in normal times. Above all, a strategic leader must be confident, credible, collaborative and compassionate in managing teams, especially during turbulent times because the true measure of leadership can be displayed only during a crisis.

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**Lieutenant General Sheikh Mamun Khaled, SUP, rcds, psc, PhD** was commissioned in Bangladesh Army in 1981. Later, he successfully attained his military training in various institutions both at home and abroad. His overseas training includes Advanced Courses in Fort Gordon, Georgia, USA, EIPC from Naval Post Graduate Academy, California, USA, Transnational Security Cooperation Course at Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, USA and RCDS from Royal College of Defence Studies, London, UK.

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## BANGLADESH NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

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**Abstract:** The essence of Bangladesh's security paradigm originates from the national core values, i.e. democracy, nationalism, socialism, and secularism. Contemporary geostrategic trends together with global pandemic have led the complex web of systematic factors, both of international and regional nature, influence Bangladesh's national security in one way or other. Bangladesh, to encounter the multifarious security challenges at global, regional, and domestic levels, needs to adopt concept of comprehensive security that would give her the strategic space to play its own role in all situations. From a national perspective, Bangladesh's security is contingent on political security, military security, economic security, social security, environmental security, and global peace. Bangladesh needs to attain socio-political stability by creating a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice will be secured for all citizens. An integrated effort is necessary to preserve sovereignty and safeguard territorial integrity by protecting national land, maritime and air spaces, and national cohesion. Bangladesh needs to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth to survive in the global economic recession due to pandemic and trade war. As a disaster-prone country, it is essential for Bangladesh to develop a healthy and sustainable environment. Following the foreign policy postulated by the Father of the Nation, Bangladesh is committed to maintain global peace. This paper attempts to focus on the conceptual issues relating to national security of Bangladesh relevance to global, regional, and domestic, geopolitical, and geostrategic environment. The paper is based on data from the constitution, books, government websites, journals, internet and news reports, attempts to assess contemporary security issues of Bangladesh, at a time when the country is facing the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Keywords:** *National Security, National Core Values, Socio Political Stability, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, Sustainable Economic Growth, Environmental Protection and Global Peace.*

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## PREAMBLE

Security is valued by individuals, families, states, and other actors. Security, however, is not the only thing they value; and the pursuit of security necessitates the sacrifice of other values. Modern concepts of national security arose in the 17th century during the thirty years' war in Europe and the civil war in England. In 1648, the "Peace of Westphalia" established the idea that the nation-state had sovereign control not only of domestic affairs such as religion, but also of external security (*Patton, 2019*). The idea of the nation-state is commonplace today, yet it would be wrong to assume that it is the only way to look at international security. It would be far better to have an international system based on the equilibrium of nation-states dedicated to the limited purposes of national sovereignty and self-defence. The realist school of thought professed by Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679) in his book "Leviathan", espoused the supremacy of the nation-state (*Hobbes, 1651*). However, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century this idea was challenged by idealist school of thought by philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in his essay "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," outlined his idea that the system of nation-states should be replaced by a new enlightened world order (*Kant, 1795*). Nation-states should subordinate their national interests to the common good and be ruled by international law (*Kant, 1795*). Thus, was born the secular view of supranational institutions governing international affairs, which today is reflected in the global world view of liberal internationalism and most clearly manifested in the United Nations (UN).

National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state using economic power, diplomacy, power projection and political power. Contemporary geostrategic trends had led the complex web of systematic factors, both of international and regional nature, influence Bangladesh's national security in one way or other (*Karim, 2006*). In the face of such challenges, Bangladesh is indeed constrained to act independently on its own. The constraint emanates not only from the confinement of state authority within the national boundary, but as well from the resource endowment that Bangladesh as a small and developing state lacks. Bangladesh is scarce to accommodate the demographic pressure and it lacks adequate strategic depth. The land-man ratio in Bangladesh is critical, therefore the question of food security and political stability are of contextual importance here. Country's mineral and energy resource is meagre to facilitate her economic growth. The country lags in connectivity, which constrains its trade and investment (*Rahmatullah, 2009*). Further, it is prone to natural disaster and susceptible to global climatic changes. Bangladesh became a nation much before it became a state and had to endure strenuous tests of national will and cohesion to emerge as an independent country (*Hussain, 2013*). Since independence, Bangladesh has made important strides forward in several fields of national life. However, the country is also facing number of challenges from within and without, which must be addressed to ensure the national security of Bangladesh. Conceptualizing security at levels other than the nation-state is not new. The

new thinking about security focuses on conceptual issues rather than empirical or normative issues. This paper attempts to focus on the conceptual issues relating to national security of Bangladesh relevance to global, regional, and domestic, geopolitical, and geostrategic environment.

## STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is undergoing fundamental transformations, and has become more complex, fast-changing, and hyper-connected. Globalisation is flattening the world by blurring geographical boundaries and increasing connectivity, and thus enhancing mobility of people, goods, thoughts and of infectious diseases (*Fischer, 2003*). The coronavirus pandemic, which was first detected in China, has infected people in 188 countries. Its spread has left businesses around the world counting costs and wondering what recovery could look like. It has affected big shifts in stock markets, where shares in companies are bought and sold, which affect the value of pensions or individual savings accounts (ISAs). Many people have lost their jobs or seen their incomes cut due to the coronavirus crisis. Unemployment rates have increased across major economies as a result. According to international monetary fund (IMF) the global economy will shrink by 3% this year due to pervading effect of coronavirus. It described the decline as the worst since the great depression of the 1930s. The travel industry has been badly damaged, with airlines cutting flights and customers cancelling business trips and holidays. Many countries introduced travel restrictions to try to contain the virus. The crude oil price had already been affected by a row between Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Eountries (OPEC), the group of oil producers, and Russia. Coronavirus drove the price down further. Retail footfall also saw unprecedented lows as shoppers stayed at home in a bid to stop the spread of Covid-19. However, governments around the world have pledged billions of dollars for a Covid-19 vaccine and treatment options (*Jones, Palumbo, & Brown, 2020*).

Globalisation has quickened the pace of developments for many around the globe but has also deepened and widened inequality. Despite significant progress in attaining the Millennium Development Goal (MDG), poverty has remained one of the greatest concerns of human security (*Shangquan, 2000*). Consequently, migration has become an ever-increasing global phenomenon. Cultural fusions have created new identities and offered new challenges to the old ones, and eventually fomented ethno-religious intolerance. There is inequality also in respect to causes and effects of the emerging environmental challenges: most of those who have contributed the least to environmental degradation are perhaps the ones least prepared to handle its effects (*Mir, Qadri & Hassan, 2015*). New technologies are revolutionising social behaviour, ideas, norms, and practices. Technology has alleviated much of human vulnerabilities but has also introduced newer ones. Besides, developmental needs have

increased the global appetite for energy. Connectivity on the other hand is reshaping the knowledge-base and facilitating formation of global opinions, faster and wider (*Akhtar, 2014*). People's demand to the state is also undergoing transformation: people around the globe are gradually forcing states to put 'Human' at the centre of all concerns and actions.

As people's behaviour and aspirations are undergoing changes, so are the concerns of the states and the norms of international relationships. While the roles of the major global powers are gradually changing, new powers are emerging fast on the global platform, and shifting the balance of power between the West and the East, and the North and the South. The re-emergence of geopolitical rivalries is signalling tectonic shifts in the international relations and raising concerns about inter-state conflicts and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (*McGlinchey, Walters, & Scheinpfug, 2017*). Rise of a wide range of non-state actors, on the other hand, is challenging and undermining the role of the state, since globalisation has undermined the capacity of states to address security challenges on their own; while strife, terrorism, unrest, radicalisation, and a host of transnational organised crimes are defining the new range of conflicts in the modern world. 'Networks' in such a complex and complicated world has gained centrality in significance: while epistemic networks may foster the creation of norms, covered networks can engage in illicit activities, ranging from terrorism to the smuggling of nuclear know-how and materials (*Falkner, 2011*). The world today as such is not only just interconnected but also intertwined and interdependent for both progressing developments and mitigating vulnerabilities.

South Asia is a developing region in the fastest developing continent of the contemporary world. Although South Asia is not amongst the best connected or integrated regions of the world, most of the countries in the region share common history, culture, ethnicity, and values, and also important socio-economic concerns; some of which are competitive while most are complementary (*Thakur and Wiggen, 2004*). Geographically, South Asia lies at the crossroads of West, Central and East Asia and the Indian Ocean, and has the potential to offer connectivity to these regions. The region also has some natural and huge human resources to offer to the world. But there exist diverged and contentious interests in the region which lead to geopolitical rivalries to the extent of nuclear empowerment and increased arms race, and involve interests of other global powers (*Snedden, 2016*). This adds some tension to the regional stability and impedes/limits regional cooperation and integration. Economically, South Asia in general consists largely of agrarian economies with increasingly private-sector-led engagement in low-end and labour-intensive manufacturing, and in the fastest-growing service sector. Socio-politically also, South Asia is not the most stable regions of the world. The most important concerns for almost all the countries in the region are the ones related to human security. Although the South Asian countries have performed relatively well in achieving the MDGs, a significant part of the population has

limited access to food, shelter and safe drinking water, and the states also face significant challenges in delivering services (*Bajpai & Sachs, 2004*). For many countries in South Asia, the internal concerns weigh higher than the external ones on the balance of security.

Bangladesh being located in between two very important regions of the globe, i.e., South Asia and South-East Asia, is considered as bridge between them. Since Bangladesh is the only flat territory between East-Southeast and West-Southwest, regions in respect to her location, therefore her geostrategic significance is very high (*Karim, 2008*). Bangladesh is considered the gateway to Bay of Bengal with its 45000 square miles of sea territory. This stretch of water gives Bangladesh an opening to the Indian Ocean and through its choke point i.e., the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific Ocean, thereby to the Asia Pacific Region. Consequently, Asia Pacific region, Indian Ocean region, South Asia and South-East Asia directly or indirectly impinge on the geo-strategic disposition of Bangladesh (*Hussain, 2006*). Bangladesh is the 8<sup>th</sup> largest and homogeneous nation of the world, which amounts to huge demographic strength. Average 65% working age provides large capacity of active manpower. Its population is resilient and hardworking to withstand any adverse situation and cope with any situation. There has been remarkable women empowerment and gender equality in all walks of life (*GED, 2015b*). Unlike many other countries, it is blessed with common language amongst majority of the population, absence of class in the society, and sound communal harmony. Bangladesh's national will has proved to be a strong force behind any national cause. This spirit of the nation provides an intrinsic strategic strength of the country. There has been number of innovations over the time since independence in the field social and economic activities, which are considered as strategic soft power of the country (*Barai & Adhikary, 2015*). Bangladesh's persistent commitment to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), lauded by the entire world, has provided diplomatic defence in its favour. Apart from diplomatic dividend, UN assignment has enabled Bangladeshi peacekeepers to expose and educate in global crisis environment (*Zaman & Biswas, 2015*). This cumulative knowledge over the years has contributed to grow expertise in international and domestic crisis management.

## **BANGLADESH'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

National security is a state or condition where most cherished values and beliefs, democratic way of life, institutions of governance and unity, welfare and well-being as a nation and people are permanently protected and continuously enhanced (*Afolabi, 2015*). Needless to state, every region has its own distinct security environment defined by its geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic positions. The complicity of geopolitics and wide variety of security issues which encompass the region today demand a holistic approach towards national

security. Such ideas have resulted in the evolution of modern concepts of security like collective, common, comprehensive, and cooperative security (*Kikkwa, 2010*). The fundamental basis of collective security is the idea of all against one (*Kara, 2018*). Common security is underpinned by the assumption that security is best assured through cooperation rather than competitive power politics. Comprehensive security recognises that military power, in itself, is not sufficient to guarantee a nation's security. Cooperative security emphasises the importance of pursuing a multi-dimensional approach to security (*Dewit, 1994*).

To secure national interest of Bangladesh, its security is contingent on comprehensive security paradigm. Bangladesh, to encounter the multifarious security challenges at global, regional, and domestic levels need to adopt concept of comprehensive security that would give her the strategic space to play its own role in all situations. Comprehensive security architecture provides a holistic view of security, as it encompasses multidimensional nature of threat that emanates from both within and outside the border. The concept is most widely used and most effective mechanism for managing bilateral disputes between the neighbours. It is suitable for dealing with non-military and non-traditional security issues involving two or more nations of the region (*Schmid, 2007*). Further, it allows the nations to cooperate with states, as well as non-state actors and allow integration of extra-regional powers in a broad area of cooperation. Finally, adoption of comprehensive security would enable Bangladesh to get the support of extra-regional powers and other regional partners.

## **FOUNDATION OF BANGLADESH'S SECURITY PARADIGM**

The essence of Bangladesh's security paradigm originates from the national core values, i.e. democracy, nationalism, socialism, and secularism. These core values render national aim to realize the democratic process for a socialist society, which is free from exploitation, a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political economic and social rights are secured for all citizens. Following national aim, the national objective is to prosper in freedom and make our full contribution towards international peace and cooperation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind (*Ministry of Law, 2009*). With these, national vision of Bangladesh is to emerge as a regionally and globally influential middle-income country, with a democratic, secular, and inclusive identity, contributing to global peace, progress, and prosperity (*GED, 2015a*). Aspiration of national vision raises the wants and need of the nation i.e. national interest of Bangladesh, which broadly includes:

- Sovereignty, territorial integrity, political and economic independence, and maintenance of identity.
- Strengthening democracy, rule of law and good governance.

- Protecting and projecting national image and identity as a secular, growing democracy.
- Seeking economic emancipation, self-reliance, and social security.
- Management and sharing of scarce national resources.
- Combat the challenges of climate change and its adverse impacts.
- Seeking to consolidate good international relations.
- Playing an active role as a responsible and contributing member of the international community.

## **NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN OF BANGLADESH**

Elements of Bangladesh national security include sovereignty and territorial integrity, socio-political stability, economic prosperity, environmental protection and global peace and stability. As a member of UN, Bangladesh is committed to global peace and security, which provides her diplomatic defence. For Bangladesh, each element of security is manifested with relevant security concern. Geostrategic location and national power of Bangladesh impinges on its territorial security and sovereignty (*Karim, 2006*). Its security mostly defines traditional threats that include both external and internal which challenges the nation state system. External threats posed by state actors while internal threats originate from transnational and internal terrorism including religious extremism. Border security of Bangladesh entails mainly border management, which is concerned with trans-national organised crimes (trafficking-arms, drugs, human, smuggling and money laundering). It also includes existing border disputes concerning demarcation (*Das, 2008*). Illegal migration is a growing concern for Bangladesh and presently the country maintains the largest refugee camp in the world. Maritime boundary delimitation enables Bangladesh to possess huge maritime space, which raises its increased security concern. Rising tension in the Indian Ocean together with global and regional maritime interest in the Bay of Bengal engenders Bangladesh's freedom action in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and maintenance of sea line of communications (SLOC) at all times (*Rahman, 2014*). Security of maritime resources in the EEZ, illegal fishing, sea piracy, trafficking and migration are also growing concern of Bangladesh.

Political culture, governance, law and order and human rights are key constituents of political security in Bangladesh. Here, political intolerance raises social tension besides democratic institutions are yet to mature (*Andaleeb, 2007*). Want of good governance, inadequate enforcement rule of law and weak social capital lags accountability to the state. Ethno-religious aspiration, unequal access to services (justice, education, health, food, and shelter), lack of employment opportunities is major concern for Bangladesh's social security (*Miazi and Islam, 2012*). Other growing social concerns are community security (road accident,



fire hazard, drowning, food adulteration etc.), pandemics, public health hazard, urban migration, cultural invasion and abuse of cyberspace in creating social or individual discontent, as well as in misusing services. Although Bangladesh has seen a delayed appearance of coronavirus with the first identified case on 8th March 2020, by now it has impacted on ready-made garments (RMG), remittances, consumer goods, small business and start-ups including challenges to financial sectors (Amit, 2020). Further, national security is hugely influenced by societal impacts. It mainly involves gender discrimination, violence against women, drug abuse and exploitation of rights of wage earners at home and abroad (*Sehgal, 2011*).

Economic prosperity in Bangladesh can be assessed in terms of the condition of having stable income or other resources to support a standard of living now and in the foreseeable future. Threats to economic security in the context of Bangladesh emanate from both internal and external sources. The internal insecurity comes mainly from massive poverty and the external ones emanate mainly from the process of globalisation, more specifically, from the effects of the global financial crisis out of trade war and recent pandemic (*CPD IRBD 2020 Team, 2020*). Bangladesh is a developing country with inadequate resources. Its resource constraints concern wider gap between demand and supply of water sources (trans-border and inland surface and subsurface), predicted shortfall of energy sources (coal, hydrocarbon, hydropower, gasoline and renewable energy) and unpredicted shortfall of energy resources (*SREDA and Power Division, 2015*). Though Bangladesh is a food sufficient country, with the rise of population and reduction of cultivable land predicted/ unpredicted shortfall of food productivity is a growing concern for food security in Bangladesh. Despite having demographic dividend, insufficient human resource development is a major concern for Bangladesh. Global recession indirectly impacts Bangladesh economy as it mainly affects RMG and overseas remittance. Present meagre domestic investment (DI) together with foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow put constrain in growth of gross domestic product (GDP) (*BIDA, 2019*). There are difficulties related to access to international market due to imposed generalised system of preferences (GSP), tariff and non-tariff barrier. Further Bangladesh lacks in integration with Asian and global value chain. Inflation remains a constant headache for growing economy like Bangladesh. Increased competitive market, inadequate infrastructure, technological incompetency, non-compliance constrains economic growth of Bangladesh. Inadequate protection of consumer's rights and lack of legal expertise in dealing with international financial dispute are also growing concern for Bangladesh economic security (*Huq et al., 2017*).

Bangladesh is among the world's most vulnerable countries to both natural and man-made disasters. Over the last three decades, disasters have killed huge people in Bangladesh and inflicted colossal financial damages. The importance of environmental protection is not only confined to manmade and natural

disasters but also reflected on issues of environmental degradation and sustainability. Bangladesh as a country is characterized by extremely high environmental stress resulting from floods, scarcity of water in dry season, growing urban population density, energy shortages, deforestation, and air pollution (*Hossain, 2011*). Climate change is expected to exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities in Bangladesh, leading to the further depletion of scarce food and water resources, augmenting migration, and increasing the number of internally displaced people. Ecological security concern includes unplanned urbanization, environmental pollution due to poor waste management, natural disaster like cyclone, fold, tidal surge, tsunami, earthquake, drought, flood etc. Deforestation due to population growth and soil erosion and siltation is a regular challenge for ecological balance in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is susceptible to global climate change through sea level rise, increase salinity in river water, changing suitability of soil and crop pattern (*Mahmood, 2012*).

## RECOMMENDATIONS

From a national perspective, Bangladesh's security is contingent on political security, military security, economic security, social security, environmental security, and global peace. Taking these into considerations following recommendations are made:

- The political institutions of Bangladesh need to attain socio-political stability by creating a balanced society that upholds the aspirations of citizens in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality, and justice- political, economic, and social - will be secured for all citizens.
- There should be an integrated approach by civil and military to preserve sovereignty and safeguard territorial integrity by protecting national land, maritime and air spaces, and national cohesion, from threats emanating from within or without, so that the nation can prosper in freedom and interact with the world on the basis of equality and mutual respect.
- To face the challenges out of global economic recession, the financial stakeholders of the country should strive to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth requisite by creating an efficient, robust, resilient, attractive, enabling, and innovative economy.
- Being one of the most environmentally vulnerable countries, government and non-government organisations of Bangladesh can endeavour to develop a healthy and sustainable environment, which is adaptable to climate change, capable to reduce risks and mitigate impacts emanating from disaster.
- Following the principles of foreign policy and as a leading peace keeping member of UN, Bangladesh armed forces should continue to

contribute towards international peace and cooperation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind.

## CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a small state but a large nation. It is worth saving Bangladesh. Since independence, the country is emerging from the least developed country (LDC) to a middle-income country despite global financial crisis, trade war, pandemic, rise of non-state actors, natural and manmade disaster through resilience, innovation, and national will. The geostrategic location of Bangladesh necessitates coercive diplomacy with credible deterrence and cooperation through a balance of power. Bangladesh as an emerging economy owns both huge potential demographic dividend, which needs to be protected and equally enormous challenges within and without, which needs to be addressed timely. The world is changing every day in the sphere of political power play through emergence of new forms of challenges like pandemic, geopolitical alignment, political culture, democracy, economy, and media. To keep pace with these transformations, Bangladesh needs to have an adaptive and integrated security outlook with optimal utilization of national power, multilateral diplomacy with smart power and good governance to secure national interest.

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## RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY: POST-CXIX DILEMMAS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

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**Abstract:** The Covid-19 (CXIX) pandemic is the greatest socio-political tragedy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that has significantly changed the international security discourse. The changes have led to new debates on the depth and breadth of security for the national security institutions. That means the concept of security has undergone different phases in history, from Homo Sapiens to Homo Technologicus, recreating different meanings of national security. This article seeks to examine the concept of ‘security’ through prisms of realist and liberal approaches, international politics, and security. The CXIX or the post-CXIX political landscapes may lead to a fundamental reconceptualization of security, and indeed, the dominant theories and approaches will undergo discursive changes over the period. Therefore, the understanding of the two dominant approaches – realism and liberalism – may allow Bangladeshi or South Asian security thinkers to rethink security through correlative approaches that would include a comprehensive view of what would constitute security and challenges for the state during the post-CXIX World.

**Keywords:** *Artificial Intelligence; bioterrorism; hegemony; neoconservatism; digital diplomacy*

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### INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW SECURITY DISCOURSE

The humankind is witnessing a paradoxical time comprising global economic crisis to ethnic wars, radical innovation, and advancement in disruptive technologies, newfound realpolitik, street revolution, blunt nationalist rhetoric, and the Internet of Things (IoT). The security discourse that we had even five years back has become significantly challenged, bearing the wildly complex developments across the regions. Even a decade is often considered primitive in the domain of technologies and the new phenomenon in geopolitics. The electoral politics in Beijing, London, Moscow, New Delhi, or Washington show that support for protective and protracted nationalism has become the new norms after the three decades of post-Cold war. The World is increasingly



returning to the age of the Cold War in which ideologies and geopolitical priorities are defining national security and global tensions. Robert Kagan labelled the post-2018 years as the era of the strongman (*Kagan, 2019*) where economics, a prime branch of intellectual inquiries that was the key to understanding the last several decades, no longer play the sole role of explaining rationality today (*Zakaria, 2019*). That does not mean that the role of economics has become any lesser, but that other elements such as cognitive behaviour, diverse source of information and misinformation, national security and popular politics have found more substantial ground in the security discourse.

Perhaps, the trends in elections, nationalism, and exposure to virtual and augmented realities are making irrationality as the real invisible hand that drives human decision making (*Ariely, 2009*). Hence, the race for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and predictive analytics have become new norms of scientific advancement for political and security supremacy. The radically different views of how people and organizations operate have further challenged the rational understanding of security for the policymakers and decision-making actors. That means we should be prepared for recurring political, social, ideological, and ecological cataclysms stemming from down-to-top viz individual to the state. These sustained changes have come along with a paradigm shift phenomenon known as the Covid-19 phenomics (hereafter referred to as CXIX). The CXIX pandemic is the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that has fundamentally changed the international security discourse and environment. Perhaps, the virus that originated in Wuhan, China, can well be seen as the World's greatest equalizer that has brought all the nations to cooperate yet renewed tensions and contradictions in hegemonic ambitions based on the politics of human security, surveillance technologies, and biotechnologies (*Khan & Sharma, 2020*). Indeed, we are at a paradoxical time. While CXIX has given the birth to global race for developing a vaccine to shape the nature of human security, parallelly the race to develop AI is gathering momentum. Harari in his well-revered article, titled *Who Will Win the Race for AI?* mentioned, "*the race to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) gathering momentum, and as the United States and China pull ahead, other countries, especially in the developing World, are lagging far behind. If they don't catch up, their economic and political prospects will be grim*" (*Harari, 2019*). In fact, CXIX, for the Bangladeshi, or perhaps the South Asian security thinkers, has compelled to rethink the idea of national security which can no longer be seen through monolithic views of realism or liberalism. The advent of the Internet, or newly emerging concepts such as Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST), or even analytics to predict social and political behaviours in advance, are affecting humans on a much higher level – neural or biological levels. As technology, politics, economics and culture continue to influence human life on an interrelated scale, we should consider the possibility that current patterns, trends, and innovations may affect human evolution generations down the line (*Perkins, 2015*). What it presents then is a clear linear path of transition from Homo Sapiens to Homo Technologicus in

which international politics and national security will be dominated by intelligence marvels.

Henceforth, debates over the meaning, nature, and scope of security and the future of security discourses are the critical streams of politics that must be critically understood by the national security institutions. The emerging and new security landscapes are firmly rooted in three theoretical approaches which include structural realism based on Waltz's rational actor argument which presents both ambiguities in and wider meaning of the idea of '*rational actor*', regional security complex, and neorealist interaction between the individual or human security and international or national security (*Buzan, 2003; Waltz, 2010*). The state-centric social capital approach and the market-centric social capital approach have transcended into a social dilemma leading to security challenges in both the national and societal spheres. This article will examine two predominantly contesting, often contradicting, approaches – realism, and liberalism – rather than the whole spectrum of approaches existing in security and strategic studies discourses. The scope of the paper will remain within the evolving tensions between the state and technologies, and then the state and individuals in which the impacts of new cognitive and intuitive technologies are embedded.

Therefore, changes in thinking about the concept of security may lead to a reconceptualization of realism or liberalism, but perhaps may allow understanding security through technology approaches that would include a comprehensive view of what constitutes security and threat perceptions associated with realist and liberal construction of new geopolitics. Given the evolving security landscapes and its underpinning elements, this article has been designed in three phases to understand the evolution of security. The first phase discusses the evolving nature of security since the earliest time till the cold war, complexities in the post-CXIX concept of security and the emerging new strategic landscape linking the Armed Forces, and then a brief assessment of the future of security. In this process, relying solely on the statist security discourses may lead to strategic mistakes. Therefore, the idea of security, precisely the idea of national security, has become more extensive, and challenging and needs to be seen beyond the confined binary prisms of the existing Western literature and the Eastern ideas. What if the robots and unmanned warfare tools take over first, indeed?

## **THE CHANGE FACTORS: THE EVOLVING NATURE OF SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

The concept of security has expanded and changed over the period which now includes multiple core elements ranging from environmental and health governance to public policy to International Development along with the

traditional approaches to security which provides for national interest, sovereignty, and military preparedness. However, throughout the history of politics, security denoted multiple meanings and different definitions. The concept of security evolved from the ancient military thoughts developed by Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Chanakya among others, and philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The foundation of realism can be found in the works from Sun Tzu to Rousseau in which state and military featured prominently. Carr (1939) articulated security as an output of anarchy and the absence of power to regulate the interactions between states (Carr, 1939).

The realist and the idealist thinkers have presented multiple definitions of security in which human existence has been an inevitable part. However, they differed on the level of influence of the state on an individual. Classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and Huig de Groot identified rational differences in different definitions of security by linking different magnitude of violence, conflict, and peace with the state and human behaviours. The Hobbesian approach undertakes that the World will remain violent in which anarchy will persist, the Kantian approach presents a more optimistic view in which peaceful existence is possible despite violence and conflict in society. The Grotian tradition “views international politics as taking place within an international society” in which “states are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law” (Bull, 1977).

Lasswell (1936) has defined security as “unavoidably political to determine who gets what, when and how in the political world” (Lasswell, 1936). Lippman (1944) defined security as “the capability of a country to protect its core values, both in terms that a state need not sacrifice core values in avoiding war and can maintain them by winning war” (Lippmann, 1944) while Ullman suggested that security is primarily about “decrease in vulnerability” (Ullman, 1983). Walt (1991) sees security as “study of threat, employment, and control of military power” (Walt, 1991) based on the use of force to protect national interest and asset, the behaviour of others, domestic policies and priorities, causes of peace and cooperation, and interdependence between economy and stability. However, Walt warned that while it is possible to include multiple elements, e.g. health and poverty, into the framework of security, such an excessive expansion of definition could potentially result in a disruption in understanding threats and finding solutions arguably complex (Walt, 1991). Henceforth, from Hobbes to Walt, the concept of security largely remained confined in the traditional approaches focusing on state actors and their military capabilities to protect national security and interest. However, Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant introduced ‘perpetual peace’ as the foundation of liberalism.

The post-Cold War period witnessed an expansion in the scope of security accentuated by liberal globalization and rapid technological advancements. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) introduced human security as a new paradigm of security. OCHA defined human

security as “response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2005). Al-Rodhan (2007) identified security as a broader concept that no longer includes states alone, but includes multiple factors such as freedom, human, health, food, environment, national, transnational, and transcultural security (Al-Rodhan, 2007). OCHA identifies that “Human Security complements state security, strengthens human development and enhances human rights” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2005). Hence, human security as a concept aligns with non-traditional views of security in which a rights-based people-freedom approach has replaced the state-interest-based approach. However, human security has its weaknesses since human rights’ universal applicability has long been used as a matter of political preference for the state leaders. One example is the contemporary US-India relationship. President Trump’s muted response to the Indian riots or Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 exposes the extent to which realist priorities now govern the U.S.-Indian relationship. Ayres, in her article titled ‘Democratic Values No Longer Define U.S.-Indian Relations’ mentioned that, “Realists on both sides of the political aisle argue that Washington’s and New Delhi’s interests align in seeking a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, with India’s heft and capabilities necessary for reaching that goal” (Ayres, 2020).

The rise of nationalism, Artificial Intelligence and cyber domain have shifted power to the hands of individuals which, in turn, has substantially challenged the monopoly of power by the state. Fountain (2001) argued that the state is still the leading player in the field, maintaining (although adapting) its role as the supreme provider of security, even in cyberspace (Fountain, 2001). However, Eriksson and Giacomello (2006) argued that “the emergence of ‘virtual states’ and network economies imply a decline of interstate violence, and hence that security generally plays a significantly lesser role than in previous times” (Eriksson & Giacomello, 2006). While cyberspace is seen as a ‘zone of international peace’, the information revolution has significantly increased the relevance of big data and predictive analytics firms, the geopolitics of information as a critical source of tension, technology interest organizations, social movements and street revolutions, transnational networks, networked diaspora and individuals. That has challenged the existing norms and standards of cooperation and international law, and the non-state actors have emerged as both challengers to and providers of security (Nye, 2004a; Nye, 2004b). Nevertheless, whether or not Carr’s realist or Waltz’s neorealist or Nye’s complex interdependence between state and non-state gave structural definitions of security; ‘virtual states’ and network economies will reconceptualize security during the uncertain post-CXIX period.

However, until the end of the Cold War, in International Security (as an academic discipline), the term security has been mostly associated with the theories of international relations. The theoretical discourse has primarily been dominated by the realist perspectives emphasizing national interest, national security, and sovereignty, and by the neoliberals emphasizing on rational and ethical behaviour

of states and institutions. Of course, the positioning of critical theories. i.e. from positivism to post-positivism, cannot be ruled out as key approaches, critical theories differed from epistemological and ontological propositions of realism and liberalism. The idea of national power was associated mainly with realist expansion of economic activities through multiple modes. i.e. trade, territorial presence, political manipulation, regional-sub-regional power equations, and the formation of strategic international alliances leading to hegemony -periphery relations that had intrinsic links with the balance of power. External security was perceived as an amalgamation of sovereignty, national identity, protection of borders, and geostrategic imperatives. At the same time, internal security emphasized on the reduction of violence and crime, often leading to human rights violation and state-centric repression, law enforcement, and political stability.

The period between the end of the Cold War and the CXIX phenomenon focused more on neoliberal approaches to security in which human security featured the most. The neoliberal international order emphasized on the role of integrated and international systems correlating institutionalism which in turn focused on liberal trade, human rights, ethical governance, and environmental security. During these three decades, the race for technological supremacy and the emergence of the Internet as the biggest propaganda machine that the humankind has ever seen accentuated the social development and changes across the regions. This broad spectrum of change led the securitization to comprehend various dimensions between state and individuals (*Waver, 1993*). One key feature has been the link between development and geopolitics in both the developing and the underdeveloped countries. Globalization took a forceful shape through economic and trade interdependence, and the strategic equations were shaped mainly by national power and advancement in science and technologies. For the developed countries, accumulation of wealth and the high politics of human rights and governance are supplemented by double standards in liberal international trade regimes and extraterritorial presence through multinational corporations, arms market, development aid, and media. While the respect for international law varied across the regions, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) witnessed fractures stemming from unilateralism, strategic preferences, or superpower syndromes. The relationship between multilateralism, collective security and global powers has remained ambivalent throughout history too (*Gordon, 2007*).

In 2018, the UN issued 27 condemnations, and 21 of them were against Israel for violating UN norms and resolutions (*TNT World, 2018*). The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been widely debated since the UN members states questioned the legality of such invasion, and the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned: *"I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it [the war] was illegal"* (*UN News, 2004*), explicitly declaring that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal. Regarding the role of the UK armed forces in the 2003 Iraq invasion, the Iraq Inquiry Report, popularly known as the Chilcot Report, identified: *"Military action might have been necessary later, but in*

March 2003, it said, there was no imminent threat from the then Iraq leader Saddam Hussein, the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time and the majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring” (BBC, 2016). In the case of Yemen conflict, backed by the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 (till now), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has accused all the parties involved in the conflict of international human rights violation. A briefing paper published by the Commission claimed: “States, individually and collectively, must take effective measures to put an end to international law violations in Yemen and ensure the accountability of perpetrators” (International Commission of Jurists, 2018). China and Russia persistently vetoed resolutions against Syrian violation of international human rights in the Security Council. In the case of grave violation of international human rights against the Rohingyas in Rakhine, Myanmar, by the Myanmar Armed Forces, the report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar mentioned that “On the basis of the body of information collected, the mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that serious crimes under international law have been committed that warrant criminal investigation and prosecution” (The Human Rights Council, 2018). While the US and its European allies supported the UN findings, Myanmar’s neighbours, i.e. China and India, along with Russia, remained supportive of Myanmar’s causes. These recent examples are the classic cases of misuse or abuse or bypassing of international law or human rights norms.

The trends above demonstrate the continuing importance of the realist approach to security despite the growth of liberal economic interdependence across the regions. The military forces remain as an arbiter of disputes both between, and particularly within, states, as well as the perceived importance of violence by external forces and terrorist groups as a weapon to alter a status quo (Baylis, 2008). The period has also witnessed shifting trajectory of security policies toward pre-emptive action, advancement in new surveillance oriented security technologies (SOSTs), and the growing importance of traditional trade-off between security and liberty which has enabled complex and exhaustive security and legal measures concerning the overall security balance of any given society (Pavone, et al., 2016). The SIPRI report has indicated the return of geopolitical rivalries and the quest for military power between the end of the Cold War and 2019. The global military expenditure stood at USD917 billion, the highest since the end of the Cold War, with 3.6 percent higher spending compared to 2018 and 7.2 percent higher than in 2010 (SIPRI, 2020a). Notably, the military expenditure decreased steadily between 2011 and 2014 following the global financial and economic meltdowns between 2007 and 2009 in which a financial crisis proliferated from the US to the rest of the World through linkages in the global financial systems. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Australia, China, India and Egypt became the top five largest arms importers between 2010 and 2018, and US, Russia, France, Germany, and Spain remained as the top five largest arms exporters (SIPRI, 2020b).

While the global security environment did not witness significant recession in the expansion of Western influence in military decision-making, spheres of influence, ideology, and culture through globalization, China with its Middle Kingdom

syndrome emerged as a counter influence. The non-Western countries are experiencing containment by the West and the Middle Kingdom, through Indo-Pacific strategy, the Chinese-led Belt Road Initiative including maritime silk route, and now the vaccine silk route, leading toward strategic dilemmas. The imbalance in the distribution of the geostrategy benefits, resulting in more considerable gaps between the countries, has made the national boundaries weakened in which extra-regional powers are becoming influencers. The Ladakh crisis of 2020 between China and India, or perhaps the ‘cartographic war’ between India and Nepal, in which Nepal redrew its map by including Indian claimed Lipulekh pass, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura. Indeed, the rise of geo-economics corridors such as the China Pakistan or China Myanmar Economic Corridors is the classic examples of geostrategic imbalances which are shaping the politics of borders and liberalism.

Therefore, the idea of national power and national security has shifted in which the weaker or less developed countries are becoming critical actors. Combining the facts such as military expenditure, politics of territory, and geo-economics; it can be assumed that ‘higher military expenditure’ or ‘wider military power’ does not necessarily mean a higher military capability to define strategic environment or that the larger armed forces would generate a more substantial real-time military effect (*Markowski, et al., 2017*). In this case, the Himalayan and the Bay of Bengal regions have become another critical geopolitical flashpoint making the entire region of Kabul to Rakhine as an arc of instability. The meaning of security here is, therefore, more complex, which presents a dichotomous existence of realist and liberal approaches. The mismatch in state capabilities, human security, and political ambitions has made the region as a geostrategic complex that includes internal threats with growing existential influence of China and the US. While India and Pakistan consider each other as an existential threat, with nuclear technologies as deterrence and source of the arms race, internal challenges from their own populations and ethnic groups loom large. Tandon and Slobodchikoff (2019) identified that “the ethnic groups have been shown to have fewer grievances when faced with external threats, internal relations between ethnic groups show increased tensions when there is little or no existential threat from abroad” (*Tandon & Slobodchikoff, 2019*).

Perhaps, a paper commissioned by the Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) identified that a new wave of technology is driving the geostrategic spheres rapidly in South Asia (*Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016*). Hence, realism and liberal international orders are increasingly the binary views of security. The potential to use the data generated by billions of people connected by mobile devices, backed by unlimited processing power, cloud computing, and access to diverse information, for (in)security has become a significant concern. In the realist context, technological investment and advancement will create both a democratic deficit in which state-individual social contract will be fragile and technology deficit in which national security will remain volatile. For the liberals, technological innovation will lead to a supply-side miracle and help in constituting a global framework in which transportation and communication costs will drop, logistics and global supply

chains will become more productive, and the cost of trade will diminish, all of which will open new markets and drive economic growth (*Schwab, 2016*).

The ICM-IPI paper has recognized that the potential use of ICTs for development, governance, and peace is unlimited. However, the concerns remain with how to govern the Internet, issues related to security and cybersecurity in particular (*Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016*). Moreover, the cyber domain has become more complex as the new warfare technologies such as armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), drones, biotechnologies are entering service. The concept of security has become further challenged as the use of armed drones is not illegal, but there is no legal or regulatory or institutional consensus on how to exercise international law on the use of unmanned technologies. Hence, both realist and liberal approaches tend to be inadequate in explaining this phenomenon. Cyberspace, then, constitutes ethical and normative challenges as state-sponsored cyber hacking is increasing. The cyberspace includes many and varied actors—from criminal hackers to terrorist networks to governments engaged in cyber espionage to disrupt economic and commercial activity and threaten military effectiveness. Moreover, the conflict that takes place in the cyber domain often mirrors conflict in the physical World (*Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016*). Therefore, cyber warfare occupies an ambiguous position in the laws of war and perhaps will set new standards and norms in security governance in future.

Along with cybersecurity, maritime security has emerged as another critical field of security discourse that links the protection of ecosystems, environment, supply routes, and strategic autonomy over maritime resources. There is a widespread discussion that the existing liberal international order in the maritime domain has become precariously competitive by China's rise and the US interests in the Indo-Pacific region – historically which was under the radar of its Pacific Command (PACOM), now Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Halford Mackinder's seminal contribution to classic geopolitics was based upon the transformative effects of railway routes, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China's Maritime Silk Initiative (MSRI) and its sub-branch Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) under Chinese magnum opus called BRI have generated persuasive discourse about transformative effects on the global geopolitical landscape (*Len, 2015*). Chinese projects in the South China Sea and MSRI provoked geopolitical competition in which the US and its allies – Quad states, i.e. Australia, Japan, and India, and the Philippines have become a part of realist geopolitical competition. That means the global energy transport choke points, e.g. Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el-Mandeb, and Suez Canal will continue to remain as subject to security competition.

The lack of international governance in the cyber domain certainly questions the non-realist values as anarchic governance modalities continue to cripple the ethical use of power and a state's capabilities to protect its values and standards from the threat in the present and future. The issue of self-sufficiency and resource nationalism, i.e. energy security, strategic autonomy, against the external threats and volatilities, has long been one of the objectives of a modern state; it has become



reinforced as the prime concern for many states, e.g. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, due to the anarchic nature that is persisting in international governance. The US unilateral withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, has further created a vacuum in international leadership. The West historically relied on US-NATO or EU-US equations for global leadership. However, the vacuum has enabled China to exercise its global vision, known as Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, that asserts Coexist well with nature with *'energy conservation and environmental protection'* policies and *'contribute to global ecological safety'* and Establish a common destiny between Chinese people and other people around the world with a *'peaceful international environment'* (Xinhua, 2018).

The dwindling features of the US foreign policy have perhaps paved the way for new international economic order in which politics of aid and financial governance is taking new shape challenging the Bretton Woods institutions – the flagbearers of international liberalism and liberal multilateralism. The new financial order has further come at the expense of eroding multilateral values in the US foreign policy. Historically, the US foreign policy embraced liberal internationalism that advocated for open markets, open polities and private sector, and multilateral institutions. Drezner *et al.* (2020) argued that the Trump presidency has repeatedly challenged *"the critical pillars of liberal internationalism, from questioning the value of NATO to ending trade agreements to insulting allies"* (Drezner *et al.*, 2020). The Chinese financial initiatives have quickly gained weight among the developing countries during the foreign policy recession in Washington.

The China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, along with its flagship financial institutions such as the US \$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in which India and Bangladesh acted as founding members, the US \$40 billion New Silk Road Fund (NSRF), the US \$50 billion New Development Bank (NDB) and the US \$100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) seek to link developing countries with its BRI strategy (Khan, 2018). These, together with CIDCA, represent Chinese backed new financial institutions that are not part of the existing Western-dominated financial architecture (Khan, 2018). The new financial order has coincided at the time when a supranational institution such as the European Union has been struggling with the rise of nationalism, Russian geopolitical ambitions, and fractured response to the coronavirus and European debt crisis. President Aleksandar Vučić, for example, mentioned, lacking any real support from the EU, that, *"Serbia now turns its eyes to China"* and *"all my personal hopes are focused on China and its president"* (Simić, 2020). Hence, the liberal institutionalism and multilateral guarantee for preserving security have once again faltered.

## REIMAGINING SECURITY: THE CXIX AND THE POST-CXIX WORLD

The rise of new economic and political orders as discussed earlier, came along with extraordinary technological challenges. Technologies are unevenly divided across the region's leading to *'technology divide'* – a new parameter in determining national power and capabilities. The unprecedented changes coincided with another unprecedented event e.g. CXIX. The CXIX has challenged the technological advancement, and extraordinary breakthroughs in medical science prevailed across the World. The death toll has been equally unprecedented, despite advancements, that has shaken the society, health systems, economics, and governments. Perhaps this is a defining moment in history which has presented a noodle bowl full of challenges, uncertainties, countless personal tragedies, social and political traumas, and certainly the core values in social systems. Hence, there has been a sharp rise in demand for realist solutions to manage the immediate impact of the pandemic and its consequences. While democratic systems are slow in responding to the immediate large-scale crises such as pandemics, demand for the quick fix of CXIX has put pressure on the concepts of *'state'* and *'security'*. The current security decisions taken by the states will determine the shape of the world order for the years to come. Woods (2020) argued that *"After COVID-19 there is a risk that the World could be yet more divided, conflictual and nationalistic. But an alternative scenario is within reach. In this scenario, collective action within communities and, where necessary, internationally, will make a more rapid and peaceful exit from the crisis possible"* (Woods, 2020). The social and consumption behaviours are likely to significantly change, leading to toxic politics of nationalism, protectionism, and racial discrimination. Woods further argued, *"some politicians will resort to a discourse combining fear and tribalism. This will exacerbate discrimination at home – as seen in some parts of the United States, China and India – and jingoistic nationalism will also make international cooperation more difficult"* (Woods, 2020).

The liberal multilateralism and supranational institutionalism such as European Union (EU) have exposed its weaknesses too. The EU has faced harsh criticism for its slow response to the pandemic and economic crisis in the Eurozone, reinforcing debates about whether it has a future without policy and political reforms. That means, the concepts of *'collective security'* and *'balance of power'* would require reconceptualization. Perhaps, the Chinese new form of Health Silk Road or the Mask diplomacy will gain new paradigms in security and foreign policy discourses. Escobar (2020) mentioned, *"in a graphic demonstration of soft power, so far China has offered Covid-19-related equipment and medical help to no fewer than 89 nations – and counting"* (Escobar, 2020). This covers not only the developing or least developing countries but also the high-income economies such as Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Serbia, and Poland. *"But Italy, most of all, is a very special case. Most are donations. Some are trade – like millions of masks sold to France (and the US)"* (Escobar, 2020). Hence, the competition for post-CXIX medical supplies,

particularly CXIX vaccines and new antibiotics, will become the key features of global security.

The politics of vaccine, leading to vaccine nationalism versus vaccine multilateralism, has put the countries to capitalize on the politicization of supplies of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). World Health Organization (WHO) attested that *“The vaccine market has very distinct features, which increase the complexity of assessing and understanding pricing and procurement. It is made up of individual markets for individual vaccines or vaccine types, each with their own specificities, particularly on the supply side”* (World Health Organization, 2020). An AB Bernstein report (2020) identified that the monopolistic and oligopolistic nature of vaccine supply and production had created a fragile balance between demand and supply in many individual vaccine markets as *“the industry has consolidated to four big players that account for about 85% of the market — British drug-maker GlaxoSmithKline, French pharmaceutical company Sanofi, and U.S.-based Merck and Pfizer”* (Li, 2020). The report further mentioned that *“for every dollar invested in vaccination in the world’s 94 lowest-income countries, the net return is \$44”*. *“This oligopoly has been built through significant market consolidation driven primarily by the complexities of the manufacturing and supply chain”* (Li, 2020). While the vaccine market is 2-3% of the global pharmaceutical market, there has been spectacular 10-15% rise in demand for vaccines (Kaddar, 2012). The vaccine market has grown six-fold over the past two decades, worth more than \$35 billion in 2020 denoting that the discovery of new viruses and trends in epidemiology (Li, 2020). A report published by the Council on Foreign Relations identified that *“97 percent of all antibiotics in the United States came from China”* (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). As a result, innovation in and demand for vaccines (and antibiotics) will continue to grow. Hence, supply and availability of new vaccines as *‘global good’* for the mass population will remain as a subject to international politics and governance at the national level.

CXIX has allowed the governments to use technologies and mappings in the form of contact tracing, and a huge database of human health profiles has become a subject to public debate. As Harari mentioned, *“many governments and tyrants wanted to do it, but nobody understood biology well enough and nobody had enough computing power and data to hack millions of people. Neither the Gestapo nor the KGB could do it. But soon at least some corporations and governments will be able to systematically hack all the people”* (Harari, 2020). Therefore, the CXIX has added another security dimension related to surveillance. The spread of CXIX has led governments to undertake and implement multiple surveillance measures including contact tracing, geolocation data to track population, health surveillance, lockdowns, social media, media, and online communication to mitigate the risks of spread and misinformation. This has enabled to government control and scrutiny over the privacy of individuals. The latest digital surveillance has further created pressure on the social contract between the state and the citizens leading to potentials for civil discontent and resistance in future. Balancing between measures to track and contain the virus or future pandemics or migration and safeguarding neoliberal modes of privacy and freedom will shape the security discourse in the post-CXIX period.

The genesis of the evolving nature of security, and the uncertain future during the post-CXIX World, the case of Bangladesh Armed Forces can be brought in here. The challenges for Bangladesh's national security will be manifold, including the expanded role of the Armed Forces in providing the surge capacity in medical facilities and personnel in future pandemics and climate infused disasters. That means, a rethinking of what procedures and policies are necessary for military preparedness and readiness to face such disasters would be essential. The Armed Forces will then have to see security from the prism of a multi-layered approach in which national security decision-making has to find common ground for balancing national security, human security, and governance. Geopolitical fault lines and national interest will continuously evolve, which would require constant calibration of defence policies, operational capabilities, and national capacities with international alliances and development. The issues related to 'strategic autonomy' over maritime and cyber domains will continue to press the security and legal discourses, which is intrinsically linked with privacy, freedom, and human rights. That calls for dynamic civil-military relation along with improved capacities to conduct comprehensive defence diplomacy. These two factors are essential in balancing public interest and public aspiration, and global outreach and regional stability. The post-CXIX uncertainty also denotes that the armed forces would require to assess cyber and biological threats, whether weaponized by state or non-state actors, on national and public security. That too will need reforms in regulatory, legal and policy frameworks.

The CXIX has further exposed security paranoia of the state and politics. The institutional structures and the monopoly of power which were once the sole domain of the state or the government, e.g. law, trade and commerce, national security, state ideologies, or micro governance has shifted to uncharted territory and anarchic digital and cyberspaces. This diffusion of power will accelerate the process of an intermingling of technological and social systems while encoding inequities and cleavages therein (*Saran, 2020*). Therefore, two security narratives have emerged: first, the CXIX has demonstrated the necessity for multilateralism and exposed that nationalism, isolationism are doctrines such as Make America Great Again or Make in India or Anti-Islamism will continue to pose threats to civic coexistence. Second, Social media, cyberspace, and globalization will continue to create vulnerabilities to pandemics and transborder terrorist threats. The CXIX lockdowns and stagnant logistics supply systems of life-saving materials require the countries to priorities their national and public interests over collective mitigation of the crisis. That means the populations of conflict-affected countries will likely remain vulnerable to pandemics, financial debts, and civil strife. International crisis management, conflict resolution mechanisms and risks to social and collective orders will require new standards and norms based on the reconceptualized concept of security.

## CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SECURITY FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Irving Kristol saw security as an outcome of neoconservatism which can be guaranteed by republicanism in the forms of bipartisan politics, oligarchy, and even popular sovereignty. He said that a “*neoconservative is a liberal who has been mugged by reality*” (Kristol, 1995). The neoconservative reality is a complex one which propounds the need for liberal supply-side economics as the basis for economic and social growth. Liberalism is perhaps ‘*a sine qua non*’ for the survival of modern democracy, political and moral philosophy, and even religious ideologies (Kristol, 1995). Michael Fuchs added to Kristol’s thoughts by linking CXIX, “*It is time, liberal internationalists must move quickly to define a new order—not least because illiberal forces are already doing the same*” (Fuchs, 2020). Fuchs and the neoconservatives have realized that Liberal institutionalism can perhaps strengthen global security in the post CXIX era for which Washington and its allies must work together to strengthen multilateral institutions such as WHO, UN and the Bretton Woods system. Multilateralism can provide platforms to reduce inequality among countries, and within them, it positively can promote safe migration, global climate agreements, and efforts to ensure stability in the conflict areas. While the pandemic has paved ways for rigid orthodoxies in both political and societal levels, it has also widened the windows of opportunity for political optimism. Fuchs argued, the pandemic may have intensified the U.S.-Chinese rivalry, but it has also driven home the importance of preserving some space for cooperation between great powers (Fuchs, 2020).

The post-CXIX World can well demonstrate an unpredictable nature of security and security threats, new security strategies and frameworks will seek to further control unpredictability through ‘*preventive*’, ‘*pre-emptive*’, and ‘*precarious*’ actions. Even foreign policy is now conducted with the assistance of technology, big data, crowdsourced information, and predictive analytics. Algorithms are being developed for cognitive interceptions for superiority in negotiations and to predict the behaviours of the state leaders and diplomats. Digital diplomacy, use of algorithms to spread narratives, online disinformation and propaganda, and consular affairs are increasingly becoming prominent features in state and foreign affairs. Hence, the use of information technology and data analytics have reduced time in developing diplomatic and military responses. The strategies and frameworks will then continue to significantly rely on the implementation and advancement of new technological gadgets and resources, ranging from nuclear to biometrics, biological to biotechnological, deep packet inspection to unmanned surveillance. The challenge will be in bridging gaps in technological advancement and ethical limitations in science. The technology industry, arms market, and the strong relations between economic and political interests will redefine the concept of security among the public. The national security institutions will continue to face the dilemma between public perception of security and the security of the state. The military and civil security markets have

already created social paranoia and public fear that can be exploited by political forces as well as the radical extremist entities. Hence, the concept of security will require the national security actors to balance between the practice of mass surveillance and pre-emptive technologies and the legal and cultural provisions that guarantee civic rights and freedom.

Interestingly, security is now assessed through the tensions between individual rights and national security imperatives. What remains as unaddressed factors are the complex interdependence between security and technology and between national security and societal security. In each case, security denotes different meanings and priorities. As a result, the national security institutions will require to develop defence policies, foreign policies, human security policies and technology policies corresponding with each other. While the security agenda has expanded, the meaning of security has expanded too. A reductionist concept of security perhaps may encourage neglecting the importance of technologically empowered units such as individuals, families, societies, and media. As this article has discussed the realist and liberal perspectives and its limits in explaining the post-CXIX world system and international politics, one should expect deeper conundrum between national security and supranational security, and hard choice between statist approach to security and human security based on universal values and norms. As such, relying solely on the statist security discourses may lead to strategic mistakes. Therefore, security and security policies need to be reconceptualized, at least for Bangladeshi or South Asian thinkers, to facilitate international and regional security by setting new norms and standards and mutual reinforcement among freedom, innovation, and human security.

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# THE DYNAMICS OF CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL POWER: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

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**Abstract:** This paper attempts to provide policymakers with an overview of cyberspace in support of their national power and national security preparedness. In this regard, it presents foundational issues and the dynamic nature of cyberspace that decision-makers often need to deal with in their policy-making process. It discusses the main building blocks of the topic and analyses how nation-states can effectively utilize cyberpower in cyberspace as an instrument of national power. The paper outlines the critical challenges posed as well as opportunities provided by cyberspace that developing countries can explore to consolidate national power. It finally proposes a set of recommendations with national cyber defensive and offensive protocols for nation-states such as Bangladesh.

**Keywords:** *Cyberspace; cybersecurity; cyberpower; cyber warfare; cyber strategy; national power*

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## INTRODUCTION

The rapid proliferation of computers and the associated technologies in the digital world has brought about fresh opportunities as well as challenges to nation-states. This digital world, although virtual, is increasingly becoming a vital component of the national power structure in the context of conflicts between nation-states. The main communication melting pot in this digital world is called cyberspace – a man-made intangible digital domain. During the early age of our civilization, the main operational domains of conventional warfare were limited only to land and sea. Nations developed their armies and navies only for these two domains (*Kaspersen, 2015, p. 1*). In the Twentieth century, the invention of aircraft and later, space rockets resulted in two more domains, air and space. Today, we have the fifth operational domain, that is, cyberspace – a virtual world of connectivity (*Schreiber, 2015, p. 10*).

Cyberspace exists as a conceptual entity that is based on connectivity to create, store, exchange and manipulate information via autonomous and interconnected

networks using computer technologies. Cyberspace is not a physical place - rather, it is a digital environment governed by networks of computers and telecommunication infrastructures (*Wingfield, 2000, p. 17*). However, rapid technological advancements and innovative ideas are constantly changing and reshaping cyberspace; hence, it is dynamic. The degree of change can be considerable, and it could be dramatic (*Kramer, 2009, p. 2*). These changes introduce opportunities as well as challenges. For example, twenty years ago, wireless communication in public places and households were unimaginable. The introduction of wireless network has elevated cyberspace to a different height in terms of efficiency and convenience. However, it also introduces a new set of threats to cyberspace. The recent invention of quantum computing, which is 100 million times faster than existing computers, is a case in point. While this provides a much higher computing power, hackers can also use the same machine to crack securities in a faster manner, thereby altering the cybersecurity landscape to a considerable extent.

This dynamic nature of cyberspace now demands a reassessment of the established national cyber strategy of many nation-states. This is particularly true for developing nation-states like Bangladesh. To utilize cyberspace as a part of national power, it is a prerequisite for developing nation-states to understand the dynamism of cyberspace, and other related areas such as cybersecurity, cyberpower, cyber warfare, and cyber strategy in the context of modern conflict (*Schreier, 2015, p. 8*). This understanding helps nation-states formulate their national cyber strategy considering the evolving nature of cyberspace. Based on the foregoing context, the objectives of this paper are set to:

- Discuss the main building blocks of cyberspace.
- Explore how and why major players in the global arena are aggressively investing on the cyber front.
- Highlight the challenges and opportunities that cyberspace has brought about, and
- Recommend ways for developing nation-states to explore opportunities and tackle challenges to enhance national security.

With these objectives in view, this paper draws upon existing literature from various fields ranging from conventional battles to modern cyber warfare. The recent advances in computing technologies, the contemporary cybersecurity landscape, different security policy frameworks adopted by key players in the global stage as well as prior experience of the author in the field have significantly contributed to the recommendations made in this paper.

The next section is on the vocabulary encompassing the topic of cyberspace. Then, a review of cyber strategies of some nation-states is provided. Next, the paper outlines major challenges as well as opportunities that developing countries can explore along with a set of recommendations for countries like Bangladesh. The paper then closes with some concluding notes.

## VOCABULARY FOR THE CYBER REALM

Beyond the daily news of cyber incidents, cyber-enabled coordinated assaults on nation-states are real (CSIS, 2020). To tackle such assaults, nation-states should have a good understanding of the full spectrum of the cyber realm such as cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyberpower, cyber warfare, and cyber strategy.

### **Cyberspace**

One can find numerous definitions of cyberspace as there is no officially agreed definition. The metaphor *cyberspace* was probably first popularized in the mid-1980s by Gibson (1984) in his science fiction book *Neuromancer*. Later, in the mid-1990s, people began to use cyberspace and information superhighway interchangeably to refer to the global digital connectivity. These metaphors were chosen deliberately to suggest the usefulness, speed, and the nature of the Internet (Dziewięca, 2014).

Cyberspace is an information superhighway where data move, rest, and are produced (White, 1994, p. 51). Origins and destinations of data are entities such as machines, databases, human users, etc. In cyberspace, humans deploy and use man-made technologies to create effects in other operational environments such as air, land, space, and sea. The national cyberspace of a nation-state consists of government, military, financial, telecommunication, and industrial networks; and it is a part of a global information superhighway.

Cyberspace connects other operational domains because they need to exchange, manipulate, and process vital critical data. Cyberspace provides huge operational effectiveness to other domains in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, speed and convenience. Cyberspace is the only domain in which all tools and tactics of national power such as diplomatic, military, and economic can be concurrently exercised through the manipulation of information (Schreiber, 2015, p. 13). However, this superhighway of digital connectivity is not free from hazards. The most alarming of such hazards is the security issue in cyberspace.

### **Cybersecurity**

Security is a major issue in cyberspace. Nation-states, criminals and even amateurs can attack the flow of information in cyberspace by making data or systems unavailable, destroying data, stealing data, and gaining control of digital entities of others. Every component of cyberspace such as network, computers, devices, software is susceptible to security problems due to deliberate attacks, accidents, or malfunctions of devices. These components have vulnerabilities which attackers exploit to launch attacks using cyber weapons. A cyber weapon used in a cyber-attack is anything that influences, impacts, or changes elements of systems of others.

Modern conventional military forces are increasingly becoming vulnerable to attacks due to excessive dependence on net-centric weaponry, which utilizes software and network to gain competitive advantages in a conflict (Andres et al.,

2014, *cb. 1, p. 5*). This capability relies on open systems that require real-time information updates using cyberspace. For example, fifth-generation multirole combat fighters such as F-35 Lightning II, Chengdu J-20, and Sukhoi Su-57 are open systems, meaning these aircraft depend on connectivity to update and integrate real-time information during combat operations. This dependency makes net-centric modern military arsenals a valuable target for cyber-attacks.

In addition to the weaponry systems, even the logistics, military command, and control systems as well as financial systems heavily rely on cyberspace. To defend malicious activities in these systems, nation-states deploy protection mechanisms. The effectiveness of such defence heavily depends on cyberpower of nation-states. To utilize cyberspace for offensive purposes, nation-states need cyberpower too. In the contemporary world, there is a direct link among cyberspace, cybersecurity and cyberpower. Cyberspace is an operational environment where adequate cyberpower of nation-states could address their cybersecurity issues.

## **Cyberpower**

Cyberpower is the capability of an individual, an organization, or a nation-state using cyberspace to explore advantages effectively and efficiently (*Kuehl, 2009, p. 38*). Cyberpower is a measure of someone's capability of using cyberspace (*Schreier, 2015, p. 14*); that is, it is the degree of ability to control, manipulate and influence cyberspace. Cyberpower can be exercised to take advantages as well as cause disadvantages to others (*Kramer, 2009, p. 48*). The magnitude of cyberpower of a nation-state is determined by (i) its technological advancements in cybersecurity, (ii) adequately skilled manpower in the field, (iii) a robust cyber strategy, and (iv) its degree of dependency on imported technologies.

Cyberpower has some unique characteristics. It is *ubiquitous*, *complementary*, and *stealthy* (*Schreier, 2015, p. 16*). *Ubiquity* refers to its ability to simultaneously generate a strategic effect on other four operational domains; so, cyberpower is pervasive. *Complementarity* means that cyberpower can be exercised as a supporting offensive tool along with other military weaponry systems. Finally, *stealthiness* alludes to the difficulty in identifying actual attackers and their motivation. Besides these three, cyberpower has other properties, namely *speed* and *zero proximity*. With cyberpower, attacks can be launched on opponents at lightning speed. It also enables one to launch an attack at *zero proximity* of targets, from anywhere (*Rattray, 2009, p. 255-256*).

Cyberpower, an indispensable complementary component in modern military conflicts, could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. From an *offensive* perspective, cyberpower provides a nation-state with the necessary capability to exploit vulnerabilities of target systems to launch an attack. The cyber offensive can be used to punish an opponent as well as to gain political objectives (*Janczewski et al., 2007, p. xiv*). Cyberpower used for offensive purposes may have far-reaching political, tactical, and military implications if executed

skillfully. For *defence*, a nation-state utilizes its cyberpower to safeguard its critical digital assets against potential attacks. A nation-state can have cyberspace supremacy over other nations in terms of cyberpower. Cyberspace supremacy is based on the capability of preventing any attempted interference by opponents through detection and mitigation.

In addition to offensive and defensive capabilities, cyberpower can provide a nation-state with improved situational awareness about the theatre of conflict. For example, an *Advanced Battle Management System* (ABMS) based on the Internet-of-Things (IoT) combat concept provides such capabilities (Janes, 2020). Cyberspace superiority is the operational advantage in cyberspace that can be translated into an advantage in cyber warfare.

### **Cyber Warfare**

The definition of cyber warfare is still debatable. In a simple term, cyber warfare is a massively coordinated symmetric or asymmetric digital assault on a nation-state by another state actor(s) to damage critical information infrastructure, as defined by USLegal.com. According to the US Department of Defence (DoD), cyber operations in cyber warfare are the exercises of cyberpower where the main goal is to achieve military objectives or impacts in or through cyberspace (JCS, 2016). As cyber warfare is becoming more real, many nation-states are actively arming themselves with cyberpower for potential cyber conflicts. An alarming number of nation-states are aggressively investing more intellectual and financial capitals in cyberspace (Robinson et al., 2013, p. ix).

Cyber warfare is an integral part of cybersecurity. Cyberspace can be the virtual battlefield of cyber warfare. Cyberpower enables a nation-state to unleash its cyber weapons using cyberspace on others in cyber warfare. We can see that cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyberpower are the central concepts in cyber warfare. However, there is a difference between cyber war and cyber warfare. Cyber war is a conflict entirely fought through digital means, whereas cyber warfare is the utilization of cyberpower to achieve a political gain against an opponent.


In cyber warfare, the attacking nation-state needs technological advances for an offensive, whereas the defending nation-state requires robust protection mechanisms to mitigate threats to its critical systems. In other words, the attacking nation-state needs technological advances and skill in launching cyber-attacks (Coughlan, 2003, p. 2). The defending nation-state requires cybersecurity skill in managing and protecting its critical information and digital infrastructure. One of the goals of cyber warfare is to create uncertainty and doubt in the minds of military commanders and political leaders to slow the decision-making process of the opponent, thereby increasing the chances of errors (Schreier, 2015, p. 25). Misleading an opposing nation is always a part of conventional warfare; cyber-attacks can exactly achieve this. However, cybersecurity incidents are not always considered cyber warfare unless these are associated with political purposes.

The success of cyber warfare mostly depends on two things: *means* and *vulnerability* (Lewis & Timlin, 2011). The trained workforce and required computing tools are the *means* that can be utilized for offensive as well as defensive objectives in cyber warfare. The *vulnerability* is the weakness of the opponent's system that can be exploited. Given the potentially damaging impacts of cyber warfare, at present, there is no international treaty or pact in place to police these (McConnell, 2017). Therefore, every nation-state needs to have its cyber strategy on how to acquire cyberpower and how to utilize it wisely for their national security.

## Cyber Strategy

A cyber strategy is a national policy that actively governs the development, deployment and exercising of cyberpower in cyberspace, and prepares a nation-state for cyber warfare to achieve national strategic objectives. It binds cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyberpower and cyber warfare with the strategic goals of a nation-state. Cyber strategy embodies a set of fundamental principles and beliefs by which a nation-state guides its operations in cyberspace to support its national security objectives. To formulate a cyber strategy, policymakers can use the traditional military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that their military has been using for a long time (Andress et al., 2014, p. 70).

Usually, cyber strategy is defined under the umbrella of national security policy. Once developed, the cyber strategy needs to be validated by analyzing three properties of any military strategy: *ends*, *ways* and *means* (Lykke, 1989, p. 3). *Ends* define the objectives or goals in cyberspace, for example, intercepting enemy's command and control messages. *Ways* formulate how the cyber strategy is to be implemented; and *means* spell out the required resources such as manpower, equipment, technology to execute the strategy. Cyberpower without any specific cyber strategy means that it merely exists without any specific purpose.



**Figure 1:** A Framework connecting cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyber power, cyber warfare, and cyber strategy.

Based on the preceding discussion, we can formulate a conceptual framework that connects cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyberpower, cyber warfare and cyber strategy, as shown in Figure 1. According to this framework, cyberspace is a digital operational environment where nation-states, individuals and organizations can exercise cyberpower governed by their cyber strategy, to control, influence and participate in cyber warfare, which is a part of cybersecurity.



## CYBER STRATEGIES OF SOME NATION-STATES

Some nation-states continue investing huge resources not only for cyber defences, but also for cyber offences. It was reported in 2016 that the US, the UK, Russia, Israel, and China were believed to be the cyber superpowers because they had acquired significant cyberpower. In a rare acknowledgement, the US announced that its military *Cyber Command* can mount effective cyber-attacks against its opponents at any time (Breene, 2016).

The *Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare: Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and Organization* is a useful compendium for various cyber doctrines and strategies (UNIDIR, 2011). The report compiled cyber policies of 133 nation-states and pointed out that a total of 33 nation-states included cyber warfare in their national security strategies, and another 36 nation-states did not have any public discussion about cyberspace and security. A similar research sponsored by Sweden was conducted on the cyber-security strategies of ten countries (Robinson et al., 2013, p. x). At this stage, we are going to have a quick look at the key aspects of cyber strategies of four nation-states, namely France, the USA, China, and the Russian Federation.

### **The Cyber Strategy of France**

On January 18, 2019, France unveiled its cyber strategy, consisting of a *defensive cyber policy* and a partially unclassified *offensive doctrine*. This strategy confirms that the French approach to cyberspace demonstrates a separation between offensive and defensive cyber operations. Its defensive strategy is limited to reacting to and attributing attacks on its systems and data. The offensive strategy is based on stealthy operations targeting the enemy's cyberspace. The offensive strategy seems to emphasize pre-emptive neutralization of enemy's systems (Laudrain, 2019).

France has made it clear that it will launch offensive operations on its opponents if necessary. The French offensive doctrine places great emphasis on the principle of risk balancing against the possibility of an escalation in an asymmetric conflict, or the risk of collateral damage on civilian infrastructures (Laudrain, 2019). The main factors for choosing such an offensive doctrine are probably driven by relatively low operating cost, zero proximity and stealthy characteristics of cyberpower in cyberspace along with its technological advancements and capability.

### **The Cyber Strategy of the United States**

The US cyber strategy includes the *Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative* (CNCI), *National Cyber Incident Response Plan* (NCIRP), *Homeland Security/Presidential Directives* (HSPDs) and *National Institute of Science and Technology* (NIST). This strategy focuses on creating and sharing situational awareness of network vulnerabilities and threats and deploying protection mechanisms against the identified vulnerabilities and threats. These defensive objectives were adopted due to weaknesses of the US digital infrastructure.

In 2018, the US Senate Intelligence Committee pointed out that the US was unprepared for cyber espionage and cyber warfare. It was also acknowledged that the opponents of the US were working with a different playbook, and the US failed to put together a comprehensive cyberspace policy (Fisb, 2018). The main reasons for such unpreparedness include out-dated cyber strategies of the US, a large number of its private cyberspace, the existence of several nation-states and non nation-state actors, the low-cost entry by other nation-states into cyberspace, and continued difficulty in attributing the source of cyber-attacks (Weber, 2018).

Considering these weaknesses, later in 2018, the US Department of Defense (DoD) reviewed its cyber doctrine. Since then, the US *Cyber Command* has been taking a more aggressive approach by getting into the enemy's national cyberspace. The offensive principle is based on the notion of persistent engagement so that the opponent never rests (Pomerleau, 2018). This line of offensive thinking is pretty much close to the approach taken by France discussed earlier. Both France and the US have acknowledged that offensive cyber operations are not ruled out in conflicts (Taillat, 2019). However, the DoD always acknowledges the reality that it is impossible to maintain permanent global cyberspace superiority due to the dynamic characteristics of cyberspace. Unlike the French approach, the US cyber strategy integrates offensive and defensive cyberspace operations.

### **The Cyber Strategy of China and the Russian Federation**

In contrast to the openness of the US and French cyber strategies, it is virtually impossible to locate details about cyber strategies of China. In 1999, Chinese strategists prepared a document called *Unrestricted Warfare*, which discussed some insightful thoughts about the value of network warfare (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999). This policy document suggests that China is more aggressive in utilizing cyberspace due to its large skilled manpower. Many suspect that China officially and unofficially maintains many skilled cyber hacker groups or cyber warriors. In a time of cyber conflicts, these could serve as a reserve militia and engage in cyber warfare. Patronizing cyber warriors by China would be a part of cyberpower.

In the case of the Russian Federation, its cyber strategy hints at the fact that they are in an 'information war' with the Western nations (McConnell, 2017). Russia does not use the term cyber security, instead, they only talk about information security, which makes it challenging to reach cybersecurity agreements with other nation-states. The Russian Federation has adopted several high-level information security strategy documents in the national and international contexts. However, information about the adopted strategy and policy is not publicly available (Lewis & Timlin, 2011; Robinson et al., 2013).

### **Reasons for Investing in Cyberpower**

The cyber strategies of four major countries discussed in the foregoing section suggest that the key players in global power politics have taken cyberspace quite seriously. They have aimed to utilize cyberspace as much as possible as a part of

their national security framework. Interestingly, many such nation-states have adopted cyber offensive along with defensive measures as their national security policy. A deeper analysis of various cyber strategies of different nation-states suggests that specific reasons have driven these nation-states to adopt their aggressive cyber strategy. Some of these reasons are outlined below:

- Firstly, nation-states have realized that they may experience cyber-attacks of varying scales today or tomorrow. To address such potential threats, they have kept their pre-emptive options open for cyber offensive on their suspected opponents.
- Secondly, one of the main reasons for adopting offensive strategy is a lack of international act or treaty to prevent, deter, or even stop cyber warfare. In cyber conflict, the involved nation-states had to handle this with their available means without being policed by any international organization like the United Nations.
- Thirdly, these nation-states find cyber-attacks on other nation-states mostly covert, meaning the attacking nation-states could not be attributed. The ability of the attacking nation-state to hide its identity makes cyber offensive more attractive. This characteristic of cyberpower makes it difficult for the defending nation-state to determine how, when, and where to retaliate and respond (*Weber, 2018*).
- Fourthly, to wage cyber warfare on a nation-state, the attacking nation-state does not need to be at closed proximity of the victim state. Cyberspace has removed the distance, time, and space between opponents regardless of their actual physical proximity. This capability is attractive to many.
- Fifthly, obtaining and maintaining cyberpower is less costly compared to advantages gained in terms of offensive as well as defensive capabilities.
- Finally, cyber offensive is easier than defence in cyberspace. Cyber conflict favors the attacker; cyber-attacks may inflict massive systems-level destruction on a society-wide scale (*Schreier, 2015, p. 104*).

These nation-states are fully exploiting the opportunities that are available in cyberspace. They are leveraging and transforming the opportunities in full into their national power.

## **CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPING NATION-STATES**

No nation-state can afford inaction in the digital era these days. A militarily strong nation-state cannot easily underestimate a militarily weaker opponent with considerable cyberpower. However, developing countries usually face some

common challenges in formulating their cyber strategy; these are outlined here:

- *Lack of clear vision of cyber affairs at the national level.* Most developing nation-states do not have any cohesive national policy regarding cyberspace and cyber preparedness.
- *Heavy reliance on imported hardware and software.* A considerable number of nation-states depend on imported computing technologies, which are used in their critical entities such as defence, financial and government organizations. This dependency is a serious threat to their national security.
- *Inadequate budget allocation for cyber operations.* Governments are reluctant to grant adequate funds to relevant organizations for cyber issues due to a lack of understanding of cybersecurity seriousness at the national level.
- *Absence of an appropriate national structure to deal with cyber warfare.* Many nation-states do not have any national level institute that could govern cyber issues at the highest national level.
- *Absence of persistent cybersecurity culture within government bodies.* Most developing nation-states do not have a regular threat monitoring policy on their critical infrastructure such as banks, telecommunication networks, government organizations, and energy sectors.
- *Perceived resistance to change and reassessment of national security issues in light of the new reality.* Governments of developing nation-states seem reluctant to initiate any drastic change to the existing policy and government apparatus.
- *Difficulty in adopting rapidly changing technologies in a timely manner.* Most of these nation-states spend considerable amount of time in making decisions on technology transfer and adoption of new technologies.
- *Lack of research and development initiatives for home-grown digital products.* Research and development is virtually non-existent in most developing nation-states.
- *Lack of efforts to tap into expertise available in the nation-state.* Many developing nation-states already have a sizeable segment of their population who are skilled in computing and cybersecurity. These nation-states do not have any policy in place to tap into these ingenious talents.

Despite these challenges, cyberspace also offers opportunities for developing countries as well.

- *Acquiring cyberpower can be relatively less costly than conventional military weaponry systems.* The entry into cyberspace is relatively cheap because inexpensive dual use computing technologies enable nation-states to utilize cyberspace. For example, a low-cost laptop used for daily routine

tasks can be used to launch an attack on an opponent in cyberspace.

- *Developing skilled manpower* is a common challenge for developing nation-states. Proper training and motivation could make a large portion of population skilled in cyberspace and in cybersecurity.
- *Identifying talents in computing technology*, especially in programming and networking, could boost the cyber capability of nation-states. Most developing countries have a treasure of such untapped talented manpower.
- *Developing home-grown technology* could provide much better defence. The ingenious technology invented by local talents could be used to exploit vulnerabilities of other countries to gain supremacy and influence over their rivals. A right policy could initiate this most important ingredient of cyberpower.

### **Need for a Cyber Strategy**

It is evident from the preceding analysis that no nation states can afford to be lagged when it comes to take advantages of the cyber world. However, the question remains: how should developing countries like Bangladesh move forward? The immediate step would be to develop and follow a comprehensive *cyber strategy* that defines a national security goal including the major milestones with specific timeframe required to reach the goal by leveraging the perceived opportunities to gain cyberpower. The milestones are intended to address the challenges posed to the nation-state. Examples of milestones in the strategy could include the following:

- Formulation of a set of principles that serve the interests of the nation-state best. These could be based on the TTPs of the nation-state.
- Establishment of a *robust governing regime* with adequate power and skill to manage cyber affairs.
- Plan for a systematic approach to *building national capacity* in cyber security by identifying and training talented personnel in the nation-state.
- Creation of *mass awareness* about cybersecurity at the national level.
- Development of *home-grown innovative* digital technologies.

These are the keys in a cyber strategy to achieve sufficient cyber strength that can boost national power. The reasons behind the massive cyber-armament of some key nation-states discussed earlier are also worth considering. Those nation-states are actively seeking to further acquire and consolidate cyberpower to utilise fully the advantages offered in cyberspace. Similarly, developing nations can learn from their experience. Despite some challenges, developing countries such as Bangladesh can leverage the opportunities that are already available to them to explore.

### **Protocols for Cyber Operations**

Considering the challenges, opportunities coupled with the identified reasons for key nation-states arming themselves with cyberpower, this section frames some

specific recommendations at the operation level for senior military tacticians, planners, and political leaders of developing nation-states like Bangladesh to go forward. Two distinct generic protocols are recommended here; one for offensive, and the other for defensive operations. Either of the two pyramid-shaped protocols embodies ten specific steps in sequential order, grouped into four successive stages: *Plan*, *Operations*, *Resources*, and *Innovation*. See Figures 2 and 3.

- *Plan*: The first four steps in this stage spell out the preparation for the cyber actions defined in the next stage.
- *Operations*: This stage includes three steps dictating what to be executed.
- *Resources*: This involves two steps relating to cyber capacity building.
- *Innovations*. This stage deals with the innovative aspects of cyber technology, that is, the relentless effort to develop home-grown independent cyber weapons and defensive technologies to support *zero trust* principle, which means that no foreign-made or supplied digital products such as computers, programs, network devices and smart-phones should be trusted.

All these steps are governed and executed by the principles defined in the national cyber strategy. We now briefly outline the two protocols.

### ***Cyber Defensive Protocol***

This proposed protocol is intended to be used for defensive purposes. It has ten steps, as depicted in Figure 2.

- 1) *Identify critical assets*: This step involves identifying three types of critical assets of a nation: (i) *Critical systems* such as computers and servers; (ii) *Critical networks* such as sensitive national intra-organizational network topology and corporate network layout; and (iii) *Critical data* such as sensitive information and authentication data.
- 2) *Assess vulnerabilities and threats*: Conduct monitoring and testing of the identified critical assets using practices such as ethical hacking, intrusion detection, penetration testing and vulnerability analysis.
- 3) *Deploy protection mechanisms*: Deploy protection mechanisms such as defence-in-depth, intrusion prevention, appropriate access control regime and intelligent firewall to mitigate threats identified in the critical assets.
- 4) *Monitor critical assets*: Assess the impact and effectiveness of the deployed defensive measures to mitigate identified threats.
- 5) *Implement disaster recovery*: It is essential to have a disaster recovery plan if attacked. The recovery plan should dictate the resources that need to be deployed in the aftermath of an attack.



**Figure 2:** *Cyber Defence Protocol*

- 6) *Deploy built-in redundancy:* To be a resilient nation-state, the identified critical assets should be supported with cutting-edge technologies like self-healing capabilities, built-in redundancies, and autonomic computing.
- 7) *Install early warning system:* These systems are essential because once a system is attacked, other systems or other parts of the system are automatically alerted by early warning systems.
- 8) *Train cyber personnel:* A nation-state may already have a sizeable, trained cybersecurity workforce serving in government and non-government organizations or as self-employed or free-lancers. They need to be included in a national cybersecurity resource ledger. Once the nation-state is at cyber warfare, these people can be sought for technical assistance. Covertly patronizing cyber warrior groups could also be an option.
- 9) *Launch awareness program:* During a cyber conflict, a nation-state needs support from its population to enhance its defensive efforts. The population could only contribute if they have elementary knowledge of cybersecurity. Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) on cybersecurity could be offered to the population free of charge. Regardless of age or educational background, every citizen should avail himself or herself of these online short courses. This results in a cyber security-aware nation.
- 10) *Research and development:* A nation-state should have a cyber R & D wing at the national level to innovate home-grown ingenious cyber defensive technologies. This supports the *Zero Trust* objective. Most hardware, software and control systems used these days by developing nation-states are manufactured by others. This makes developing countries too vulnerable due to possible hidden malware-spyware in those products.

### ***Cyber Offensive Protocol***

The cyber offensive protocol, as shown in Figure 3, also includes ten steps that are self-explanatory.

- 1) *Identify target assets*: This step selects the target system(s) of the opponent and finds rationale for selecting those targets.
- 2) *Find out vulnerability*: To launch attack, it is necessary to find out vulnerabilities of the target systems.
- 3) *Devise offensive protocol*: It includes selecting the timing of the attack, evaluating the current political environment, mode of attack, etc.



***Figure 3: Cyber Offensive Protocol.***

- 4) *Estimate impact*: It is quite vital to estimate and assess expected damage on the target system, anticipated reactions, and collateral damages.
- 5) *Select cyber weapon*: The choice of cyber weapon is to be made in this step along with reasonable justifications for the selected weapons.
- 6) *Execute operation*: This step fires the cyber weapon on the target system.
- 7) *Quantify impact*: Gather information about the post-attack scenario and the impact of the attack.
- 8) *Train cyber personnel*: The step is identical to that we have already discussed in relation to the defence protocol.
- 9) *Increase reconnaissance capability*: It involves activities such as capacity building for cyber espionage, reconnaissance, and surveillance on the enemy's digital systems.
- 10) *Research and development*: This step involve researching, innovating and developing home-grown niche technologies for advanced *offensive* operations based on the principle of *Zero Trust*.



## Governing Cyber Affairs

Management of cyber affairs requires a thoughtful approach. Different nation-states have taken different approaches and management models of response to cyber warfare at the national level. For example, in some nation-states, the police department is responsible for dealing with cybercrime; national security agencies look after cyber espionage and surveillance activities; an inter-departmental committee tackles issues related to cyber warfare (Robinson et al., 2013). The task of formulating a national cyber strategy is usually allocated to a national coordinating authority composed of military and non-military government agencies. In some cases, newly created offices, and in others, the existing departments are assigned the cyberspace affairs. All these vary from nation to nation. There is no uniform structure followed by nation-states.

For example, the US has the *National Cyber Security Division* under the Department of Homeland Security, and *Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)* is under the Department of Defense. France has created *Strategic Commission for the Defense of National Information Systems* under the Ministry for Homeland Security and the National Agency for Information System Security. Germany has formed the *National Cyber Response Centre* under the Federal Office for Information Security and the National Cyber Security Council.

## CONCLUSION

The paper has discussed the dynamic nature of cyberspace and the major building blocks related to cyberspace along with some case studies of cyber strategies. It has also pointed out possible reasons why some nation-states have invested aggressively for cyber offensive operations. The paper has identified major challenges and opportunities that developing nation-states could explore. It has finally tabled a set of recommendations for developing countries to consider on how to obtain cyberpower by leveraging opportunities and addressing challenges.

Rapid technological innovations and operational creativity have transformed cyberspace into an influential phenomenon of the national power structure of nation-states. Denying this reality by a nation-state may result in not-so-good consequences. We have seen in this paper a global cyber arms race among some nation-states. Cyberspace is not technically flawless, many security vulnerabilities plague cyberspace. These are difficult challenges. The emergence of cyberspace not only raises challenges but also provides opportunities for developing nation-states. Developing nations can aim to utilize this dynamic space and tackle the challenges for national interests.

Cyberspace has several intrinsic properties suggesting its evolution in the future may differ considerably from its current state. Decision-makers are therefore advised to formulate cyber strategies for a dynamic context. This approach requires developing a cyber strategy that is sufficiently flexible to adapt to changes

in the future. The power of human invention of technologies ultimately influences the dynamism of cyberspace.

We can postulate that any future conflict between nation-states will likely use cyberspace as a part of their theatre of conflict. In this context, developing nation-states cannot afford to opt out of national cyber preparedness by underestimating the notion that cyberspace can be used as a theatre of conflict. Nation-states need practical-oriented cyber strategy aligned with their national security priority, policies, and interests. The ultimate objective of developing nation-states is to formulate their cyber doctrine – a comprehensive manual that guides their cyber affairs.

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## NEED BASED SKILLED HUMAN RESOURCES FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

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**Abstract:** The Government of Bangladesh had been promoting overseas employment to the Middle East and other developed countries since the 1970s. The trend is still on the rise, but unfortunately most of its overseas workers are unskilled or less skilled migrants who remain vulnerable to job termination, low wage, and demeaning working environment. Nevertheless, there are enormous employment opportunities for the skilled human resources (HR). To maintain the momentum of migration and remittance earning, Bangladesh must identify skills needed to prepare its HR accordingly. Thus, the main purpose of the study is to determine required skills to prepare need based skilled HR in Bangladesh for overseas employment. The paper has been constructed with the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. A stratified sampling technique was used to collect quantitative data from Bangladeshi expatriates ( $n = 102$ ) through convenience and judgemental techniques via pre-coded survey opinions in the Likert's scale and qualitative data were collected through FGD and KII. Secondary information was collected from books, journals, reports, and relevant websites. The research hypothesis- 'the more need based skilled human resources, the more there will be overseas employment opportunities' was analysed and tested using SPSS software. The study found that there is a direct relationship and effect of need based skilled HR on overseas employment ( $\beta = 0.569$ ). The study also found the most significant causes which are, a mismatch between training provided and skills requirement in the job market, obsolete training discourses and lack of proper education of the expatriates. The research suggests developing infrastructures to impart market-oriented training on communication and analytical skills, interpersonal behavioural skills, legal knowledge, hygiene, and sanitation practices, learning to learn, and proficiency in life skills and so on.

**Keywords:** *Overseas employment, Need based skilled HR, Overseas workers, Skilled human resources, Education, Technology*

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## INTRODUCTION

### Background of the Study

Bangladesh is the domain of 50 million youngsters aged between 15 and 29 accounting for 30% of the 163 million population with 11% youths unemployed (Mostafiz, 2018). The country is facing the scourge of 4.2% unemployment accounting to 2.6 million which further rises to 13.8 million if underemployment<sup>1</sup> is added to unemployment (Molla & Habib, 2017; Byron & Alamgir, 2019). On the contrary, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) reports (Staff Correspondent, 2020) over 0.16 million foreign workers mostly from India (41%) followed by China, Japan, South Korea and Malaysia siphon off 3.1 billion USD through employment in the high skilled technical and managerial appointments in sectors like apparel, chemical, pharmaceutical and other export oriented manufacturing industries (Staff Correspondent, 2020). People are forced into underemployment as the number of workers is more than the vacancies. Besides, mismatch between skills demand and skills supplied by the educational and technical training system is one of the prime causes of unemployment and underemployment. Unemployment incites frustration and leads to deviant habits like drug addiction and other anti-social behaviours.

Sensing the urgency, the Bangladesh Government started promoting overseas employment since the 1970s. The trend is still on the rise, presently Bangladesh stands as the sixth largest migrants' origin countries in the world (The Business Standard, 2019). 9.5 million Bangladeshi migrants' remits over 18 billion USD from 160 countries (BMET, 2020) which is the second highest contributor to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after apparel sector. There are further opportunities to increase the remittance inflow, if one takes lessons from the case of Philippines as an example. Only 5.2 million Philippines skilled HR remit over 34 billion USD (The Business Standard, 2019). The secret to Philippines's success is the need-based employability<sup>2</sup> skills such as continuous learning habit, self-awareness, initiative, image, and interpersonal skills (Torres, 2014). On the contrary, in Bangladesh, universities and specialist institutes do not update curriculum and continue to conduct age old traditional theoretical courses without realizing skills demand of the 4.0 Industrial Revolution (IR) (KII). Besides, its technical training system is not technology-based. Due to this fact, almost 75% KSA employers have no confidence on the skill training system. Thus, Bangladeshi workers are employed in the low priority indecent jobs like construction workers, tea boy, etcetera with low wage and compensation package (City and Guilds & IOM, 2017). Further, Bangladeshi migrants are vulnerable to severe exploitation posed by unscrupulous recruiting agencies, middlemen and employers.

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<sup>1</sup> Underemployment may be defined as insufficient opportunity regarding use of education, knowledge, skills, and time.

<sup>2</sup> Employability skills are the skills those help get employment.

The situation is so precarious that it cannot be allowed to continue any further. Advent of 4.0 IR replacing man with machines, threats of new entrants, global economic contraction, and image crisis pose serious threats to overseas employment and remittance earning of Bangladesh. Nonetheless, emerging opportunities are also knocking. If a huge unemployed population could be given need-based training, challenges would turn into opportunities as developed countries need skilled HR to keep their economic wheel rolling. In this backdrop, this research intends to ascertain skills needed to prepare need based skilled HR in Bangladesh for overseas employment.

### **Rationale of the Study**

Overseas employment has been a prime contributor to keep the unemployment rate stable for a long time. The remittance contributes 5.5% in the national GDP (Hussain, 2020). But unfortunately, the sector is not immune from challenges of new entrants, job cut, and job losses etcetera. Additionally, most of the Bangladeshi migrants are unskilled or semiskilled who are highly vulnerable to termination due to rapid growth of technology, digitalization, and automation. Bangladeshi migrants are also exposed to exploitation due to illiteracy and lack of essential soft and hard skills. Hence, it is significant to ascertain skills needed to prepare need based skilled HR for overseas employment and remittance earning.

### **Research Questions**

- What are the skills needed for most promising overseas employment?
- What is the skills gap of Bangladeshi migrants?
- What skills training need to be imparted to prepare need based skilled HR for overseas employment?

### **Hypothesis**

- ***H A1.*** The more the number of need-based skilled HR, the more there will be opportunities for overseas employment.
- ***H O1.*** More number of need-based skilled HR will not create opportunities for overseas employment.
- ***Independent Variable.*** Need based skilled HR
- ***Dependent Variable.*** Overseas employment

### **Research Objectives**

- ***Broad Objectives:*** The broad objective of the research is to ascertain training needs to prepare need based skilled HR in Bangladesh for overseas employment.
- ***Specific Objectives.***
  - To ascertain skills needed for overseas employment.
  - To analyse skills gap of Bangladeshi migrants and challenges ahead.
  - To determine training needs to prepare need based skilled HR for overseas employment.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Islam (*Islam, 2012*) states, Bangladeshi migrants are classified as professionals, skilled, semi-skilled, and less skilled. The professional group consists of doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers, ICT specialists, and pharmacists, etcetera. Drivers, cooks, plumbers, masons, electricians, tailors, etcetera professionals fall within the category of skilled HR. Domestic aid, gardeners, farmers, etcetera category are grouped as semi-skilled HR. Construction workers, field workers etcetera category fall within less-skilled or unskilled category. Unskilled manpower is officially called as less-skilled in Bangladesh. (*The Business Standard, 2019*)

Bhuyan (*Bhuyan, 2019*) points out that, there is a gradual shift of manpower requirement from unskilled labours to skilled HR. Hence, there is a resolve to transform employees into skilled HR. Skilled HR enjoy more employment opportunities and higher wages. World Bank (*World Bank, 2018, pp. 28-33*) report highlights, high income destination countries depend on foreign workers to create and sustain many of their industries including knowledge creation centres. In 1990, 27% of world migrants had tertiary education which rose to 50% in 2010 accounting for 43 million migrants. The top 10 world destination countries account for 75% high skilled migrants and the USA alone is the home to two third of all high skilled migrants (*World Bank, 2018, p. 31*). Better employment opportunities, higher wage and salary structure, freedom, provision of permanent settlement and citizenship attract most of the skilled HR for migration to developed countries. Besides, high skilled migrants can easily overcome physical distances, linguistic differences, and policy barriers.

According to Wilson (*Wilson, 2012, p. 124*), the Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong in 1997 emphasized on providing the young with the core knowledge and core skills, and the habit of learning that enable them to learn continuously throughout their lives. According to Torres (*Torres, 2014*), discipline-based knowledge for a job is no longer relevant as the knowledge will be outdated as new technology emerges. But the habit of continuous learning will keep people abreast with the latest innovation and prepare them suited for any job.

Rosenberg (*Rosenberg, 2019*) reports citing Population Reference Bureau presented that at least 20 countries<sup>3</sup> of the world are facing negative or zero population growth rate. These countries welcome foreign migrants to compensate shortage of manpower. Zaman states (*Aminuzgamman, 2007, pp. 5-20*), people above 80 years of age are increasing in some developed countries<sup>4</sup>. These aged people stay alone at home and they need constant support from professional

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<sup>3</sup> Countries like Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Moldova, Croatia, Germany, C' Republic, and Japan are facing negative growth rate of population (Rosenberg, 2019).

<sup>4</sup>Countries like Canada, USA, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have a greater number of aged population (*Aminuzgamman, 2007*).



care givers. As a whole, there are huge opportunities for skilled HR in the developed countries. Hence, all efforts must be directed to training HR on need-based skills.

Hossain<sup>5</sup> states, as reported by Quayyum (*Quayyum, 2019*), almost 60% of Bangladeshi population are of working age and 35% of them consists of the youth. Only 1.07% of those 35% possess skill development training and even these 1.07% are not properly skilled. Hence, Bangladeshi workers are often denied desired employment and due wages without proper certification. Wilson states citing Obama<sup>6</sup> (*Wilson, 2012, p. 124*), the most valuable skills which can be sold is knowledge, 'a good education is no longer just a pathway to opportunity - it is a prerequisite. The countries that out teach us today will out compete us tomorrow'.

Hoque (*Hoque, 2019*) states, rural economy, living standard, and purchasing power of the common people are growing due to inflow of remittance. There are more employment opportunities for need based skilled HR. Bangladesh also has vast number of unemployed graduates who are not qualified enough with need-based skills. Tourists-dependent economies like Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Indonesia demand hotel management experts. Japan welcomes professionals from Bangladesh. Therefore, need based skill training should be imparted to the potential aspirants to exploit emerging employment opportunities.

### **Research Gap**

There are plenty of research works on overseas employment, migration, skill training, remittance, and contribution of remittance to GDP. A substantial amount of literature is also available on skill training infrastructure, impacts of remittance, and difficulties faced by Bangladeshi migrants. Most of the research has been done in isolation by different writers, organizations, and departments. Very few writers made a comprehensive focus linking entire gamut to ascertaining global skills need, skills gap of Bangladeshi migrants, and training needed to prepare need based skilled HR for overseas employment and remittance earning.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **Research Design**

The research followed a combination of qualitative and quantitative method of research technique. The data was collected through a sample survey method. The survey population is 9.5 million overseas employees working in 160 countries and persons involved in skill training and overseas employment. Population who had previously worked in overseas countries were also considered as survey population.

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<sup>5</sup> Md Faruque Hossain is the executive chairman of NSDA.

<sup>6</sup> US President Barack Obama's speech on 24 February 2009.

### **Sample Design**

The sample was drawn following stratified sampling technique on convenience method to ensure representation from all strata of population, i.e. professionals, skilled, semi-skilled, un-skilled or less skilled, and other group. Since the population are Bangladeshi expatriates living in various parts of the world, samples are drawn on convenience method using electronic media. The total sample size was 105 covering different socio economy of the world. Each individual's country of work has been recorded. However, for ease of data compilation, those countries have been grouped into 04 regions keeping socioeconomic condition of those countries in view. Americas, Europe, Australia, and countries like South Africa, Japan, Korea and Singapore have been grouped as developed countries. Countries of MENA have been placed in the same group considering similarity of their socio-economy. Thailand and Malaysia have been grouped as South Asian Countries, and the remaining countries are grouped as 'other countries'.

### **Survey Questionnaire Design**

A pre-coded survey questionnaire was designed to draw valuable inputs from the respondents. Survey questionnaire had 02 parts i.e. demographic details of the respondents and survey opinions. Survey opinions were calibrated on a five-point Likert scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree value from 5 to 1 respectively, based on their attitude towards opinions.

### **Data Collection**

In addition to survey questionnaire, primary data were collected through KII and FGD to validate and substantiate data collected from various sources like books, journals, reports, and internet sources. High officials of MoEWOE, recruiting agency, Bangladesh Technical Education Board (BTEB), Technical Training Institutes (TTI), Councillor of Bangladesh High Commission abroad, academicians, and representatives of ILO formed part of the key informants. 02 FGDs have been organized to gain first-hand information from the expatriates.

### **Drawbacks of the Study**

Almost all the survey populations are Bangladeshi expatriates, hence, all of them were communicated through electronic means, and thus face to face contact was missing. There were some compromises done during the FGD sessions as they were held under the supervision of dedicated coordinators during COVID situation.

## **FINDINGS ON SURVEY POPULATION**

### **Workplace of the Sample Population**

Specific county-wise participants' workplace has been recorded. For ease of data analysis, the sample populations have been grouped into 04 regions based on the

socio-economic condition of the country they represent. Workplace of the sample population is shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Region of Work of the Survey Population**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Other Countries	6	5.8	5.8
South Asian Countries	15	14.7	20.5
MENA Countries	26	25.4	46.0
Developed Countries	55	53.9	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

### Occupation of the Sample Population

Occupation of the sample population is shown in Table 2 below:

**Table 2: Category of Occupation of the Survey Population**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Other Category	5	4.9	4.9
Unskilled	19	18.6	23.5
Semi-skilled	15	14.7	38.2
Skilled	23	22.5	60.8
Professional	40	39.2	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

### Region and Occupation Cross Tabulation

Region and Occupation cross tabulation of survey population is presented in Table 3.

**Table 3: Region and Occupation Cross Tabulation**

	Occupation Category					Total
	Others	U-skilled	S-skilled	Skilled	Professional	
<b>Other Countries</b>	0	1	1	1	3	6
<b>SA Countries</b>	0	7	3	3	2	15
<b>MENA Countries</b>	0	4	5	10	7	26
<b>Developed Countries</b>	5	7	6	9	28	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>102</b>

**Measure of Scale Reliability**

Measure of the scale reliability/consistency test through Cronbach Alpha has been done to measure how closely different items are related. According to Glen (*Glen, 2014*), Cronbach Alpha value above 0.7 is acceptable. In this case, Cronbach Alpha yielded a result of 0.930 which indicates excellent internal consistency as shown in Table 4 below:

*Table 4: Reliability Statistics*

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.903	19

**SKILLS NEED FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT**

In the last 20 years, the world experienced more transformation and rapid technological innovation than the preceding 100 years. The next five years' technology transformation is likely to be even more rapid than the previous 20 years. The most pronounced and dominating technology of today will be obsolete tomorrow. Hence, no technological knowledge or skill will remain relevant for ever. Torres (*Torres, 2014*) reports, the future employers will look for the employability skills<sup>7</sup> instead of specific knowledge. This implies, even if the academic credentials do not directly match with the job description, the employees will be hired based on their employability qualities and skills. The concept of discipline-based knowledge for a job is no longer relevant as the knowledge will be outdated frequently. But the habit of continuous learning will keep people abreast with the latest innovation and prepare them suited for any job.

**Opportunities in Different Skills Category**

During interview, one of the key informants informed that, MoEWOE has recently received huge offer in the field of nursing, age care, welding, care giving, pipe fitting, and plumbing etcetera from countries like Japan, Korea, Qatar, Hong Kong, and Hungary. In addition to the skills needed for respective field of work, language is a prerequisite for countries like Japan and Korea. Countries like Austria, Germany, Albania, and Poland demanded skilled HR of different disciplines in varying number to the MoEWOE. Opportunities for the skilled HR is also emerging in Latin America and Caribbean, East European, ASEAN, and in African countries (KII). Besides, Artificial Intelligence (AI), computer systems analysts, robotics, genetic engineering, big data analysts, security experts, and

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<sup>7</sup>*In addition to understanding about subject matters, employability skills are a set of skills that employers want from an employee to carry out their role to the best of their ability.*

culinary service, etcetera professionals and high skilled HR will enjoy high demand for employment. Above 80% survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that, skilled HR has more employability than unskilled and 89.9% respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that, skilled HR able to earn more wages compared to unskilled HR.

### **Universal Skills Need**


In addition to the skills needed for specific profession, some skills are universal requirement. Those skills enrich one's professional excellence and facilitate to adjust and adapt in any cross-cultural environment. Some of the most pronounced skills needed are enumerated below (*Torres, 2014*), (FGD, KII):

- Communication and interpersonal behavioural skills
- Self-awareness and confidence
- Learning ability and adaptability
- Ability to work in a team
- Working under pressure
- Maintaining the deadlines
- Initiative
- Computer literacy
- Ability to work in a cross-cultural environment

## **SKILLS GAP OF BANGLADESHI MIGRANTS**

### **Declining Trend of Skilled Category HR**

The trend of sending professionals and skilled HR is declining in Bangladesh. In 1990, 5.7% migrants were skilled whereas in 2019, the percentage of skilled HR consists only 0.27% (*ADB, 2016, p. 2; BMET, 2020*). The trend envisages two alarming fallouts, firstly, declining trend will adversely affect remittance inflow and image of the nation, and secondly, unskilled labours are vulnerable to repatriation as most of the developed countries are rapidly resorting to hi-tech automation and digitalization. Declining trend of Bangladeshi skilled HR is shown in Figure 1. Though most of the MENA countries especially KSA looks for less-skilled labours for their construction works (KII), efforts should be taken to gain access for skilled HR:



*Figure 1: Declining Trend of Skill category (ADB, 2016; BMET, 2020)*

### Skills Gap

According to City and Guilds (*City and Guilds & IOM, 2017*), KSA is the prime overseas destination accounting for 31.98% wage earners from Bangladesh. KSA being the largest source of remittance and migration destination, plays a leading role in shaping overseas employment and skills development in Bangladesh. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to know, how KSA employers view Bangladeshi workers. KSA employers' perceptions about Bangladeshi construction workers are as follows:


- Lack of cultural awareness
- Poor communication skills
- Poor language skills
- Untrustworthiness
- Poor behavioural issues
- Moral issues
- Physical unsuitability for construction work
- Lack of technical skills prior to migration
- Willing to accept low pay

Most of the key informants and FGD participants highlighted following skills gap (KII, FGD):

- Lack of exposure to modern gadgets
- Poor interpersonal behavioural skill
- Lack of professional skills
- Lack of understanding about host country's legal system
- Low hygiene and sanitation practice

## Gaps in Educational Qualification

Educational qualification is at the epitome and bedrock of all kinds of qualifications including self-confidence and national image. Lack of basic education is the primary causes of exploitation in the overseas countries (KII, FGD). 43.50% survey respondents agreed, and 25.90% respondents strongly agreed that, lack of basic education is the primary causes of exploitation in overseas countries. Gender-wise educational qualification of migrants is shown in Figure 2.



**Figure 2:** Educational Qualification of Bangladeshi Migrants  
(BBS & BIDS, 2015, p. 14)

## Gaps in Skill Training

Some of the key informants (KII) believe that most of the existing training infrastructure has limitations on instructors, instruments, and training facilities. Age old training courses and syllabus, lack of technology, and modern gadgets are some of the shortcomings in Technical, Vocational, and Education Training (TVET). Most of the high skilled professional institutes do not review their courses and syllabus to match with the demand of 4.0 IR and international requirement (KII, FGD). Bidisha (*Bidisha, 2012*) states following training gaps and challenges:

- Lack of interest among young population to undergo technical training<sup>8</sup>
- Mismatch between training provided and skills need in job market
- Poor quality and age-old training offered by most of the TTIs

<sup>8</sup> Total number of students being educated in primary, secondary, madrassa, and technical education is 27,172,545; out of which 506,556 are engaged in technical and vocational education making it only 1.8% of the total students (*Barkat, & Ahmed, 2014*).

## **Challenges Ahead**

The 4.0 IR is happening at an unprecedented whirlwind pace paving the way for radical transformation in every sector. Rapid growth of AI, robotics, 3D printing, big data analysis, quantum computing, genetic engineering, and the Internet of Things (IoT) are the trends of the day. The migration destination countries being rich and developed in technology, are in the process of automation and digitalization. The COVID 19 situation has further accelerated the process of digitalization. Hence, Bangladesh needs to identify most promising skills needed and train its HR to be compatible in global workplace. The consequence of failure to match with 4.0 IR will exterminate the country from global workplace.

## **TRAINING NEEDS FOR SKILLED HR**

### **Training Needs**

To remain relevant in global workplace, Governments should listen to the voice of labour market in designing high skilled immigration policies (WB, 2018, p. 33). In consonance with the call of the WB, most of the key informants (KII) opined that, international skills demand to be ascertained first to provide need-based skills training. During the survey, 55% respondents agreed and 32.1% respondents strongly agreed that, considering the emerging requirement of skilled HR in developed countries, Bangladesh Government should take effective initiatives for developing skilled HR for overseas employment. After a threadbare analysis of the most promising global skills needed and skills gaps of Bangladeshi migrants, the following training needs have been identified as the most important skills requirement for smooth flow of migration:

- Basic Education
- Communication skills
- Technical know-how in respective field
- Interpersonal Behavioural skills
- Basic hygiene and sanitation practice
- Learning to learn skills
- Basic knowledge on host country's legal system

### **Impact of Training on Overseas Employment**

If Bangladesh could prepare need based skilled HR through appropriate training, it will enjoy enormous overseas employment opportunities. During the survey, most of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that proactive initiative by the employers to hire need based skilled HR would be the most important upshot of need-based skills training.



## HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS

The research hypothesis ‘the more the number of need-based skilled HR, the more there will be opportunities for overseas employment’ has been analysed using SPSS software. There are 02 variables i.e. need based skilled HR (independent variable) and overseas employment (dependent variable). In line with the variables, 02 constructs have been formulated as follows.

### Construct 1 - Need based skilled HR

A list of most essential skills needed were short listed and circulated to the survey population for their opinion in a Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree (value from 5 to 1). Descriptive statistics on the skills needed is shown in Table 5.

*Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Skills Need (Survey Results)*

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Education	102	3.15	1.164
Communication skills	102	3.91	0.913
Confidence	102	3.72	0.948
Technical know-how	102	4.18	0.776
Interpersonal Behavioural skills	102	4.08	0.841
Knowledge on host country’s legal system	102	3.74	0.954
Hygiene and sanitation practice	101	3.74	1.101
Learning to learn skills	102	3.95	0.837

### Construct 2 – Overseas Employment Opportunities

Descriptive statistics on the impact of need based skilled HR on overseas employment is shown in Table 6.

*Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on Impact of Need based Skilled HR (Survey Results)*

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Increased demand of workers	102	4.09	0.891
Enhanced wage and compensation package	102	3.79	1.066
Improved working environment	102	4.06	0.865
Proactive initiative to hire HR	101	4.14	0.884
Increased flow of HR	101	4.07	0.816
Increased flow of remittance	102	4.05	0.927

### Statistical Analysis

Relationship between constructs have been analysed with various tools using SPSS. Analysis and results of various tests are appended below:

**Linear Regression Analysis:** To measure relationship between need based skilled HR and opportunities for overseas employment, linear regression analysis has been done through SPSS. According to model summary ( $R = 0.812$ ), there is a strong relationship between need based skilled HR and overseas employment opportunities. R Square, the coefficient of determination, is the squared value of the multiple correlation coefficient. It shows that 65.9% of the variation in time is explained by the model. Model summary is shown in Table 7.

*Table 7: Linear Regression Analysis*

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.812 <sup>a</sup>	0.659	0.628	0.44542
a. Predictors: (Constant), Need Based skilled HR				

**ANOVA:** The ANOVA table is used to check whether there is a statistically significant relationship between variables. The Sig. 0.000 value is  $< 0.05$  (Table 8). This implies (Sig.) that there is a statistically significant relationship between skilled HR and overseas employment opportunities.

*Table 8: ANOVA Table*

ANOVA <sup>a</sup>					
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	16.945	1	16.945	46.477	0.000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	35.365	97	0.365		
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.310</b>	<b>98</b>			
a. Dependent Variable: Opportunities for Overseas employment					
b. Predictors: (Constant), Need based skilled HR					

**Coefficients:** The coefficients table provides information to predict dependent variable from independent variable. The Table 9 shows that, 01 (one) unit increase in need based skilled HR will result to 0.769 increase in opportunities for overseas employment. According to Glen (*Glen, 2014*), standardized beta coefficient compares the strength of the effect of independent variable to the

dependent variable. In this case, there is a strong effect of need based skilled HR to overseas employment as Beta value is 0.569 (Table 9).

**Table 9: Coefficients**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
(Constant)	1.109	0.435		2.550	0.012
Need based skilled HR	0.769	0.113	0.569	6.817	0.000

a. Dependent Variable: Opportunities for Overseas employment

**Correlation between Variables:** The table 10 below shows Pearson Correlation value 0.569, which means that there is a strong uphill positive linear relationship between need based skilled HR and opportunities for overseas employment (Kentstate, 2020). The significance value 0.000 indicates a significant correlation between variables:

**Table 10: Correlations between Independent and dependent variables**

Correlations			
		Need based skilled HR	Opportunities for Overseas employment
Need based skilled HR	Pearson Correlation	1	0.569**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
	N	101	99
Opportunities for Overseas employment	Pearson Correlation	<b>0.569**</b>	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	
	N	99	100

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**One Sample T Test (Hypothesis Testing):** One sample t test for both the constructs at 95% confidence level has been done (Table 11). Mean values of the constructs are 3.80 and 4.04 for need based skilled HR and opportunities for overseas employment, respectively. In a 05 (five) point Likert scale, the mean value between 3.41 and 4.20 indicate population 'agreed' with the statements that,

‘the more the number of need based skilled HR, the more there will be opportunities for overseas employment’.

**Table 11: One Sample Statistics**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Need based skilled HR	101	3.8057	0.54843	0.05457
Opportunities for Overseas employment	100	4.0433	0.72692	0.07269

In Table 12, Sig. (2 tailed) or p value for both the construct is 0.00. Ideally, p value lower than 0.05 indicates less support for the null hypothesis (a greater number of need-based skilled HR will not create more opportunities for overseas employment), hereby null is rejected. As 0.00 is < 0.05, so the alternate hypothesis is proved.

**Table 12: One-Sample Test**

	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Test Value = 0	
					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Need based skilled HR	69.739	100	0.000	3.80569	3.6974	3.9140
Opportunities for Overseas employment	55.623	99	0.000	4.04333	3.8991	4.1876

In the light of the above scientific analysis, it is proved that ‘the more the number of need-based skilled HR, the more there will be opportunities for oversea employment’, thus alternate hypothesis is proved. On the contrary, null hypothesis, ‘the greater number of need-based skilled HR will not create opportunities for overseas employment’ is rejected.

## CONCLUSIONS

Bangladesh Government had been promoting overseas employment since the 1970s. So far, Bangladesh had been doing well and presently stands as sixth largest migration origin country. But unfortunately, it is not within 10 largest

remittance earning countries. So, the country needs to go a long way to maintain a balance between its migration and remittance growth rate. While the country is struggling to increase its remittance earning, it is also facing the challenges of technological paradigm shift from man to machine. Challenges bring opportunities as well. Many developed countries are facing shortage of population, so they need skilled HR for nursing, age caring, and medical support. Besides, professionals and high skilled HR in the field of AI, robotics, data analysis, genetic engineering, and culinary service would find themselves ever demanding in the global workplace.

On the contrary, Bangladeshi youngsters suffer from lots of skills gap such as poor educational background and communication skills, lack of knowledge on internationally accepted rules of behaviour, and poor hygiene and sanitation practices etcetera. They need training on the above-mentioned skills to remain relevant. Unfortunately, the skills training infrastructure in Bangladesh faces numerous challenges like lack of interest among young population to undergo technical training, mismatch between training offer and skills needed in job market, poor quality and age-old training system etcetera. Hence, efforts need to be taken to facilitate need-based skills training infrastructure.

Most promising skills needed for Bangladeshi aspirants have been ascertained as education, communication skills, confidence, technical know-how, interpersonal behavioural skills, knowledge on host country's legal system, hygiene and sanitation practice, and learning to learn skills etcetera. If youngsters of Bangladesh could be trained on the above-mentioned skills, there would be ample of overseas employment opportunities. The Pearson Correlation yielded a value 0.569 indicating strong positive uphill relationship between need based skilled HR and overseas employment. Therefore, the research concludes, 'the more the number of need-based skilled HR, the more there will be overseas employment opportunities.

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## AN APPROACH TO HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY FORCE: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

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**Abstract:** Bangladesh, the 33<sup>rd</sup> Member State of Global Nuclear Club, is committed to establish Nuclear Security Regime before commissioning its first Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in 2023. Therefore, Bangladesh has formed Nuclear Security and Physical Protection System Cell (NSPC) under Bangladesh Army in 2017. However, NSPC could not formulate a formidable Nuclear Security Force (NSF) yet. Absence of an appropriate Human Resource Development (HRD) model for NSF in literature, heterogeneous force composition, feeble legal and regulatory framework, scanty HRD infrastructures and expertise in the field of Nuclear Security, insignificant research in Bangladesh caveat, etc. are generally identified as major impediments. At this backdrop, a non-experimental, exploratory research has been conducted to explore HRD modalities for NSF of Bangladesh. Available literary contents, international, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance, global best practices, opinions of the Subject Matter Experts (SME) and structured response of the Key Informants (KI) were the basis of the research. Both primary and secondary data sources had been accessed applying cross-sectional non-probability purposive sampling techniques. Based on the research, this paper has proposed an HRD model and suggests modalities appropriate for HRD of NSF in Bangladesh caveat. Proposed model is structured as a networked-wheel model centering Nuclear Security Strategy of Bangladesh. It has three interrelated functional pillars: Training and Development, Workforce Development, and Organization Development. Eighteen elements of these pillars are interconnected through a comprehensive Knowledge Network. It has also proposed modalities for restructuring existing system, inter-agency collaboration, international cooperation, technology integration, mass awareness, security mind-set and culture, etc. Propositions of this paper may immensely assist Bangladesh in developing Human Resource (HR) of its NSF.

**Keywords:** *Nuclear Power Plant, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Security Regime, Nuclear Security Force, Human Resource Development, and Nuclear Security and Physical Protection System Cell.*

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## INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh has taken a courageous step in conceiving nuclear power as a component of National Energy Policy through commencement of Rooppur NPP project and aspires to excel this initiative further. Construction of NPP has three intermingled dimensions: functional/operational, technology and technical including nuclear safety, and nuclear security/physical protection. IAEA's milestone approach suggests a holistic progression of all three dimensions (*IAEA, 2013a, p. 2*). Within these dimensions, IAEA delineated Nuclear Security as the State's responsibility (*IAEA, 2013b, p. 4*). Therefore, Bangladesh has established NSPC under Bangladesh Army in 2017 for ensuring Nuclear Security of Rooppur NPP (*Ministry of Science and Technology, 2018, p. 34*).

Though apparently, 'Nuclear Security' seems as 'gun-guard-gate' model, it is far beyond that in current time. IAEA defines 'Nuclear Security' as "*the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material or their associated facilities*" (*IAEA, 2015, p. 18*). State needs to establish a Nuclear Security Regime through critical nurturing of interdisciplinary approach. Nuclear Security Regime encompasses number of elements and activities including Human Resource Management (HRM). IAEA guidelines have directed HRD, a function of HRM, as an essential element for ensuring sustainable Nuclear Security Regime of a State (*IAEA, 2018b, p. 11*). Though other sectors of nuclear power infrastructure have progressed substantially in Bangladesh, it lacks in developing HR of NSF.

Organization and employment of NSF varies from country to country. Landscaping global guidance and best practices in Bangladesh parlance, NSF can be defined as "*a disciplined force competent with required skills and expertise on ensuring security to nuclear materials and installations within the state regulated through an organization legally authorised to regulate Nuclear Security aspects of the State*". NSPC is tasked to ensure Nuclear Security and organize NSF well before the commissioning of Rooppur NPP. However, HRD related infrastructures for NSF has not progressed substantially. Nuclear Security is a classified State affair and preparedness of NSF is specific to national threat assessment (*IAEA, 2018b, pp. 9*). Therefore, State needs to generate HRD modalities for its NSF indigenously. Being incumbent, Bangladesh needs to address multifaceted requirements that necessitate a wide-ranged research on the question: "*How the HR of NSF can be developed in Bangladesh?*" Therefore, a comprehensive non-experimental, exploratory research has been conducted in quest of answering the question. The research identified major impediments to develop HRD related infrastructures for NSF. Addressing those impediments, this research could explore an appropriate and applied HRD modalities for NSF of Bangladesh.

Findings of the research are the constituent of this paper. This paper firstly highlights the methodology followed throughout the research. It then discloses research results in the form of describing explored NSF structure and HRD model for NSF of Bangladesh. Finally, it discusses the mending modalities of identified challenges in implementing the explored HRD model in Bangladesh perspective. It also put forward a few recommendations on HRD of NSF and scope for further research in this field.

## REVIEW OF LITERATURES

Universally accepted definition for HRD is not available in literature due to its dynamic evolutions. Throughout eighteenth and nineteenth century, developing HR evolved through ‘Apprenticeship Training’ programs, DeWitt Clinton’s ‘Vocational Education’, ‘Factory Schools’ programme and Charles Allen’s four-steps instructional method - “show, tell, do, check”. In late 1930s, ‘Human Relations’ was included in describing organization as a ‘Social Structure’. During the World War II, HR training was established as a profession and by 1970s it expanded beyond classroom to include ‘Interpersonal Skills’ within it; the term ‘HRD’ came into being (*Werner and DeSimone, 2012, p. 4*).

Often HRD and HRM are synonymously used though HRM is broader in scope. HRM can be defined as “*the effective selection and utilization of employees to best achieve the goals and strategies of an organization, as well as the goals and needs of employees*” (*Werner and DeSimone, 2012, p. 8*). HRD is either one of the primary functions or a stand-alone function within the HRM department. Distinctions between HRM and HRD minimized when Pat McLagan proposed a major shift of HRD from traditional Training and Development (T&D) through integrating ‘Career Development’ and ‘Organization Development’ issues (*McLagan, 1989, p. 49*). Thus, HRD was defined as “*a process for unleashing and developing human expertise through organizational development and personnel training and development for the purpose of improving performance*” (*Torraco and Swanson, 1995, p. 10*). Paul Bernthal et al. further portrayed an expanded view of HRD where T&D, the core functions of McLagan’s HR wheel, was extended by ‘Learning and Performance’ (Werner and DeSimone, 2012, p. 8). This expansion could establish more vivid relation between organizational functions and HRD (McLean, 2010, p. 318). In later days, Svensson, et al. proposed ‘Strategic HRD’ concept involving HRD professionals into strategic functions of the organization (*Svensson, et al., 2009, p. 772*). Recent evolution of Industry 4.0 concept added ‘External Partnerships’ as a new dimension to the sustainable HRD (*Stachová, et al., 2019, pp. 1-5*). Through repeated evolution, HRD has become a function of organization, human, social and strategic domain in the present-day context.

HRD in the field of Nuclear Security is complex in nature as it bears global scope and deals with multidimensional physical threats. Allocation of sufficient HR is an essential element for sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime (*IAEA,*

2013, p. 5) of a user State and developing those HR is one of the vital national sustainability objectives (IAEA, 2018b, p. 4). HRD in Nuclear Security primarily includes education, training, exercise, awareness raising, workforce management, knowledge management and knowledge networks (IAEA, 2018c, p. 7). HRD is a long-term activity (Akbar and Jolly, 2013, p. 19). Therefore, IAEA milestone approach on developing nuclear infrastructure may be a preferred option for any State (IAEA, 2013, pp. 1-3). However, modalities for HRD of NSF in Bangladesh caveat is absent in literature.

Due to the varying threat scenario in States, various nuclear user States are following indigenous HRD systems. Indonesia follows layered education and training approach applying indigenous Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) model and conducts exercises involving all stake holders of the State (Haditjahyono, 2014). Vietnam's education and training system is monitored by a National Steering Committee. It integrated indigenous nuclear institution and departments of five general universities in nuclear education discipline (Nguyen & Vuong, 2016, p. 6). Pakistan conducts courses for NSF personnel on fixed installations protection, transports escort and emergency response (Iftakhar & Noor, 2017, p. 5). Philippines and Thailand are frontrunners in HRD programmes within Southeast Asia (Trajano, 2019, p. 1703). Many nuclear user States have adopted indigenous force-on-force exercises as a tool to HRD (Bunn, Roth, & Tobey, 2019, pp. 62-63). As Nuclear Security is a classified State affair, modalities of these indigenous approaches are not available in public literature. However, due to the growing demand of trained Nuclear Security workforce, various global universities are also offering Master's and PhD degree following IAEA education program (Islam & Ahmed, 2016, p. 2) to establish a global common platform.

## METHODOLOGY

### Study Area and Target Population

All concerned Nuclear Security stakeholders of Bangladesh were the target population of this research. SMEs of this research were the members of Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC), NSPC, National Working Group for developing Physical Protection System (PPS) of Rooppur NPP, Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited (NPCBL), Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), Bangladesh Army, Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) and military forces operating at Rooppur NPP. Contents of national and international best practices (Russia, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Vietnam), related books, journals, guiding instruments, IAEA publications, etc. were studied for the purpose of this research. Military officers with the experience and/or knowledge on Nuclear Security were the KIs for this research. However, due to the non-availability of

NSF in Bangladesh, this research could not access real-time working information related to the NPP.

### **Research Questions**

This research primarily focused to obtain answer of the question “*How the HR of NSF can be developed in Bangladesh?*” In doing so, it also sought for the answer of following secondary questions:

- What is the appropriate HRD model for NSF of Bangladesh?
- How national and international NSF are developing their security related HR?
- What are the HRD related nuclear security infrastructures available at Bangladesh?
- What are the initiatives that Bangladesh has undertaken to enhance its HRD capabilities for NSF?
- What are the challenges in implementing HRD process for NSF in Bangladesh?
- How the challenges can be mitigated to develop HR of NSF?

### **Data**

Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. Primary data were collected through informal interview of SMEs. These were the key sources of qualitative data. Quantitative data were collected through structured questionnaire survey conducted on security experts of Bangladesh Army. Secondary data were obtained through content analysis of various national and international regulations, guidelines, recommendations, best practice sharing, etc. with special emphasis on IAEA. This research applied Non-probability Purposive data sampling technique and each sample were accessed following Cross-Sectional method.

### **Research Methods**

Mixed methods were followed in this research. Quantitative data were analysed through descriptive statistical method using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version-23. For qualitative data analysis content, narrative and discourse methods were followed.

### **Personal Experiences**

The researcher himself had experience of working in the field of Nuclear Security in Bangladesh. As professional commitment, he had visited various nuclear related installations of Russia. He also represented Bangladesh in a technical meeting on SAT at IAEA Headquarters (HQ), Vienna. These were

highly contributory to carry out this research in a more authentic tone and proposals/recommendations were more practicable.

### **Research Design**

It was a non-experimental, exploratory, and applied research. Initially the researcher explored a suitable HRD model for NSF of Bangladesh through analysing contents of existing literature and views of the SMEs. The researcher then collected data to identify impediments, in its implementation at Bangladesh. Based on the identified impediments the researcher sought for mitigation means through accessing SMEs, KIs, and global best practices.

## **RESULTS**

Outcome of the research was a comprehensive ‘HRD model’ for NSF of Bangladesh. It also explored an appropriate NSF structure for Bangladesh.


### **Proposed NSF Structure for Bangladesh**

Bangladesh has identified HRD as a priority area (*Shahid, 2019*), however, it is yet to finalize its NSF structure. Therefore, a functional structure for NSF is proposed in Figure 1. According to this proposition, the Honourable Prime Minister may command and administer all site-specific NSFs through the Chief of Army Staff (CAS). CAS may be answerable to Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) for all Nuclear Security affairs of the State.


Each NSF may broadly be categorized into three units: Security Management Unit (SMU), Security Operations Unit (SOU) and Technical Security Unit (TSU) (*IAEA, 2018a, pp. 50-51*). Force HQ of NSF at sites should be considered as SMU. Units directly or indirectly engaged to on-site security of nuclear facilities may be considered as SOU and the establishments that will provide technical and other administrative assistance to the on-site force may fall under TSU. Unit members should be categorized in four groups: management level leaders (senior leaders beyond unit commanders), operation level leaders (officers as unit/subunit/detachment commanders), supervisors [Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)], and soldiers.

### **Proposed HRD Model for NSF of Bangladesh**

Figure 2 is the proposed HRD model for the NSF of Bangladesh. It is a networked-wheel model. Nuclear Security Strategy of the State is the foundation of this model. It has three core functional pillars, and each pillar is composed of numbers of related elements. Synergy among these functions and elements is accomplished through a comprehensive ‘Knowledge Network’.




**Figure 1:** Proposed Command and Control Structure of NSF



**Figure 2:** Proposed HRD Model for NSF of Bangladesh

### *Training and Development*

T&D is the most important functional pillar for developing HRD of NSF. It will generate a competent person through imparting layered education and training as shown in Figure 3.



**Figure 3:** Layered Competence Development for NSF

**Education:** Education may be provided in the form of general awareness education through national education curriculum; occupational education programmes in the form of undergraduate education through technical or vocational institutions, graduation and advance degree through universities; and individual career development programmes including instructional ability enhancement programme. Bangladesh should conduct a need assessment and formulate national policy and strategy for Nuclear Security education encompassing all mode of education. NSPC and stakeholders should also formulate their education policy to strengthen Safety-Security-Safeguard (3S) interface. Soldiers of NSF should be educated through various cadres run by the NSF organization and Nuclear Security training institutions. Supervisors (JCOs and NCOs) should be either directly recruited with prerequisite undergraduate degree or made competent through technical and vocational institutions. Nuclear Security training institution may have the capability to run up to postgraduate programme. Officers should obtain minimum graduation on Nuclear Security discipline. Educational institutions of Bangladesh Armed Forces, i.e. MIST, Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), etc. may be utilized for such education. IAEA guidelines should be the basis of all education. NSPC, in collaboration with the Government, should establish



regional and international cooperation in the form of sending NSF members abroad and/or hiring foreign specialists. Distant learning may also be arranged with international network-based institutions.

**Training:** NSF training may be classroom and practical training, on-the-job training, train the trainer, virtual training, and collective training. Units may have adequate training aids to organize periodic refresher training. Separate wing of NSPC may monitor, coordinate, and assist training curriculum, and develop virtual training system in cost-effective manner. Collective training may integrate all stakeholders for enhanced 3S interface. Few military training institutions may be utilized for initial HRD. Nuclear Security training institutions may be established as a priority with assistance of Russian Federation, IAEA, and/or other countries. Selected NSF members may be sent abroad for ‘Train the Trainer’. All training initiative should follow a functional SAT model.

**Exercise:** Exercises may be in the form of tutorial exercise, table top exercise, workshops, map exercise, communication exercise, decision making exercise, contingency plan validation exercise, tactical exercise without troops, force-on-force exercise, emergency response exercise, situation exercise, general field training exercise, etc. NSF may conduct standalone exercise and/or sometimes integrate on-site and off-site stakeholders, other related national agencies, regional or international alliances, etc.

**Awareness Raising:** BAERA may implement national awareness raising programmes focusing public, policy makers, operators, and authorized persons. Information sensitivity and ‘need-to-know’ rule should get preference. Awareness raising programmes of NSPC should develop desired behaviours and beliefs among NSF members and stakeholders. NSPC may adopt ‘Centre of Excellence’ approach to implement awareness raising through knowledge sharing.

**Knowledge Management:** BAERA may formulate National Nuclear Security Knowledge Management strategy and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) should operate a National Knowledge Database. NSPC should develop inter-connected knowledge management system including individual and organizational knowledge. Knowledge databases may have the capability to archive, retrieve, transform, interpret, disseminate, and protect acquired knowledge. It may connect education and training systems with controlled access.

### ***Workforce Development***

BAERA may define level of competences for NSF and NSPC should develop tailored strategies for workforce development. Strategy may ensure long-term availability of key HR in the nuclear facilities.

**Workforce Planning:** Planning should address both short and long-term needs. It may include recruiting-to-retirement cycle, force development, additional force requirement for emergency situation management, succession planning, etc.

**Workforce Management:** An independent board may initially recruit members from all the law enforcing agencies of Bangladesh with majority force from Bangladesh Army. Subsequent recruitment may be institutionalized through an independent in-house recruiting organization. Candidate may undergo a software and hardware based qualitative and quantitative examination that includes physical, educational, and psychological test. Both Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and Emotional Quotient (EQ) test should be given preference for selecting officers. Criminal records or tendency may be verified by Bangladesh Police and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Recruiting strategy may attract competent and intellect candidates to join NSF through promoting opportunities and remunerations. Workforce may be regulated and managed through Nuclear Security Act and organizational Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Stable and secure employment environment should be ensured through digitized HRM system.

**Performance Management:** NSPC may periodically evaluate performance needs, gaps, and reasons. Evaluation system should encompass long-term perspective to evaluate uneven development of individual skills. It may also identify functional deficiencies in the workforce management system and suggest corrective measures.

**Career Planning:** NSF career may be organized in various tiers following rank structure of Bangladesh Army, controlled by a separate wing at NSPC. “One must have institutional education and training on Nuclear Security” - should be a basic rule for leaders’ career progression.

**Career Management:** NSPC may arrange appropriate remuneration and reward that commensurate employees’ contribution. It may design and forecast clear career path towards higher positions to set individual professional goals and to strive for promotion. It may also organize competence-based assignment and skill development opportunities for NSF members.

### ***Organization Development***

Bangladesh may emphasize on developing organizational infrastructure for NSF to establish a sustainable Nuclear Security Regime.

**Policy and Regulations:** Bangladesh may enact Nuclear Security Act immediately. NSF should be authorized by law as ‘Competent Authority’, which will operate under the CAS. NSPC may formulate related SOPs for force management and pursue the Government for enacting subsequent laws and acts.

**Infrastructure Development:** Bangladesh may establish an indigenous Nuclear Security training institution; a university for educating all disciplines on nuclear science and technology, and 3S; and one or more vocational training institutions on nuclear disciplines. Nuclear Security department may also be opened in existing education institutions. Military and other law enforcing agency's training institutions may be equipped and staffed for ad hoc training of initial NSF members. International cooperation is necessary for foreign training, training aid procurement and hiring foreign trainers.

**Leadership Development:** NSF leaders should be both intellectually and emotionally robust. They should attain adequate knowledge on 3S, technology, national and international rules, and regulations, etc. Officers should attain graduation whereas JCOs and NCOs should have diploma degree on Nuclear Security. Soldiers should be trained on elementary leadership to independently manage crisis.

**Management Development:** Management system of NSF may ensure coherent and congenial relation among leaders and led to work in utmost synergy as a spirited team. Management may strike a balance between strictness to task performance and compassion to human problems.

**Professional Society:** BAERA, through other related ministries, may undertake national action plan for developing macro-level professional society on Nuclear Security. NSPC may develop micro-level professional society at facility sites through fostering Nuclear Security culture within the facility and its peripherals.

**Learning Environment:** Bangladesh may establish "Centre of Excellence" and connect with regional and international organizations. NSPC may conduct study period, seminar, training, workshops, etc. at facilities integrating local people also. Digital gadgets and secured network may be utilized for sharing knowledge among stakeholders.

**International Cooperation:** Bangladesh may extend international cooperation in the form of education, training, joint exercise, seminar, workshop, presentation, visit, procurement, etc. at various levels.

**Equipment and Technology:** HRD for NSF may be state-of-the-art technology driven. NSF members may be trained in handling modern technology-based equipment. Civil intellects may also be integrated in indigenous equipment development.

### ***Knowledge Network***

Bangladesh may develop National Knowledge Networks in the form of Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC), involving all stakeholders and specialized groups, for enhanced cooperation, coordination, and knowledge sharing. It may also be connected to the global knowledge networks on Nuclear Security. NSPC

may develop Organizational Knowledge Network for sharing knowledge among NSF members with common roles, responsibilities, good practices, etc.

## DISCUSSIONS

This paper has proposed an HRD model for NSF of Bangladesh through conducting a comprehensive non-experimental exploratory research. Basis of the research was the available contents, international and IAEA guidance, global best practices, opinions of the SMEs and structured response of the KIs. Proposed HRD model for NSF has three interrelated functional pillars: Training and Development, Workforce Development and Organization Development. All elements of these three pillars are interconnected through a comprehensive Knowledge Network. It has also proposed a hierarchy of NSF structured under the Honourable Prime Minister through the CAS. In implementation of the proposed HRD model and NSF structure, Bangladesh is likely to overcome few of the challenges. This research has also identified the challenges and their mitigation means. These are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

### **Challenges in Implementing HRD System for NSF**

Bangladesh faces following major challenges in establishing Nuclear Security Regime and implementing HRD model for its NSF:


- Security overlooking psyche of the policymakers.
- Absence of inter-agency cooperation and coordination mechanism.
- Absence of holistic qualification requirements for initial NSF.
- Dilemma on carrier-cycle of initial NSF members.
- Insufficient international cooperation.
- Ad hoc structure and inadequate staffing of NSPC to address HRD issues.
- Inadequate focus and absence of Nuclear Security experts in BAERA and BAEC.
- Absence of joint working environment between BAEC and NSPC.
- Absence of an effective legal framework.
- Absence of education programmes and indigenous institutions.
- Training institutions of Law Enforcing Agencies are not equipped and staffed to train on Nuclear Security.
- Absence of a definite recruiting system.

## Ways Ahead for Bangladesh in Implementing HRD Modalities for NSF

Mending modalities of identified challenges to functionally implement proposed HRD model in Bangladesh caveat are highlighted in subsequent paragraphs.

### ***Awareness Raising***

BAERA and BAEC may minimize security overlooking psyche of top leaders and policymakers through undertaking a comprehensive awareness raising programme which may include various seminars and workshops, visit to nuclear facilities abroad, etc. 70.5% respondents opine that proactive engagement of NSPC with policymakers will raise awareness among senior leaderships on Nuclear Security issues (Figure 4). At organization level, NSPC may ensure flow of information through evaluation, remuneration and punitive measures. Awareness raising programme may be incorporated through training, motivation, poster, leaflets, e-message, etc.




**Figure 4:** Respondents' Views on "Awareness Raising Needs Proactive Engagement of NSPC with Policymakers".

### ***Formulating Legal and Regulatory Framework***

Bangladesh, through Ministry of Law, may enact Nuclear Security Act on priority basis. BAERA, in coordination with BAEC and NSPC, may formulate supplementary regulations related to the HRD of NSF. Bangladesh may appoint Bangladesh Army as the 'Competent Authority' for Nuclear Security affairs of the State by law. Law may delineate the command and control structure in line with the proposition of this paper.

***Restructuring BAERA and BAEC***


Both BAERA and BAEC need to be restructured and adequately staffed with Nuclear Security experts (Figure 5). Mission and role of both these organizations should incorporate Nuclear Security issues in clear terms including HRD aspects. Nuclear Security experts from Bangladesh Army, serving/retired, may also be deputed and/or appointed to BAEC and BAERA.



**Figure 5:** Respondents' Views on "Nuclear Security Experts at BAERA is Inadequate to Address HRD of NSF".

***Establishing Indigenous Training and Education Infrastructures***


Generic Nuclear Security awareness lessons may be included into the textbooks of secondary and higher secondary standard (Figure 6). Ministry of Education may arrange diploma on Nuclear Security to few technical or vocational institutions, and graduation and advance degree in few public or private universities with preference to military institutes. Bangladesh should also establish indigenous Nuclear Security education and training institutions on priority basis with the assistance of IAEA and other expert countries.



**Figure 6:** Respondents' views on "Nuclear Security Lessons need to be included in National Education Curricula".

***Framing Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism***


Bangladesh should initiate a functional mechanism for inter-agency coordination on Nuclear Security (Figure 7). Stakeholders may meet periodically to share their knowledge, observation, and concern. Inter-agency coordination may be enhanced through holistic training, social interactions, coordination cell at NSPC and BAERA, inter-agency posting, flow of information, publishing journals and periodicals, etc.



**Figure 7:** Respondents' Views on "Bangladesh Needs an Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism for Nuclear Security".

***Restructuring NSPC***

NSPC needs to be restructured and adequately staffed for managing all HR aspects of NSF (Figure 8). It may have various wings for addressing all HRD related activities as proposed in the HRD model for NSF.



**Figure 8:** Respondents' Views on "NSPC Needs Restructuring to Accommodate HRD Aspects of NSF".

### ***Planning and Management of Initial NSF***

Initial workforce may be generated through permanently recruiting from feeder organizations. Engineer Centre and School of Military Engineering (ECSME), Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Centre and School (EMEC&S), Bangladesh Infantry Regimental Centre (BIRC), East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC) and School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T) may be equipped to train this workforce by procuring training aids on priority basis, hiring foreign trainers, 'train the trainer' abroad, etc. A common platform may be created to accommodate recruited members from diverged agencies.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

From the findings and discussions of this research, followings are recommended for the HRD of NSF in Bangladesh:

- Bangladesh, through its various organs, may implement the explored HRD modalities of this research for developing its NSF.
- NSPC may generate NSF for Rooppur NPP on immediate basis following proposed NSF structure.
- Ministry of Law, as a priority, may formulate Nuclear Security Acts and designate Bangladesh Army as 'Competent Authority' for Nuclear Security by law.
- Ministry of Education and NCTB may restructure existing education system of Bangladesh to integrate and accommodate Nuclear Security education at various tiers of national education curricula. NSPC may develop indigenous education and training infrastructures as a priority.
- BAERA, BAEC, and NSPC may be restructured for accommodating Nuclear Security aspects.

Followings are recommended for further outlook and research:

- Once NPP is operative, modalities proposed in this research may be revised incorporating opinions and experiences of nuclear workforce.
- Modern HRD encompasses cognitive domain, i.e. attitude and behaviour of the workforce and organizational culture. Further research may be conducted on cognitive domain of NSF.

## **CONCLUSION**

Any State wishing to peacefully utilize nuclear power is legally obligated to the international forum for ensuring its security in global terms. It may, therefore, establish a comprehensive Nuclear Security Regime within the State. Construction of NPP needs a balanced approach among all its dimensions. Though Bangladesh



could substantially progress in developing other dimensions of NPP, Nuclear Security aspects need expedite attention to harmonize overall efforts.

Nuclear Security is a classified State affair. Again, threat patterns are State/region centric and geo-politic dependent. Therefore, States need to develop HRD modalities for its NSF indigenously. To assist Bangladesh in developing its HR in the field of Nuclear Security, this paper proposed an HRD model explored through a systematic research. It also proposed a hierarchy of NSF structured under the Honourable Prime Minister through the CAS. The research identified that the proposed HRD model and hierarchy structure of NSF is the most appropriate approach in Bangladesh caveat.

This paper highlighted a few challenges in implementing the proposed HRD model that encompasses: policymakers' psyche, inter-agency cooperation and coordination, holistic qualification requirements, carrier-cycle of initial NSF members, international cooperation, structure and focus of NSPC, BAERA and BAEC, legal framework, recruiting system, indigenous education and training support structures, etc. It also articulated mitigation means for identified challenges. Mending modalities emphasized on awareness raising initiatives at all level, legal and regulatory framework formulation, indigenous training and education infrastructures development, coordination among concerned agencies, restructuring NSPC, BAEC and BAERA, and management of initial NSF.

Developing HR of NSF involves integrated effort of all related stakeholders where holistic planning, coordination, management, and implementation are essential ingredients. Drives of the policymakers and top-level management, and institutionalization of Nuclear Security culture into the members' behaviour and attitude can develop a functional HRD system for NSF of Bangladesh.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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# THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) CHARTER

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**Abstract:** Does humanitarian intervention necessarily involve military intervention within the purview of the United Nations (UN) Charter? This paper argues the existence of military involvement within the UN Charter's purview. The concept of humanitarian intervention is noble. This noble humanitarian approach may not always involve military forces. However, over the history of humanity, military involvement has appeared to be an inevitable humanitarian intervention phenomenon. In this paper, qualitative methodology has been adopted for data collection and analysis. In the contemporary literature, the increased trend of military involvement has triggered philosophical debate regarding humanitarian intervention's nobility. In this context of contemporary literature, this paper has attempted to analyze military involvement within the broader purview of humanitarianism through classical and liberal schools of thought. Finally, this paper's key findings revealed a manifestation of noble cause and discriminatory motives of different actors for the military involvement in humanitarian intervention.

**Keywords:** *Humanitarian intervention; military intervention; human rights; international law; the UN Charter; International Relations*

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## INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian intervention, an action undertaken by an organization or state or coalition of states to alleviate extensive human suffering, has generated an academic debate from Classical<sup>1</sup> and Liberal<sup>2</sup> Schools of thought regarding the issue of using military forces and state sovereignty. The term 'humanitarian intervention' lacks clarity from conceptual and practical viewpoints, as identified by scholars and policy practitioners (*Trim & Simms, 2011*). Throughout humanity's history, a humanitarian emergency had existed either **due to natural**

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<sup>1</sup> Classical Theories of International Relations edited by Clark and Neumann (2016).

<sup>2</sup> A Brief Understanding of Liberal Theory in International Relations by Binu Joseph.

calamity or human-made disaster, as observed by Salvatici (2020), and others. A response to such an emergency had come in different forms of assisting the affected people. Over the years, the forms of humanitarian response have been transformed due to various socio-politico-economic motives that occurred from purely humanitarian purposes to military domination (Sullivan, 2008). In the realm of humanitarian intervention, the involvement of military forces has led to a philosophical confusion as scholars and practitioners have different conjectures and disciplinary perspectives (Ticlin, 2014). This confusion exists due to the blurred distinction between the altruism and motive, in case of a military involvement for any humanitarian intervention.

The literature of humanitarian intervention reflects a wide range of 'perspective' that has emerged as a relatively new term in the context of humanitarianism. According to Scheffer (1991), the humanitarian intervention involves a state or states or the international community for delivering humanitarian support once the affected group of people falls under ignorance, abasements, and other forms of marginalization. These acts of human sufferings may be conducted either by non-state actors or state actors or by both. As a noble responsibility for discharging assistance for eradicating the sufferings of affected people, the international community may have the scope to intervene in a situation where a government is either unable to protect or unwilling to protect its people. Humanitarian intervention initiates the debate between the concept of state-sovereignty and a state's responsibility to protect its people. This type of intervention further challenges the legal involvement military forces questioning very fundamental aspects of state-sovereignty that has been endorsed in the UN Charter<sup>3</sup>. Referring to the Human Rights Watch World Report, Heinze (2006: 20) has observed a redundancy of using military forces in humanitarian intervention. Williams and Pearlman (2019) further argue regarding the indiscriminate use of military forces that do not support military forces as an inevitable humanitarian intervention tool. However, over time, military forces have become the prime component of humanitarian intervention. However, there are debates over who can authorize such intervention. The UN Charter has prohibited aggression on another state's internal affairs, but Chesterman (2001) argues that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the authority to make an exception to the charter if a situation arises that threatens world peace and security. Chesterman's argument is further complimented by Welsh's (2004) preference that identifies the UNSC as a deciding authority for such intervention. However, Ayoob (2002) views that the international community's military involvement, including the UNSC and other entities, is motivated by either national interest or humanitarian obligation or both.

The humanitarian intervention, within the purview of international law, typically refers to the threat of using force by a state or states or international organizations (Yoshida, 2013). No particular or standard delineation has been

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<sup>3</sup> Article 2 of the UN Charter.

found in the literature regarding the only definition of humanitarian intervention. This has prompted varying perceptions among scholars and practitioners regarding definition, scope, and other contextual peripheries of humanitarian intervention. Primarily, the purpose of such intervention is to protect the people of a particular state or community from widespread deprivation of internationally recognized human rights, including genocide and crimes against humanity (*Andonovska, 2019*). The use of force does not necessarily implicate a military intervention since using force or threat of using force can be projected through preventive diplomacy, economic sanction, and other means (*Murithi, 2009*). However, Schubert and Smith (*2007*) have anticipated that military forces' use would become an inevitable phenomenon in humanitarian intervention. Identifying the 'Peace Support Operations' (PSO) as an emerging trend of military involvement in humanitarian intervention, Pugh (*1998*) observed military involvement's inevitable existence for attaining the ultimate objective of a humanitarian intervention. According to Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, narrated in the edited seminal work of Woodhouse, Bruce, and Dando (*2016*), increasing military involvement has been observed during the humanitarian interventions in the post-cold war era. Considering the philosophical debate, this paper attempts to rationalize the necessity of military involvement in the broader purview of humanitarian intervention that prioritizes the classical school of thought over the liberal school of thought in contemporary IR literature.

**Research Objective:** The purpose of this paper is to review the necessity of military involvement, within the overall purview of humanitarian intervention, from the perspective of the UN Charter.

**Research Question:** To what extent is military involvement necessary in humanitarian intervention within the context of the UN Charter?

**Research Methodology:** Complying with the paper's objective, this paper has followed qualitative analysis. The research has followed content analysis on both primary and secondary resources that facilitate the research's application with the abstracts of representative studies. A wide range of secondary resources has provided expert opinions and insights for the qualitative improvement of the analysis. While following content analysis on primary resources, the UN Charter, the Humanitarian Charter and different resolutions of the UNSC have proved particularly beneficial for consulting various aspects of humanitarianism regarding different articles and chapters of the UN Charter. Besides this primary source, this research has conducted a systematic and critical review of varieties of secondary resources that include related documents, policies, case studies, published articles, journals, books, periodicals, and other web-based resources. Considering the study's scope and purpose, the research method prefers inductive reasoning through Research Question to validating Research Hypothesis. The use of multiple sources has facilitated further scrutiny to avoid possible biases of different information. Various primary and

secondary sources have been accessed online through Google Scholar and the 'Web of Science' search engine.

## AN INTROSPECTIVE STUDY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

To understand the underpinnings of 'humanitarian intervention' in the context of international relations, it is necessary to investigate the defining parameters of two words: humanitarian and intervention. 'Humanitarian' is concerned with humanity that promotes human welfare (Jones, 2016). Ways and means of attaining such welfare are elaborate, exhaustive, and contentious (Weiss, 2016). However, in general terms, an action that is prompted for the betterment of humanity can be termed a humanitarian act. An intervention is an act of directing resources through coercive approaches or pacific settlement or a combination of both (Kritsiotis, 1997). Such intervention aims to contain or improve a deteriorating situation in a humanitarian disaster in the IR literature. Thereby, an intervention can be considered an act of interference to attain a humanitarian aspect's desired effect. In a broader sense, humanitarian intervention has been defined from classical and liberal perspectives by scholars that denote differences in insight. Classical and liberal definitions differ concerning theoretical aspects and practical implementation.

From the empirical understanding, as Tesón (1988) viewed, humanitarian intervention is the assistance rendered to an individual or group, or community who are being denied from their fundamental human rights. Tesón's view has further been complemented by Wheeler's (2003) understanding that points out such activities in the context of severe violation of human rights. While these scholars of classical school have been more focused on humane aspects, Orford's (2003) critical narrative prefers using force to protect human rights in a humanitarian intervention that places purpose of interest over morality. According to Knudsen (1996) and other scholars of the classical school of thought, humanitarian intervention necessitates using force. Other scholars from classical thought have also accepted Verwey's definition with the agreement of involving coercive and forcible measures mentioning that an intervention does not essentially implicate the use of military forces; instead, it may involve non-forcible military means such as political, diplomatic and economic pressure (Miskel, 2000). In contrast, liberal scholars have viewed an intervention from a humane perspective indicating that humanitarian intervention may take various forms ranging from mild and non-violent means through applying either use or non-use of force (Kwakwa, 1994). Referring to Kwakwa, other scholars from the liberal school of thought further prefer public criticism, media campaign, political reform, and other forms of non-military yet forcible means of intervention (Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 1995). Besides these thoughts, a few liberal school scholars have found a classical form of

intervention in liberal context as they indicate coercive means as an alternative in case of unavoidable circumstances (Davidson, 2012). However, scholars from the liberal school of thought opine that major international institutions' support remains obligatory for the recipients as they have either no choice or minimal option but to accept.

The humanitarian emergency requires a response to provide relief goods, medical supplies, or even military equipment. Davey, Borton and Foley (2013) have found such a response in a broader sense of either religious or military or purely humanitarian viewpoints. From a religious perspective, a humanitarian response comes from the charitable obligation of different religious beliefs (Alger, 2002). The tradition of 'zakat' in Islam is one such response offered to the underprivileged people from the religious obligation. A Christian idea of charity has been observed in particular geographical locations like Europe, North America and Africa. Indicating a complicated relationship between religion and geographic location, Thomas (2000) has expressed that such religious response usually appears charitable and ends in capitalizing an interest-based motive. In Europe, during various disasters and calamities, rendering humanitarian assistance had been recognized as a symbol of charity from Christian ideology. Nevertheless, rendering such assistance was limited within the religious purview once there had been conflicts between different religious values. During a series of religious wars between the Christians and the Muslims, often referred to as the Crusades, the provision of humanitarian assistance was confined within the respective religious groups (Tyerman, 2018). It implicates that the Christians in Europe were ready to provide everything available to them to win the war against the Muslims. On the other hand, the Muslims had been desperate for rendering whatever they had to win over the Christians in establishing footsteps in Europe. Though such assistance, during the Crusades, can be argued as a humanitarian intervention or not; scholars perceived a transforming notion of humanitarian intervention from humanitarian assistance (Kayhan, Camela, & Al Moghabat 2018). Keulman (2018) has further termed this transforming phenomenon as a merging trend of humanitarian intervention initiated from relief, aid, and other humanitarian assistance forms. As such, the 'Crusading Philosophy' of military intervention had experienced significant transformation primarily through the 'Grotius Concept' of individual freedom and human rights, and then through the ideology of Westphalia. With the emerging notion of humanitarianism at the beginning of the 20th century, humanitarian intervention becomes more prominent in safeguarding social justice and protecting human rights. In Africa, delivering humanitarian assistance was initiated as a noble gesture from the Christian Churches and ultimately ended in sectorial domination, which has been viewed by Smock (1996) as the foundation of 'imperialism' in Africa by the Europeans. Referring to the UK's military involvement and other western powers in the Nigerian Biafran War, Heerten (2009) has indicated that the Western role was more of attaining political gain than that of providing



humanitarian assistance. Thus, the essence of humanitarian assistance had been transformed from a purely noble gesture to the point of interest in the context of political interest.

The modern age of humanitarian intervention has begun with the end of the Cold War as the world has observed more numbers of humanitarian interventions after the cold war era (*Welsb, 2004: 11*). However, the concept dates back to the 17th century when Hugo Grotius introduced customary international law (*Brett, 2019*). The Dutch philosopher also significantly contributed to the evolution of human rights in the framework of humanitarianism. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the European expeditionary forces undertook the endeavor for searching new countries or localities. Wilkins and Nash (2008) argued that these voyages were undertaken to find to find new business opportunities, while Grove (2020) saw this as an opportunity for colonial expansion. European and American interventionist posture continued up to the early 20th century as some western powers intervened in different countries disguised in humanitarian motives. To give a few examples, the Belgium intervention in Congo (1960), the US intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), French intervention in Central Africa (1978), Belgium and French intervention in Shaba Province (1978, the US intervention in Nicaragua (1970-1987) and in Grenada (1983) that is mentioned in various literatures (*Amer, 1994; Amer, 2007; Weiss, 2016*). Most of these interventions were politically motivated with the active involvement of military forces. Indicating this trend of military-dominated humanitarian intervention, Maxey (2020) has criticized these western interventions that violate the norm of state-sovereignty and adherence to the principles of non-interference.

Norm of humanitarian intervention has got different dimensions during the cold war and in the post-cold war era regarding the use of force in military involvement. Scholars and practitioners argued about military forces' legitimate involvement in humanitarian intervention (*Chomsky, Barsamian, & Zinn, 1997*). In the cold war period, world politics revolved around two major superpowers (the USA and the USSR) that used to dominate world affairs. Humanitarian aspects had been ignored as countries were not interested in involving in such an issue with the fear of getting trapped in the rivalry into the rivalry of either of these two superpowers (*Schmidt, 2013*). As a result, humanitarian intervention had been deeply constrained to avoid confrontation either with the US-led NATO block or the USSR-led WARSAW block. States did not act as part of the international community unless they had attained consent from their aligned blocks. Military intervention had been mainly in low profile in fear of falling prey to the opposing side (*Hoffmann, 1998*). However, during the cold war era, state sovereignty had been respected among the states and within the NATO and WARSAW block. With the departure of the USSR, bi-polar world politics had shifted to unipolar world politics. At the same time, individual states had come out of the shadow of bipolar world politics. With the former USSR's breakup, democratic ideology prevailed over communism that focused more on

humanitarian issues. The international community could raise a stronger voice on the humanitarian aspect as some individual states took the initiative to uphold human rights. Despite the significant transformation from bi-polar to unipolar world politics and initiative from states and the international community to uphold the humanitarian issue, military intervention had appeared as a definite tool for humanitarian intervention (*Voeten, 2007*). The world has experienced an upward trend of military intervention in the post-cold war era. The first humanitarian intervention in the post-cold war era was the Iraq invasion by the US-led coalition forces in 1991. Though the fall of Saddam Hussain was viewed as a relief for the USA and its allies, the intervention was demonstrated as an urge to restore the human rights of Iraqi people. Since then, states and the international community have conducted several humanitarian interventions where military forces had been the prime movers (*Von Hippel, 2004*). The increasing trend of military involvement in humanitarian intervention has raised the legacy and legitimacy of such intervention (*Hopf, 2005*). Evolving norms related to human rights and the use of force have sparked normative and empirical debates over the legality, legitimacy, ethics of using military forces to respond to human rights violations. In the context of such debates, scholars and practitioners argued over the application of humanitarian intervention, questioning when to intervene, who to intervene and how to intervene, and finally whether such intervention is effective or not (*Macfarlane, Thielking, & Weiss, 2004*).

## **THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION**

Humanitarian intervention is by-default humane and universal, rather than interest-biased. Therefore, such intervention should be launched only in extreme circumstances with strict adherence to customary international laws prohibiting state-sovereignty and non-interference. In international norms, an intervention is carried out with the authorization of the UNSC. A resolution approved by the UNSC gives the international community the mandate to intervene in a particular humanitarian crisis. Here, the UNSC acts as credible and legitimate stature for authorizing any humanitarian intervention. A state-initiated and executed intervention, without the approval of the UNSC, lacks a legal justification for conducting the intervention. In case of any intervention without the approval and consent of the UNSC, the overall involvement is likely to be questioned as intervening power gets involved in 'pick and choose' approach (*Weiss in Ayoob 2002, 86*). Credibility and legitimacy are compromised once the national interest of concerned coalition state or international community prevails over noble humane intentions. The threshold step of any humanitarian intervention usually starts through diplomatic negotiation, continues through economic sanctions and other coercive diplomacy tools, and finally ends with the military intervention (*Fixdal & Smith, 1998*). Regarding the

mode, type, and means of intervention, scholars and practitioners of humanitarianism have different understandings while defining the intervention's threshold level. Preferring military intervention before economic sanctions and other kinds of interventions, *Skocpol and Finegold (1982)* have opined that the absence of an initial robust approach would make futile the nobility and the international community's overall objective's involvement. Considering the institutional framework of the UNSC, Evans (*2004: 82*) has established a set of threshold criteria for humanitarian intervention that are:

- The scale of the crisis must encompass either mass atrocities or the inability to maintain law and order.
- The purpose of the intervention must be humanitarian.
- There should be multilateral action to diminish the incidence of national agendas.
- Military intervention should be a last resort, only instigated when diplomatic talks and economic sanctions have failed.
- Force should be proportional, not excessive, to ensure a better outcome than harm.

The essence of the threshold criteria mentioned above has been further explained in the literature of Atack (*2002*) who supports humanitarian intervention as a responsibility to protect (R2P) the affected communities. The R2P is a doctrine which was recognized by the members of the UN in 2005 for protecting people from the gross violation of human rights<sup>4</sup>. The R2P Doctrine, related to the protection of human rights, is particularly essential for the humanitarian literature since the UN Charter confirms safeguarding the fundamentals of human rights that has been further elucidated in different chapters of the UN Charter (Article 1 of Chapter I, Article 12 of the Chapter IV, Article 55 of the Chapter IX, Article 62 and 68 of the Chapter X and Article 76 of the Chapter XII). However, Newman (*2013*) has criticized the UN for not doing enough to protect human rights, within the purview of R2P. Such involvement of the UN was observed in Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya, and elsewhere once the UNSC authorizes its humanitarian intervention resources. Referring to Somalia's mass starvation during the civil war and atrocities of Haiti, Holzgrefe and Keohane (*2003*) contradict with Newman's argument expressing that R2P does not address all issues within the framework of the UN Charters. Pattison (*2011*) observed the same by referring to Gaddafi's threat to his community. Therefore, Chapter VII that deals with the international peace and security is trapped between the R2P and the state-sovereignty notion. Ayoob (*2002: 87*) have termed such standoff as an indicative politics between interest and nobility of different actors, states, or coalition. The other peripheral issue of threshold

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<sup>4</sup> The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

criteria is the limitation of R2P regarding the international community's involvement and human rights violations through the use of force. In such discourse, the use of military force remains arguable, demanding the legal existence of military involvement. While the responsibility to protect the affected community remains a moral obligation for the international community, their use of force and human rights violations to other communities calls into question the legitimacy of such intervention. In the case of military intervention in the name of humanitarian perspective, human rights violation of the rest of the community remains a significant concern identified by Bellamy (2005: 33) while referring to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Humanitarian interventions are supposedly incited on behalf of benevolent interest (Newman, 2002). Therefore, the greater good for the affected community remains futile if the broader community cannot reap the benefit from an intervention.

The other threshold criteria for humanitarian intervention are the legal authorization by the UNSC and the acceptance of legitimacy either by the affected community or by the part of the international community not involved in it. The involvement of Acemoglu's (2005) powerful states and weaker states merits a state's existence based on economic and political stability. As intervention usually takes place by powerful states or coalition in weaker states' affairs, such intervention has been termed as 'Trojan Horse' by Bellamy (2005), terming the UNSC initiated intervention as legal yet not legitimate. On the other hand, military intervention becomes redundant if the situation can be solved without using force with all parties' consent to the conflict. Again, the use of force sometimes appears inevitable despite the absence of a legal consent by either a local or regional or international actor as has been experienced during the Kosovo crisis (Auerwald, 2001). In such a case, moral obligation supersedes the legal aspects. However, the use of force does not always necessarily mean the military involvement, since the threshold criteria of using military in any humanitarian intervention have been viewed as the last resort (Pugh, 1998: 341). Here, ways and means of attaining humanitarian objectives remain vague and obscured in the context of motive and purpose. Referring to the R2P document and other policy guidelines, theorists and practitioners have preferred specific parameters (the Three Pillars Theory of R2P)<sup>5</sup> for humanitarian intervention that have been further identified by Acharya (2013) and specified by Bellamy (2005). This scholarly review supports the UNSC-initiated threshold criteria wherein both military involvement cases happen to be the last preference for a humanitarian intervention. The use of military forces marks the imperative approach in the threshold of human rights abuses, over the rights of state sovereignty.

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<sup>5</sup> Enhancing Protection Capacity: Policy Guide to the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians (Page 09)

## THE LEGAL AND LEGITIMATE NOTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

During the cold war period, the bipolar world order relied more on ideological value than humanitarian issues. Within the purview of humanitarian intervention, military involvement has experienced a significant transformation in the post-cold war era (*Shibusawa, 2016*). The Balkan crisis was such an example where the international community's intervention had been in the status quo due to the superpower's difference of perception regarding settling the ethnic issues. Though the Balkan crisis occurred immediately after the post-cold war period, indicating the event as a transition point of two distinct epochs (post-cold war and cold war), Kuperman (*2008*) has indicated the Balkan Crisis as a historical lesson. The Balkan crisis can be analyzed further through the philosophical perception of Hugo Grotius. Grotius philosophy of humanitarianism, which has been accepted as a customary dogma for years, has been ignored during the cold war era due to the politically inclined ideology of bi-polar order (*Brett, 2019*). However, Grotius's philosophy of humanitarian intervention, proposed in his three theories, experienced a paradigm shift in the post-cold war era as the perception regarding moral and ethical values has altered from the cold war ideology. According to Criddle's (*2015: 474*) claim, a state's intervention in another state's affair for protecting people from intolerable sufferings has been legitimized by Grotius's interventionist theories that validates the legacy of humanitarian intervention terming it to be a legal obligation for protecting humanity. However, none of the Grotius's theories essentially propagates military involvement violating the norms of IR. The Westphalian humanitarian concepts inherited the Grotius's philosophical legacy, which is also reflected in the UN Charter and the Humanitarian Charter<sup>6</sup>. In this regard, the articles of the UN Charter are particularly significant due to its dominant focus on the disputed issues like state-sovereignty and human rights violations. The varying explanation, existing in the different articles of the UN Charter, caused a disputed explanation regarding the military involvement in the humanitarian intervention (*Kob, 2017*). At one end, the UN is obliged to safeguard individual states' sovereignty, while on the other, the UN is determined to endorse the fundamentals of human rights<sup>7</sup>. According to the purpose and the principles of the UN Charter, the UN is organizationally obligated upholding the principle of sovereign equality of all its member states (Article 2 of Chapter I). This organizational responsibility may impede the UN while defending the human rights issues through military and other coercive approaches. Identifying this critical trend of military intervention, Kier and Mercer (*1996*) commented that a military intervention might lack legitimacy, even the intervention is a legal one. Conversely, a military intervention may not be a legal one, yet can be legitimate to serve humanity's purpose.

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<sup>6</sup> The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.

<sup>7</sup> The UN Charter.

In case of any humanitarian intervention, the debate of legality and legitimacy plays a vital role in shaping up the humanitarian approach. Military involvement in a humanitarian intervention further obscures humanitarianism's overall notion (Luckham, 1971). Knudsen (1996) and Hehir (2012) observed the existence of the legality vs. legitimacy debate throughout the history of humanitarian intervention, while Buzan (2008) witnessed the meaningful existence of this debate in the post-cold war era due to an increased trend of military intervention. In the post-cold war era, the world experienced the first humanitarian intervention in 1991 as the US-led coalition force intervened in Iraq after Iraq had invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had been legitimized by the Iraqi government but not by most of the world (Weston, 1991). According to the UN Charter, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not legitimate since the invasion breached the norm of state sovereignty of an independent country without the consent of the UNSC (Kreps, 2019). Therefore, the UNSC had approved the use of force to restore the situation<sup>8</sup>. In this case, the military intervention by the US-led coalition force had legal approval by the UNSC and also attained legitimacy as Niblock (2004) has endorsed the world's consensus for taking a punitive measure of such misdeed of Iraq. The case of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 was quite different from the previous one that drew criticism from many countries and international bodies. The intervention with an allegation on Iraq for possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) failed to attain a legal mandate from the UNSC, and thereby lacked the moral reasoning of legitimacy (Gillespie, 2006). In the absence of a legal UNSC mandate, the UK-initiated and the US-led coalition force had found a legitimate cause of saving the Iraqi people from a state authority alleged for not complying with its people's usual humanitarian standard (Scott & Ambler, 2007). However, according to Asada (2008), the US-led coalition force failed to justify their legitimacy of intervention as WMD could not be found in Iraq. Thereby, the US-led Iraq invasion of 2003 had lacked both legal and legitimate mandate, while the coalition intervention of 1991 could attain both a legal verdict from the UNSC and consensus of legitimacy from the rest of the world. The US-led military intervention in 1991 had been inevitable from both legal and legitimate viewpoints, while the military intervention in 2003 was criticized for not complying with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter (Chouliaraki, 2005; Garey, 2020). Thus, a military intervention may not be necessary for attaining the desired objective of humanitarian intervention yet may be directed to establish a self-proclaimed legacy to serve self-interest.

## CONCLUSION

The history of humanitarian intervention is intermingled with the international humanitarian system, an age-old issue. In humanity's history, the humanitarian

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<sup>8</sup> The UNSC Resolution 678

intervention had been impelled as a response to a humanitarian crisis. In response to such a crisis, humanitarian intervention has been universally accepted as a noble norm of protecting human rights. Defending human rights can be ensured through different tools of humanitarian intervention. Military involvement often has been used as a tool for humanitarian intervention. Once the military means is used as a humanitarian intervention tool, it initiates the debate between the legal and legitimate existence of using military power within the purview of the United Nations (UN) Charter. As humanitarian intervention has been universally accepted as a benevolent approach; therefore, such an approach may be enacted with a strict adherence to international norms so that no question arises regarding its motive and purpose. However, military power in a humanitarian intervention raised criticism regarding its motive of biased-interest over benevolent motives. Though the humanitarian intervention had been directed at securing a political agenda, the military power had been used as a tool for attaining that particular political agenda. Such use of military power generates the criticism regarding its necessity to attain greater good for any humanitarian intervention.

The criticism regarding the inevitability of military power also invites the debate between legal involvement and legitimate acceptance within the UN Charter's purview. Several humanitarian interventions have been observed in the post-cold war period where military involvements ignored either legal stature or legitimate acceptance. In the Iraq War of 1991, military intervention was inevitable as all other approaches had failed. Nevertheless, such was not the case for the Iraq War of 2003, protracted against customary legal and legitimate norms. If the Iraq War of 1991 is supported by the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, then the Iraq War of 2003 breached the norm of Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the UN Charter that proclaims the principle of state-sovereignty. Besides deviating from the UN Purposes and Principles (mentioned in Chapter I of the UN Charter), the Iraq invasion has also breached Article 42 of the UN Charter that prohibits any use of force without the legal consent of the UNSC. However, non-intervention of military forces may not be successful always as has been observed during the Kosovo crisis, where humane factors superseded the legal binding of international norms. Thousands of innocent people of Kosovo had been trapped due to the international community's indecisiveness, which had failed to make a bold decision as the UNSC could not come to a common consensus for launching an effective military intervention. In the case of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, the US-led coalition forces ignored the legal stature of the UNSC yet could save thousands of people while placing the morality-driven legitimacy over the legal condemnation of the UNSC. In the case of the Iraq War of 1991, the US-led military intervention was legal and legitimate. However, the Iraq War of 2003, the UK-initiated and US-led intervention on Iraq, lacked both legal and legitimate discourse despite of self-proclaimed legitimacy declared by the UK and the USA. However, the Iraq War of 2003 created much chaos in the international arena. The military

interventions in Iraq and Kosovo indicate how legal aspects and legitimate acceptance are being influenced by the noble cause and biased notion of different actors involved in humanitarian interventions.

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