

NDC JOURNAL <i>Security Through Knowledge</i>
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VISION AND MISSION STATEMENTS OF THE COLLEGE

VISION

The National Defence College is dedicated to be the premier National Centre of Excellence in security, strategic and development studies.

MISSION

To Educate and Train Selected Senior Armed Forces and Civil Services Officers at Operational and Strategic Level of National Security and Development.

To Focus on Long Term National Security and Development Issues and Suggest Appropriate National Response.

To Support the National Agencies in Policy Making on Security and Development Matters.

To Support the Armed Forces on Strategic and Operational Level Planning of Warfare.

To Strengthen Civil-Military Relation in Bangladesh.

To Strengthen Military to Military Cooperation in the Region and Beyond.

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FOREWARD

National Defence College, Bangladesh started its journey in 1999 with a vision: to develop as the national centre of excellence on security and development studies - meeting the challenges of the 21st Century. Now, at the verge of its decade long existence, we feel proud to be recognized as the premier institution of the country. Its credibility has transcended beyond the border of the country. This year, our eleven friendly countries have sent 20 of their esteemed members to undergo the academic session of this reputed institution.

Keeping its motto 'Security through Knowledge' at the fore-front, the college always maintains a constant focus on achieving a comprehensive understanding of defence and security. The college has been endeavoring utmost to offer an intellectually rewarding and effective academic curriculum to the potential planners, leaders and strategic thinkers of the future. To prepare them to face the complex security environment, emphasis has always been given on subjects that impact or impinge on defence and national security. It is heartening to see, the graduates of this college have shown a mark of distinction in their respective fields.

National Defence College has always been emphasizing on conducting quality research on contemporary issues on defence and national security. It is pleasing to note that the 8th issue of NDC journal bears the testimony of our efforts. The selected 'Individual Research Papers' of the course members of both National Defence Course and Armed Forces War Course have been published in the journal. The editorial board could accommodate thought provoking articles of varied interest. I believe, avid readers will find the publication useful and enriching.

I congratulate all the members who have contributed to this journal. I thank the editorial board for editing and publishing the journal as scheduled. This issue of the journal is yet another milestone in the path of progress of National Defence College, Bangladesh.

Sina Ibn Jamali, awc, psc
 Lieutenant General
 Commandant

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EDITORIAL

Our ideas are born in our imagination. They represent the intelligence with which we clothe our consciousness and empirical investigation of the phenomena in subtle and sensitive analysis. Power of ideas carries far beyond the individual creation of subjective cognitive frontier. Their accomplishment lies in their collective share of understanding and intellectual empathy. As every age is captured in the images of ideas that control the particular moments of time, so is every scholastic institution portrayed by unbridling the thoughts in creative work by its scholars. Excellence of thoughts can only come through a process, which is both sublime and arduous. The passion of thought is to seek the pedestal of idealistic truth. More onerous the path of investigation is, more accurate the proximity of its destination to truth will be. This search for truth is not without the challenges of certitude and intellectual pain. But that is where lies the beauty and appeal of human endeavour at trying to make others believe its logic and profundity. To create a sense of intellectual curiosity in the minds is like being swayed by the force of intellectual storm and inspired to yearn for greater heights of knowledge.

National Defence College is one such premier academia of Bangladesh whose mission is energized towards cultivating and sharpening the storm of intellectual passion within its members. NDC Journal is one such work that truly embodies the qualitative product of its members. It contains research works by senior civil and military officers, both from home and abroad, suggestive of the College motto "Security Through Knowledge". The articles, incorporated in this journal, are the abridged version of much broader research works carried on individual basis. The abridgement is executed in a manner that the inner significance and depth of the contents has lost none of their significance and preciseness. The range of their spectrum speaks of the breadth and plurality of themes embodied in the profound intellectual interests of the course members. They widely vary in substance and touch upon the subjects of current import, namely, terrorism, illegal migration, strategic leadership, unipolarity, Asian highway, warship building, pharmaceuticals, post-insurgency management and decision-making process. This issue also includes an article by a guest writer on foreign direct investment. The merit of these articles is that their message deserves reflection in national policy making debates. It may be mentioned here that these articles are selected from an array of 54 individual Research Papers produced by the course members of National Defense Course (NDC) and Armed Forces War Course (AFWC). If other research papers have not found their place in the current issue of the journal, lack of space in meeting the size of this volume will account for such unintended exclusion. We only wish if they could also be housed in this issue but alas! There is no doubt that their quality and merit are of equal finesse to the ones included in the current volume. Their research works epitomize their passion for intellectual curiosity about making this planet earth an abode of peace by resolving multi-dimensional security issues. Their intellectual commitment, physical labour and mental toil in producing their works deserve all our heartfelt appreciation.

This editorial would not be complete if we did not record our gratitude to the Chief Patron of the Journal, Lt Gen Sina Ibn Jamali, awc, psc, the Commandant of National Defence College. He gave us invaluable guidance in our editorial responsibility. We forward our deepest appreciation of the hard work and relentless support by members of the editorial board. Despite all efforts, toils and sincerity, unintentional errors in whatever form may not be unlikely in the appearance of the journal. We fervently beseech the readers to pardon us of such unnoticed slights.

We shall consider ourselves richly rewarded to receive constructive and suggestive criticisms from our valued readers. We hope that the journal will prove its worth to a reader with an investigative mind, an intellectual zeal, an assiduous learning and an academic yearning.

A B M Mostafizur Rahman, ndc, afwc, psc
 Air Commodore
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Colonel Wang Zhijun, *ndc*
2. *India and Pakistan as Nuclear Powers: Implications for Bangladesh and the Region*
Brigadier R P Sahi, *ndc*
3. *Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Threat Analysis and Counter Strategies*
Colonel Effendi bin Ab Karim, *ndc*
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13. *International Humanitarian Law and Low Intensity Conflict: Nigeria a Case Study*
Captain Gideon Adegboyega Ojedokun, *ndc*

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ABSTRACT

QUOTA INTERVENTION IN CIVIL SERVICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional Secretary A. L. M. Abdur Rahman, *ndc*

National The Quota system in the Civil Service originated during the British period. In independent Bangladesh, quota intervention in recruitment of Civil Service was implemented on 5 September 1972. At present in recruitment to the Civil Service, 55 percent posts have been reserved for quota, only 45 percent posts are allocated on the basis of merit. Cadre-wise, the Quota system is followed in promotion, starting from the position of deputy secretary and above, up to additional secretary. This policy goes against the principles of equality and non-discrimination envisaged in article 29(1) and 29(2) of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. It has in fact, created serious impediments to merit based Civil Service promotion. Of course, article 29(3) (a) empowers the state to set aside positions for making special provisions for backward section of citizens in recruitment to the public service. Unfortunately, the spirit of this article has been ignored in meeting the Quota provision for recruitment in public posts. To ensure efficiency, effectiveness and dynamism in the Civil Service, and above all, to achieve a merit based Civil Service, the use of Quotas at the entry level needs to be revalued and reasonable accommodation made for merit, setting aside 75 percent of the positions at the lowest for this purpose. As well, Quota at the Senior Promotion level should be totally dropped and the Senior Service Pool should be reintroduced. All Civil Service Reform Commissions/ Committees formed so far, including the Bangladesh Public Service Commission, have prescribed for reforms in the Civil Service in this direction. In this paper, by way of critical examination, a rational solution has been sought to reshape and replace, the existing Quota systems for a merit-based Civil Service.

EVALUATION OF PHULBARI DEAL: SEARCH FOR POLICY OPTIONS

Group Captain Muhammad Mortuza Kamal, *ndc, psc, GD(P)*

An Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary Minerals International Exploration Inc (BHP), started coal exploration in Phulbari area. Bangladesh government signed a contract with BHP through an open tender. In 1998, the

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Brigadier General Md Zahirul Islam, *ndc, psc, G*
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Brigadier General Md Mozammel Hossain, *ndc, psc*

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contract was assigned to Asia Energy (AEC), a British company, after estimating the coal reserve. A AEC report claims that Bangladesh will receive benefits worth US\$13.7 billion as indirect or multiplier benefits. The mine itself and the coal fired plant for the production of electricity will contribute 1% percent per annum to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. 26 August 2006, the local people assembled in Phulbari town to tell the foreign company that it must vacate their ancestral land. They would rather die than allow the company to mine their land for coal since that would displace a huge population. It seems that the full implementation of the agreement between the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Port and the government seems to be the hardest part of the episode. However, all concerned should look into the factors that have led to this catastrophic situation. It seems that is a clear mismatch between the deal signed and the coal policy. Many believe that the Phulbari Coal project will be a burden for the country. So the issue needs urgent attention. The lessons learnt must be drawn in the upcoming coal policy which is still in draft form. Keeping all the realities in mind, it is necessary to examine the deal minutely and establish the facts and expose the deviations in the deal which have lead to such national crisis. This paper makes an humble effort at evaluating the deal and suggest a few viable options. The aim of the paper is to suggest stopping further recurrence of such misunderstanding, finding out the mismatch between the deal and its implementation and recommend a suitable extraction method based on keeping the national interest at the centre.

MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA : THREAT ANALYSIS AND COUNTER STRATEGY

Colonel Effendi Bin Hj AB Karim, *afdc, ndc, psc*

This paper is aimed at examining the validity of the international users' perception that terrorists may collaborate with pirates to mount punitive attacks in the Straits of Malacca. The two littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia do not subscribe to such a view. Hence the research question lingers on the issue of why a is the Straits of Malacca was said to be the next target of attack? Do terrorist-pirate plots really exist? Or is there any other agenda behind the overwhelming concern about the threat of maritime terrorism in the Straits? These questions lead to the hypothesis that due to numerous countervailing factors, maritime terrorism attacks are unlikely to occur in the Straits of Malacca in the near future. Among the objective of this paper to analyze the importance of the Straits of Malacca to its user, determine potential threats, and focus on the possibility of security hypes in

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43. *Media Politics in Bangladesh: Crossing the Boundary of Professionalism*
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9. *Religion Based Terrorism and Its Implication on National Security of Bangladesh*
Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Ehteshamul Haque, *afwc, psc, Engrs*

XII

the Straits of Malacca being driven by other factors. To achieve these objectives, the analysis examined the perceived frameworks used by Al-Qaeda in planning and executing 9/11 attacks in the United States. These include the need for dedicated leadership, efficient communication and intelligence relevant expertise, and sufficient logistic support. This paper concludes that due to numerous countervailing factors, a maritime terrorism attack is unlikely to happen in the Straits of Malacca in the near future. It also concludes that despite divergent threat perceptions between littoral states and international users, both could work together to ensure the safety and security of strait users.

DISTRICT LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN: PERSPECTIVE FOR BANGLADESH

Brigadier General Abul Muksid Md Wazed Thakur, *ndc, psc*

The characteristics of good governance is ingrained in Abraham Lincoln's historical statement that, "democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people". Institutions of governance based on democratic principles, and local governments are undoubtedly are the institutions that are closest to the people and at the base of the democratic system of government, their development can thus go a long way in strengthening the democratic form of Government. Democratic local governments, indeed, provide a pertinent political education for citizens of free societies. In third world countries like Bangladesh, administrative and local governance system can reach out to grass-roots level and have all the features needed for participatory democracy. Countries of the region have recently carried out experiments and studies to attempt to decentralize and strengthen the local government system. Government of Pakistan has sought the assistance of donor agencies, and with the initiatives of the World Bank, a 'Big Bang' approach to local government decentralization was implemented in 2000. Through the 'Big Bang' model Pakistan installed a democratic and service oriented institutional set-up at the district level for better administration governance. In spite of reports and studies of different commission / committee reports, it is unfortunate that, no serious efforts have been made till now to decentralize power and devolve authority to local government in Bangladesh to create a viable institutional framework for sustainable democracy and good governance. Keeping this particular perspective in mind, this situation has been carried out to explore the Pakistan experience in order to find out its implications to initiate a devolution scheme at the district level for administrative and local government Bangladesh. This study has come up with three alternative models Zila Government, Zila Parishad and Zila Development and Coordination Committee for

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EXTERNAL FORCE PROJECTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY: ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

Captain Andrew Adebowale Dacosta, ndc

The much expected peace, stability and development after the Cold War remain elusive. While it was hoped to be an era of promise and developing partnerships it became an era of irregular and increasingly intermittent conflict in which Africa is not an exception. However, the tremendous potential of the Gulf of Guinea is creating investment opportunities for the region. Some of its resources, such as oil, minerals and forests, continue to attract significant investments whereas others like natural gas could be exploited to their full potential if the necessary investments were undertaken. Nevertheless, the Gulf of Guinea has to cope with numerous challenges, both exogenous and endogenous, before it can fully benefit from its riches. One of these problems stems from the overwhelmingly weak institutions and governance, pointed by stylized facts, which add to the risks of "natural resource curse" and can feed the theory of the Paradox of Plenty. The lacunae created by the neglect of the maritime domain allowed the US and other foreign powers to foray in the region to exploit its resources. The case is made that regional institutional arrangements and increased involvement of the international community and other stakeholders should complement the efforts in which countries in the region should engage to address policy and governance issues. Complementary avenues are proposed, including maintaining stability and security, putting in place credible maritime guard force and making better use of the region's own assets.

STREET CHILDREN OF DHAKA CITY : WHERE THEY ARE HEADING TO ?

Joint Secretary Shaheen Khan, ndc

The presence of a large number of homeless children on the streets of Dhaka city is silently growing into a matter of concern that can lead to major negative consequences on the society as a whole. This research paper aims at developing into the issues of street children, their socio-economic condition, adversities faced by them and the subsequent effect on social, economic, political and national security. The study conducted in Dhaka city focused on bus terminals, railway stations, market places and traffic signals due to their concentration in these areas.

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Several data collection methodologies were used while 75 boys and 26 girls in age group 5-18 years were interviewed. Several case studies provide a better illustration of their lives. The study has come up with findings on the adversities faced by street children daily. Subsequent consequences include involvement in criminal activities and inability to integrate with mainstream society. Serious repercussions of street life include retarded mental and physical growth thus threatening quality of life, holding an ominous future and having subsequent effect on human, societal, national, regional and international security. Thus, what seems to be a small problem in the present context could become a serious threat in future, if neglected. This study has come up with several suggestions like awareness building, media campaign, changing social mind-set, sympathetic attitude towards their plight and providing accommodation especially night shelters. Education in the form of night schools, vocational training, health care facilities and legal aid will enable them to undergo rehabilitation in the society. To remove the children from the streets, they must be motivated to remain off the streets and counselled to reintegrate with their families as well as to overcome trauma, dysfunctional behaviour and ensure smooth transition to normal life. As the government has reaffirmed its commitment to Child Rights by signing two optional protocols in United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children and has recognized street children in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and National Children Policy coordinated action plans must be pursued with utmost urgency to mitigate hardships and rehabilitate them. This would result in street children being turned into national assets capable of contributing meaningfully to the society, and ultimately to the nation.

CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY AND ROLE OF THE POLICY MAKERS: OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

Commander Mohammad Musa, afwc, psc, BN

In present geopolitical scenario, sea is vitally important for ensuring security of the state from economic, political, societal, military and environmental perspectives. Bangladesh has long been drawing her security perimeters with a landward vision. The maritime sector is neglected leading to multiple vulnerabilities. Hence, there is a need to look at the maritime security aspects in depth. There are many national interests lying in the maritime sector which faces greater challenges today. Again, the unawareness of the Policy Makers, weak institutional and infrastructural base, regional disunity, technological backwardness, environmental negligence etc are contributory factors in

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Bangladesh's maritime insecurity. The new strategic environment may require a change in the shape and focus of our maritime forces, as well as an expansion of responsibility to include organizations associated with the maritime domain directly and indirectly. Most importantly, it is essential to develop maritime awareness among the policy makers to respond in maritime security challenges. Coupled with these responses, maritime forces supported by credible maritime infrastructures can tackle the hardcore threats both from the state and non-state actor. Again, as the seas are indivisible, many threats are transnational in nature. Hence, both bilateral and regional cooperation are also necessary to have a common platform of effective regional maritime security partnership.

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: MYTH OR REALITY FOR BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES?

Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Quamrul Islam, afwc, psc

The emerging theory of 'Network Centric Warfare' (NCW) has proved to be a force multiplier of battle space in the recent past. It enables military commanders to take the information advantage that can significantly increases the fighting power of a force. It also helps operational and tactical level commanders in taking quick decisions to self-synchronize their actions. The concept of NCW is not very familiar to the Bangladesh Armed Forces. But many modern armies have introduced the concept of NCW to enhance the synergetic effort required in the battle space. Therefore, it is important to analyse the necessity of conducting NCW in the context of the requirement of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. This primary research attempts to identify the implication and feasibility of NCW. The option of adopting NCW for the Bangladesh Armed Forces have been suggested in this paper. Because of rapid development in information technology, the means of connecting sensor, shooter and the commander may vary but the idea of networking forces by any means remains the basic consideration of NCW. The author attempts to show that the concept of NCW is very applicable for Bangladesh and can be implemented with existing communication infrastructure and facilities. This paper also suggests ways of implementing the concept of NCW into reality. A brief proposal for training personnel on NCW has been included to familiarise the subject and help develop expertise to undertake Network-Centric Operations in the future.

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IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) ON REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA) IN BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Wing Commander Md Alamgir Hossain, afwc, psc

According to Karl von Clausewitz the nature of war never changes, but the manner of conducting the wars have undergone considerable changes, which can also be explained by noting that other a historical discontinuity, or revolution has occurred in the way wars are fought. A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a combination of technological, organizational, social, doctrinal and political-economic changes take place in conjunction and affect the way militaries plan, equip and train to wage war. This current RMA is driven by technology, namely Information Technologies (IT), which include different kinds of new tools and processes of waging war such as Information Warfare (IW), Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Integrated Command and Control (C4ISR), System of Systems, jointmanship etc. Toady any topic on military, strategic, or national security invariably promotes the concept of emerging RMA. Whatever else the RMA is about, its primary emphasis is on the enhancement of military capability that will permit profound changes in military operations, doctrines and organisation. But RMA has been neglected in the Bangladesh Armed Forces because of many obvious reasons. Considering the technological development of other countries in this region, we need to prepare ourselves to face the variety of warfare tools that might be employed against us in the future conflicts. As such, it is time for Bangladesh Armed Forces to focus on possible changes required in doctrine, organization and training for operational adaptability with the developments in the field of IT and IW to derive all possible benefits of RMA to face the future challenges for the armed forces and for the national security.

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QUOTA INTERVENTION IN CIVIL SERVICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional Secretary A. L. M. Abdur Rahman, ndc

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) is as old as British rule in India. After its long journey since its inception, BCS is now at the threshold of global competitiveness. It has to face the challenges of the 21st century. That requires a paradigm shift from transactional leadership to transformational leadership. To meet the challenges of globalization, the Civil Service of Bangladesh must have speed, adaptability, flexibility and responsiveness in order to discharge the responsibilities bestowed upon it. Civil Servants, are supposed to be Change Agents who welcome, anticipate and cause change. All these issues have been linked up with HRM and HRD implication in Civil Service.

Recruitment at the entry level and promotion at the senior management level are crucial for the Bangladesh Civil service. The Recruitment Policy should be designed to attract the most talented people in the Civil service. The Promotion Policy at the Senior Management level should be based on merit and performance. Unfortunately, in both cases, no significant reforms have been made so far. As a result, the Bangladesh Civil service is not yet prepared to undertake the challenges of the 21st century and can not compete with any world class Civil service. As a Government report puts it admits "... the Civil Service currently operates in all most in the same manner as it did in the days of strong authoritarian.... rule , often even using the same techniques and management practices that were introduced a few decades ago. The accent still remains more on process than on outputs, and on rule responsiveness". These are major concerns for the Civil Service of Bangladesh. Considering the more bound nature of the civil service, we have taken Quota System for examination.

As per recruitment policy of the Government, 55 percent of the positions in the Civil Service have been reserved for Quota while 45 percent positions of come under the purview. The Quota intervention in Civil Service in fact extends to senior positions. Here again merit has had to yield to Quota intervention.

Objectives

This paper will first attempt to suggest a recruitment policy for Bangladesh Civil Service based on merit. Secondly, it will explore the way, for making

1. Ministry of Establishment, Developing Civil Service Capacity for 21st Century Administration, (TPP), Dhaka, 2005

promotions at the senior level on the basis of competency and merit.

Scope and Limitation

This paper has been divided into seven chapters. The first chapter deals with the background, aims, objectives, methodology followed and scope and limitations. The second chapter covers the historical perspectives of the evolution of the quota system. The third chapter compares Quota intervention at the entry level in Bangladesh with some other countries of the world. The fourth chapter critically analyzes some dilemmas faced in addressing the Quota system during Recruitment. The fifth chapter deals with Quota intervention in senior level promotions. The sixth chapter compiles the opinion survey and transforms data into information as findings. The seventh chapter relates to formulation of conclusions and recommendations. The present study, it should be emphasized includes only the two aforementioned dimensions of the Bangladesh Civil for consideration and excludes all other public services

Methodology

The information collected for this paper, is essentially based on secondary data. Reports of Administrative Reform Commissions, papers prepared by donor agencies and experts and some selected Annual Reports of The Public Service Commission have been utilized. We had to resort to primary data, developed through questionnaires supplied to potential resource persons. Interviews of some resource persons in connection with quota intervention were recorded. The primary data have been processed, analyzed and reflected as findings of the opinion survey.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF QUOTA SYSTEM

The Quota system followed in the BCS is not a new phenomenon. Quota for minorities was formally introduced on July 14, 1934 on the basis of an executive order. Under this order, 16.5 percent seats in Indian Civil Service (ICS), other class I and class II and subordinate services were reserved for Muslims and 8.5 percent seats were earmarked for other communities. The reservation for scheduled caste was introduced in 1943.² With the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, a new dimension of Quota policy came into being considering the regional disparity and

2. Khan Akbar Ali & Kazi Rakibuddin Ahmed, *Quota System for Civil Service Recruitment in Bangladesh: An Exploratory Analysis*, World Bank & PSC, 2007.

Province	Percentage of total population
East Bengal	42
Punjab	24
Karachi	2
All other provinces and princely states of West Pakistan	17
Potential migrants from India	15

Source: Waseem Mohammad, "Affirmative Action Policies in Pakistan", Ethnic Studies Report Vol. XV, 1997

The drawbacks of the 1948 quota system were reviewed by the appropriate authority and a more moderate quota system was introduced in 1949. Under the revised system only 20 percent posts were reserved for national merit and the remaining 80 percents posts were distributed on a regional basis..

The introduction of the quota system in post war Bangladesh is nothing but a legacy of the past. Quota intervention in public service was introduced on 05 September 1972. Under the first quota order, distribution of posts was as follows - for national positions 20 percent merit, affected women 10 percent, Freedom Fighters 30 percent and for district/ division merit 10 percent. It was pointed out that quotas were introduced for more equitable representation of the people of all districts of Bangladesh in the various services and posts under the Government.³

Date	Merit	FF	W	AW	TB	GM	Total
5 th September, 1972	20	30	0	10	0	40	100
8 th April, 1976	40	30	10	10	0	10	100
28 th April, 1985 - 2007	45	30	10	0	5	10	100

Source: Government of Bangladesh, Establishment Manual. Vol.1

3. Ministry of Establishment, Establishment Manual Vol. 1, 1995 p. 220

Quota Characteristics in Bangladesh and Five Developing Countries and Five Developed Countries

Country	Vertical Quota Characteristics	Basis	%	Horizontal Quota characteristics	Basis	%
India	Total No -4 1.Scheduled caste 2.Scheduled tribes 3.Other Backward classes 4.General	Caste	15% 7.5% 27% 50.5%	1.Disability 2.Ex-service personnel 3.Legal heirs	Disability Reward for past service Compassionate	3% 10% of lowest jobs 5% vacancies at lowest level (C &D)
Malaysia	1.Bhumiputra 2.Non-Malayan	Ethnic	80% 20%	Handicapped persons	Disability	1%
Nigeria	1. 36 states 2.Federal Capital Territory	Regional	2.6 % each 1 %			
South Africa	1.Blacks 2.Whites	Race	Minimum 50 % (to be raised gradually)	1.Women 2.Disabled	Sex Disability	30% new recruits 2%
Pakistan	1.Merit 2.Punjab 3.Rural Sindh 4.Urban Sindh 5.Northern Areas & FATA 6.Azad Kashmir	Regional	10% 50% 11.4% 7.6% 4% 1%	1. Disabled	Disability	1 %
Bangladesh	1. Merit 2.64 districts	Regional	45% 55%	1.Freedom fighter 2.Women 3.Tribes	Recognition Sex Ethnicity	30% 10% 5%

Source: Khan Akbar Ali & Kazi Rakibuddin Ahmed, *Quota System for Civil Service Recruitment in Bangladesh: An Exploratory Analysis*, World Bank & PSC, 2007

In the comparative quota depicted in table 3 the following important points come out as determining issues for discussion:

a. Regional Quota and Nature of the Government: Regional quota exists in three of the six developing countries. Out of these three countries, two namely Pakistan and Nigeria, are Federal states. It is recognised that regional quota may better fit a federal structure rather than a unitary form of Government. Since Bangladesh is constitutionally⁵ a unitary form of Government, regional / district Quota system do not effectively address the issues at hand.

5. Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1999.

b. Quota Reservation for the Women: In our example, out of 6 countries, only two countries i.e. Bangladesh and South Africa provide quota reservations for women at the central level. Normally in developed countries gender equality does not appear to be the guiding factor in the politics of job reservation. But in case of Bangladesh, article 29 (3) has clearly directed the government to make quota provisions for women..

c. Variation in Number of Quota from Country to Country: Bangladesh experiences the highest dimensions of quota by 64 vertical and 4 horizontal natures. From the view points of Job earmarked for merit and quota it can be see that in Malaysia, South Africa and Nigeria, 100 percent positions in public employment are modes on the basis of Quota. Analysis reveals that the Quota share in India is 50 percent, in Pakistan 90 percent and in Bangladesh 55 percent.

SOME DILEMMAS IN ADDRESSING QUOTA IN RECRUITMENT

The constitutional support to the Quota system in recruitment, as well as the implicit spirit/ directives of the constitution in regard to extending the time limit for the continuity of Quota, need to be analysed. In Quota intervention Bangladesh experiences 64 vertical and 4 horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension as we have already mentioned, refers to regional /district quota while the horizontal dimension refers to the quota set aside for freedom fighters, women, tribals and merit. As directed in our Constitution, the main thrust for affirmative actions should be given to backward sections of citizens and women. So here, we will attempt to examine the appropriateness of Quota provided to other stakeholders.

Constitutional Directives of the Quota

Let us take a look at the spirit and directives of the Constitution.

- a. **Equality of Opportunity:** Article 29 (1) of the Constitution declares⁶ "There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment of offices in the service of the Republic."
- b. **Principles of Non discrimination:** Article 29(2) proclaims that "No citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste sex, or place of birth be ineligible for or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office in the service of the Republic."
- c. **Making Special Provisions :** Article 29 (3) (a) of the Constitution clearly

6. Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1999.

stipulates- that "Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from- (a) making special provision in favour of any backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service of the Republic".⁷ This is the root of making quota reservation in public service, more specifically the quota system in the Civil Service.

d. Violation of the spirit of the Constitution: Now if we integrate the different instructions stipulated in the relevant articles of the Constitution regarding quota reservation and analyze them, we may be able to throw light on some controversies and conflicts regarding over the whole issue. One important instruction is that the quota provision must not exceed the explicit spirit of the constitution. Now vested provision of 55 percent quota for preferred groups may easily be questioned in the presence of equality of opportunity in article 29(1) & 29(2) of the Constitution. Mahamudul Islam, an eminent jurist and ex- attorney general of GOB in his book titled Constitutional Law of Bangladesh has opined that clause 3 of article 29 is an exception to the guarantee of equal opportunity as mentioned in Article 29(1) and 29(2). He is of the view that any interpretation that nullifies these guarantees can not be acceptable in the eyes of the law.

Question of Time limit for quota and other issues

If we look at the matter from a global perspective, in the federal Constitution of Pakistan, the time limit for continuity of quota reservation has been mentioned. In the Bangladesh Constitution, however there is no mention of any time limit. But if we look at some other sections of the Constitution, we find quota reservation for women parliament members are limited by time limits. On the same analogy the quota manifestation allowed by article 29(3) (a) of the Constitution, as far as women and backward section of citizens concerned, a definite timetable should be given. Moreover, the quota has the specific goal of attaining adequate representation in the service of the Republic and achieving advancement for these - citizens. If the required purpose is achieved, obviously there remain no positive grounds for further continuity of quota. Quotas therefore must be time bound and there should be sufficient research on the impacts of quota. But unfortunately, the quota system in the civil service is still operative without any potential research regarding its impacts having been carried out. But for all practical purposes, there should be a definite time limit for further continuity of Quota.

The dilemma of District or Regional quota

Article, 29 (3) (a) of the Constitution, has empowered the state to make special

7. Ibid

provisions for "any backward sections of citizens". Now the question is whether a district may be recognized as a backward section. By and large, the typical district contains both backward and affluent citizens and, so it can not be defined as a backward section. So the district Quota clearly goes against the spirit of the Constitution.

Analysis of Freedom fighters Quota

There is no justification shown any where for 30 percent quota reservation for freedom fighters. By no definition or by any study made so far, Freedom fighters are backward section of citizens. No available data testifying socio- economic backwardness of freedom fighters. In Zainul Abedin VS Bangladesh (34 DLR - 77), the High Court Division of the Supreme Court nullified providing quota facilities in public employment for freedom fighters, in line with the spirit of articles 27 and 29 of the Constitution. So there is no reasonable ground for retaining this quota.

A Review of the Quota for women

The Quota Provision for women had been guaranteed under article 29 (3) (a) of the Constitution. As per the 2001 census, women constitute 48.1 percent of our population. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Establishment, the percentage share of women employees in the service of the Republic as of 2006 is only 15 percent. The total number of class one female officers in the service of the Republic is 10511 this figure as a percentage of the total number of officers is 11.20 percent.⁸

The number of women officers in the Bangladesh Secretariat, is very limited. At present, women officers, ranging from Assistant Secretary to Secretary, number 670, compared to their male counterparts who number 3725.

There is only one Secretary, one Additional Secretary, 25 Joint Secretaries and 169 Deputy Secretaries are women at present. So there is plenty of scope for affirmative action for women with to enhance their position in the Civil Service.

A Review of the Tribal Quota

Article 29(3) (a) is the basis for the tribal quota as they fall within the purview of the backward section of citizens. There are about 13 tribal ethnic groups living in Chittagong Hill Tracts. At present the three major tribal groups i.e. the Chakma, the Marma and the Tripuras usually take advantage of the quota system. So measures to safeguard the right of the other tribal groups should be taken into consideration.

8. Statistics and Research Cell, O&M, MOE, 2006.

Promotion at Senior Level in Civil Service

"With regard to promotion, we recommend the following formula: first, in filling the higher posts in the Service, merit should be the only consideration; second, in filling posts in the middle level of the Service, merit should be the determining factor, i.e., merit-cum-seniority basis; and third, in the lower ranges of the Service, seniority, i.e., length of service will carry appropriate weight, i.e., seniority-cum-merit basis." Report of The Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, Part-one, 1973, under the Chairmanship of Prof. Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhuri.

Promotion to the senior secretariat posts, ranging from deputy and above, is very vital to the Civil Service. So selection of appropriate and competent personnel at this level is essential. Senior level promotion are taken care of by a Superior Selection Board (SSB), headed by the cabinet secretary with some other members. The final approving authority, however, is the head of the Government, i.e. the Prime Minister.

As per Promotion Rules 2002, at present the following quota system is being followed in determining shares of different cadres at the senior level.

Percentage share of quota at higher position Table- 4

Name of the post	Quota for BCS(Admin)	Other cadres
Deputy secretary	75%	25%
Joint secretary	70%	30%
Additional secretary	70%	30%

Source: Ministry of Establishment, notification of 11 June, 2002, (SRO. 146/law /2002)

Promotion Rules 2002 make no provision for judging merit and performance in the case of senior promotions. The evaluation criterion to be followed in case of promotion as given in the second schedule of the rule is as follows:

Evaluation criterion for promotion Table -5

Criterion for evaluation	% of marks
Educational qualification	25
Average marks obtained in last five years' ACR	30
Average of ACR marks of the whole service length excepting last five years	25

Bonus marks for no adverse comment in any ACR	10
Bonus marks for no disciplinary punishment through out the service life	10
Total marks -100	

Source: Ministry of Establishment, notification of 11 June, 2002,

Again, the marks for educational qualification are to be evaluated in the following way:

Marks for educational qualification Table 6

Name of the exam.	First class / division	Second class / division	Third class / division
SSC	6	4	2
HSC	6	4	2
Graduation	9	6	3
Masters	4	3	2

Source: Ibid

There has been much dissatisfaction over the issue of promotion at the senior level among different cadres, resulting in Inter-Cadre Rivalry. In this regard, we can show the inter cadre share in the posts of the government starting from deputy secretary and above through the following Table:

Cadre and rank wise statistics of officers Table-7

Cadre name	Secretary	Additional Secretary	Joint Secretary	Deputy Secretary
BCS (Admin)	43	57	284	1222
All other cadres	16	18	74	200
Total	59	75	358	

Source: Public Administration Computer Centre (PACC) Moe, 2008

In its report, "Government that Works" the World Bank proposed establishing a Specialized Senior Staffing Pattern (SSSP) for enhancing professional standards and skill in the Civil Service. Promotion it stressed, needs to be integrated with

Performance. The UNDP Report on public administration sector study in Bangladesh revealed that the existing promotion system adds much to inter-cadre rivalries and tensions. Basically, these tensions can arise because of the tensions between the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) Administration cadre and the other 27 cadres and tensions between different qualifiable batches of the civil service intracadres & extra cadres. PARC has observed that inter-cadre discrimination is a deep-rooted problem in the civil service. Report of the ASRC, 1973 also noted the civil service was divided into too many distinct entities with artificial walls built around them, varying career prospects, lack of professionalism and one cadre pitted against another. So, all these issues need to be addressed.

In line with the recommendations of the Pay and Services Commission's Report (1977)⁹, an apex cadre named Senior Services Pool (SSP) was created in 1979. The establishment of SSP in 1979 allowing entry of all cadres to a unified cadre at the senior level was meant to enhance efficiency and remove discriminations among various cadre services. SSP also aimed at broadening the recruitment base for the highest executive and policy making positions. Unfortunately, the SSP was abandoned on the basis of the recommendation of a cabinet committee in 1989. The revival of SSP opens to be a requirement.

PARC has recommended that the Senior Management Pool SMP/ SSP should be restored. It has suggested that the post of deputy secretary should be the induction post as an entry-level post to be filled up from all cadre-officers through competitive examinations to be conducted by the BPSC. In restoring the SSP issues like the minimum level of officers at which SSP be restored, categories of officers to be taken in SSP, and the selection criterion of the issues to be addressed. Moreover, promotion at all other senior levels should also be made on the basis of examination and logical performance appraisal by the appropriate authority.

FINDINGS OF OPINION SURVEY

A questionnaire was developed to survey opinion of certain groups of people keeping in mind their gender identity, race, age, and involvement with freedom fighters on the quota system (Appendix-1). The questions asked were of the following nature:

- a. If the prevailing quota system at entry level should be reviewed and restructured.
- b. Whether quota system is a barrier to quality civil service.

9. Report of the Pay and Services Commission, Bangladesh, 1997, part 1, Vol. 1 Cabinet Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the foregoing discussion, the following recommendations are made.

a. **Restructuring Quota for Recruitment.** Quotas at the entry level of the Civil Service for freedom fighters /for issues of freedom fighters along with the district quota should be abolished and redistributed amongst women and for national merit. Accordingly, the proposed revised quota system could be as follows:

Table-7.1: Proposed Revised Quota Table

Beneficiaries of Quota	% of Quota
National Merit	75
Women Merit	20
Tribal	5
Total	100

b. **Reintroduction of SSP.** For Promotion to the senior level, the Senior Services Pool (SSP) should be revived after necessary changes. The SSP may consist of the post of Deputy Secretaries at the bottom and secretaries at the top. Induction to the SSP at the Deputy Secretary level will be on the basis of examination to be conducted by the Public Service Commission. Moreover promotion to the next higher levels should be given on the basis of competitive examinations and performance appraisals.

c. **Abolition of President's Quota.** Quota reservation for promotion at the disposal of the President, should be dropped on grounds that it may create discrimination.

d. **Commission to be Set Up.** In exercise of power conferred in article133 of the Constitution, the President should promulgate a Civil Service Act, in which a Civil Service Commissions should be created. The Civil Service Commission can act as the Ombudsman in matters relating to civil servants. The Ministry of Establishment / BPSC can also act as the Monitor of the impacts of quota.

CONCLUSION

Redistribution of the District Quota for Merit: In case of regional quota, a district being only an administrative unit, it can by no way represent and can not be

seen as a backward section as seen in article 129(3)(a) of the Constitution. Quota system basically introduced as an interim measure for removing disparity in public employment among regions. The Study reveals that by implementing development policies disparity in cases of employment and education among regions of Bangladesh, have been significantly reduced¹⁰. So the very grounds for district quota exist no more. The 10 percent quota provision for districts may be merged with the national merit.

Abolition of Freedom Fighters' Quota. The freedom fighters quota, conflicts with the spirit of the Constitution. By no definition it falls within the purview of article 29(3) (a), as backward section of citizens. Rather it acts as hindrances to quality recruitment. So this quota should be abolished.

Enhancing Women Quota. Women constitute about 48.1 percent of the total population. In context of Bangladesh, women as a community are in a backward position. For example, at different level posts in the Secretariat, starting from Assistant Secretary to Secretary to the top, the percentage share of women officers is only 15.24 percent. So if we are resume to preferential action, the existing quota for women which is 10 percent, does not seem to be enough. It should be enhanced to the level of 20 percent.

Rethinking the Tribal Quota. One inherent problem of this quota system is to ensure equitable distribution for all the indigenous groups living in the country. There are about 13 ethnic groups living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.¹¹ According to the information available, the Chakma community may be termed as the privileged group and of always benefits from the quota benefit. So in the future, when providing reservation benefits, the affluent and advanced group among the tribal communities should be debarred and preferential treatment should be given to the least advantageous communities.

Enhancing Merit. Article 28(1) of the Constitution instructs us to follow the principle of non discrimination and article 29(1) (2) strongly advocates equality of opportunity in public employment. So there is a strong constitutional plea for enhancing the merit quota at entry level. Again different Committees/Commissions setup on different occasion, emphatically recommend enhancing merit based recruitments. So merit quota at the entry level of recruitment must be enhanced.

Gradual Abolition of Quota. The report fitted "Towards Better Government in Bangladesh"¹² recommended rationalization of various forms of quota and

10. Khan Akbar Ali & Kazi Rakibuddin Ahmed, Quota System for Civil Service Recruitment in Bangladesh: An Exploratory Analysis, World Bank & PSC, 2007.

11. Report of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 1992.

12. Towards Better Government in Bangladesh, A Report by Four Secretaries, 1993.

ultimately abolishment of quotas gradually. PARC¹³ also recommends gradual abolition of the Quota. BPSC has always urged gradual abolition of Quota. Accordingly in the long run, the Quota system should be replaced by merit.

Impact Assessment of Quota. At present there is no mechanism to monitor the impact of quotas. There must be some sort of mechanism to assess the impacts of quota intervention and it should be made public. The monitoring mechanism can lie with BPSC and MOE and they monitors report to the Parliamentary Standing Committee and to the Council of Ministers periodically.

Senior Level Promotion. The Quota at the senior level of promotion works against the principle of meritocracy, rather it creates room for inter cadre rivalry. For a merit and performance-based civil service, incumbents should be judged through rigorous examination conducted by the BPSC. With this in view and, at this juncture of time, SSP should be reintroduced. In this regard there is a need for revising the Civil Service Act and forming a Civil Service Commission to look after the issues of Civil Service.

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c. Whether in line with the spirit of Article 29(3) (a) of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, quota benefit should be withdrawn from freedom fighters / Issues of freedom fighters, as they are not Backward Section of Citizens.

d. In considering the need of the time freedom fighters quota should be merged with: (a) National Merit & Women quota/ (b) only with National Merit / (c) none.

e. If district quota being not consistent with article 29(3) (a) of the constitution -meaning to Backward Section of Citizens, should be abolished and merged with national merit.

f. Whether for an efficient and effective Civil Service, promotion at the senior level from Deputy Secretary and above, a Senior Service Pool (SSP) should be reintroduced as it was done in 1979 if necessary with some changes.

g. Whether the percentage share of Tribal Quota should be enhanced.

h. If women are not properly represented at different levels of Public Service for many reasons, so that Quota share in favour of women should be enhanced reasonably.

In analyzing the data it was found that the respondents belonged to different walks of life. They comprised civil servants - senior, junior and mid level; university teachers, doctors, engineers and other professional groups. Interestingly some students were also interviewed for the survey. Their responses were very encouraging. Besides opinion survey by questionnaire, Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary affairs was interviewed to noted the legal points involved. He responded judiciously and agreed with the two propositions regarding radical restructuring of quota at entry level and reviving SSP for senior level promotion (Appendix-2). Besides, five other officers at the joint secretary level were interviewed. They all agreed to the need for proper restructuring of quota intervention at entry level and reintroduction of SSP for promotion at the senior level starting from the position of the deputy secretary.

From the findings of the opinion survey it becomes obvious that all respondents agree that it is necessary to restructure and reshape the present quota intervention at the entry level of Civil Service & reintroduce SSP at senior level promotions. They also agreed by overwhelming majority on the issue of withdrawing quota coverage from Freedom fighters/ issues of freedom fighters and also redistributing it on the basis of national merit and for women. They also supported abolishment of the district quota and for national merit.

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Stakeholders' Role

Background. Until 2003 and 2004 people did not know anything much about the activities of AEC. Indeed people of the surroundings area felt that mining would bring good to them as well as the country¹⁴. While the company started exploration drilling many villagers heard violent sound and saw cracks developing in their traditional houses. Phulbari Protection Committee (PPC) and National Committee for the Protection of Oil, Gas, Mineral resources and Power and Port (NC) them developed an awareness program¹⁵. Locals now came to know about the mining method. They learned that more than 100 villages in some 59 square kilometers would have to be evicted and the inhabitants relocated¹⁶. The locals look fright and were motivate to join movement against the AEC. On 26 August 06 security forces opened fire on the crowd to contain protests in which three people died. The major stakeholders of coalmine are the GOB, the company, the protection committees and the villagers. Besides media, experts, civil society, NGOs and financing institutes can also be called as the stakeholders. The, role of few stakeholders will be discussed. In the following pages.

Standing of the Government. The objectives of any government should be people centric. But when the GOB signed the deal with BHP, it did not consult other stakeholders. Till today people don't know much regarding the deal. The GOB wanted to suppress public opinion forcefully. During field survey locals were asked, "Once Phulbari coalmine will be developed then local people would have a stronger economy- was that correct?" In there responses almost 50% interviewees answered negatively-Government needs to gain confidence.

Yes, I think locals will better off economically	No, locals will not be benefited
51.72% (15)	48.28% (14)
Note: One man said that local people would be paid less.	

Activities of AEC. The company started taking appropriate measures to extract coal without considering the welfare of the locals. The company took into account the view of the community and interested stakeholders without explaining the effect of mining. It conducted two consultations with Phulbari Municipality Chairman (22 March 2005) and with Deputy Commissioner (7 September 2005) at

14. 'Open Pit Mining for Coal: Horror Feeling Shrouds Northern Bangladesh', available online <http://www.schd.org/phulbari/index.html>, dated accessed 04 April 08.
15. Dr. Tapan Bagchi, Op. cit., p.69
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EVALUATION OF PHULBARI DEAL: SEARCH FOR POLICY OPTIONS

Group Captain Muhammad Mortuza Kamal, ndc, psc, GD(P)

INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh has significant amount of quality coal as a natural resource in number of coal fields. This coal fields are found in the north-west region of the country. It could be a possible alternative energy source. Presently the country has five coal fields and Phulbari is one of them. It was discovered in 1997 by the Australian Company, Broken Hill Proprietary Minerals International Exploration Inc (BHP)¹. The total reserve of coal found here is approximately 3000 million tons (MT)². Bangladesh has been mining one MT of coal per year from Barapukuria Coalmine since 2003. This mine has been fueling the 250-Mega Watt (MW) power plant in Parbotipur since January 2006³. Its present power generation capacity is 3816 MW⁴ against 5500 MW. The present gas reserve of 11.6 trillion cubic feet (TCF) can generate electricity till 2015⁵ with the present commitments. Adequate and reliable supply of electricity attracts both domestic and foreign investment. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) is committed to provide electricity to all by 2020 when the generation capacity will be raised from 3816 MW to 17,765 MW⁶. Therefore, huge investment is needed in this sector, which could be met largely by using the coal mined in the country.

To attract investment by International Mining Companies in the coal sector, GOB advertised in International journals in the early 1990. BHP showed some interest and on 20 August 1994 GOB signed a contract (11/C-94) with BHP based on the 'Mines and Minerals Rules' (MMR) 1968 (amended). The contract had an 'Investment Agreement' in accordance with the Board of Investment (BOI) Handbook⁷. Following a few years of exploration effort, BHP discovered coal deposit in 1997 at Phulbari. It then left the country in 1998 assigning the contract for further exploration to Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Private Ltd (AEC)

1. Dr Tapan Bagchi, Phulbari Coal Mine: Environment and Reaction, BARCIK, June 06, p.13
2. Md. Mosharraf Hossain, 'A second look at the Energy sector in Bangladesh', Power & Energy, Vol-5, 1st Issue, June 2007, p.20
3. Langdon D. Clough, Energy Profile of Bangladesh, 30 January 07, available online, http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Bangladesh, date accessed 04 July 08.
4. Mr Shawkat Ali, Chairman Power Development Board, Supplied paper during Interview on 30 July 08.
5. Md. Mosharraf Hossain, Op.cit., p.19
6. Md. Mosharraf Hossain, Op. cit., p.19, Mr. Shawkat Ali, Op.cit., during Interview.
7. Gary Lye, 'Correcting Misconceptions Regarding Phulbari Coal Project, AEC', 30.11.07, p.2

have opined, however, that the Phulbari agreement had become effective as the government had already fulfilled a number of the agreement's conditions²³. The Democratic government on the other hand, has to accept the people's verdict.

Perception of Local Population. Although the local populations were affected directly they had been ignored. Neither the GOB nor AEC had consulted them²⁴. A 75-year-old man wondered, "What will happen to us if we are forced to move from here? What will happen to our livelihoods? I don't want us to live like this. Our mosques and holy places and the places we were born will be destroyed. What will happen to the graveyards of our ancestors?"²⁵ The Fear of the locals appears genuine but they were away of making any suggestions.

Media's Contribution. The Media constitute the watchdog of society. People didn't know Phulbari until media focused on the problems of the deal. It was the relentless coverage of the media. That informed the people about the problems with the deal. The Internet edition of newspapers and the satellite net work of the media informed many Bangladeshis about the situation. The Media stood beside the people during the general strike and forced the GOB to resolve the issue amicably. But it also divided people's opinion instead of trying to work for unity.

Comments with Field Survey Report

During the field survey none of the locals agreed to open pit mining and a few did not even want any coalmine in Phulbari. The following table answers the following question, "In your opinion which method should be followed to extract coal from Phulbari?"

Underground Method	Open pit Method	Any Other Opinion
96.56% (28)	-	Both methods are bad, therefore, not in favour of any one 3.44% (1)

In other words, locals need to be motivated as well as paid compensation. Event they can be made shareholder of the projects.

If government gives appropriate compensation then we will be in favour of the coalmine	Yes, we would be in favour of coalmine/ we would give our land for the nation	No, I will not give my opinion	Compensation wouldn't be sufficient, therefore, I will not give my opinion
24.14% (7)	37.93% (11)	33.33% (10)	3.44% (1)

23. Staff Correspondent, 'Committee terms ministry's opinion on Phulbari deal disrespectful of people', New Age, 06 September 2007.
24. Dr. Tapan Bagchi, Op. cit., p.69
25. Kristan Deconinck, 'BBC News, Bangladesh coal divides region', 12 July 2006, available online <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5080386.stm>, date accessed 11 March 2008.

on 11 February 1998 with the approval of GOB. AEC's 100% share is owned by Asia Energy Public Ltd Corp. London. Later, the company changed its name to Global Coal Management (GCM). However, AEC initially wanted to invest over US\$1 billion and develop a mine mouth coal fired power plant with a generating capacity of 1000 MW electricity totaling cost of US\$ 3 billions⁸. This project would generate approximately 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) each year of the total project life⁹. But this project has drawn heavy criticism as AEC wanted to extract the coal following the open pit mining method. Consequently, there is a dilemma about which method to be followed in extracting the coal.

AEC carried out drilling in 2003 at Phulbari and got 'Environment Clearance Certificate' on 11 September 2004¹⁰. The company established its office at Phulbari in May 2004¹¹ and conducted Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) for the project. It submitted its report to the GOB on 30 July 2005¹². AEC submitted 'Feasibility Study and Scheme of Development' on 02 October 2005¹³ to Director, Bureau of Mineral Development (BMD). The GOB was supposed to respond within three months but has not yet done so. Though the deal between the GOB and BHP looks impressive yet there are some questions still being asked: "Why did the local population demonstrate against AEC? Why did security forces open the fire? Is there any problem with the stakeholders? Is there any problem with the agreement, which needs detail study? Is there any problem with the method of extracting coal, which is intimidating locals?" In answering these questions, the paper attempts to focus on three objectives. These are: Suggest measures to stop recurrence of violence, which will prevent bloodshed, provide inputs for the GOB to decide regarding the assigned deal with AEC, and discuss the extraction method of coal and its use. The paper concludes that the coal to be extracted by convincing and compensating the locals appropriately primarily for the sale of power generation.

8. Gary Lye, Op.cit., Pp.3-6
9. Rakib Ahmed, 'Asia Energy's Phulbari Coal Project Delivering Energy Security to Bangladesh', Power & Energy, Vol-5, Issue-1, June 2007, p.67
10. 'Ban: Phulbari Coal Project', available online <http://www.adb.org/Projects/project.asp?id=39933>, date accessed 04 April 08.
11. Professor Nurul Islam & Committee Members, Technical Committee Report on 'Feasibility Study Report & Scheme of Development', 20 Sep 06, p.39
12. 'Ban: Phulbari Coal Project' Op.cit., <http://www.adb.org/Projects/project.asp?id=39933>.
13. Ibid., <http://www.adb.org/Projects/project.asp?id=39933>.

During the field survey it was found that many people didn't believe that the GOB would pay them appropriate compensation. The answer to the following question "If you are compensated for your house and farming land, would you opine in-favour of Phulbari coalmine?" Will substantiate this statement.

Impact of Coalmine

A study reveals that the groundwater of the north-western region of Bangladesh is almost arsenic-contamination free²⁶. This groundwater is 80-120 meters thick in the DupiTila formation and situated at about 10-12 meters below the surface. Open pit mining requires dewatering of the mine area round-the-clock during the entire lifetime of the project²⁷. 800 million liters of water will be pumped out of the mine everyday for next 30 years²⁸, which could lead to desertification of 500 Sq/km. Farmers could lose their livelihood. Moreover, the topsoil would be displaced once the mining operation begins. It could, however, be brought back and spread on the top of the area filled in. Never the less no, one can say when the land could become cultivable again. At the final stage of the mining operation, Bangladesh would get a huge lake filled up with fresh water. Mining experts warn that the final hollow, after 30 years of digging and other activities, would contain toxic substances²⁹. In underground mining subsidence of soil would be seen. The land could, however, remain cultivable.

Open pit mine could produce Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) and if immersed with water could remain for a decade or so, destroying Sherries and crops. The cost of mitigating AMD in a mine is high but the SEIA conducted by AEC provides little detail about the management of AMD. In a country like Bangladesh, where hundreds of small rivers are linked like a huge net, polluted water can travel way beyond the mining area³⁰. In this regard mining expert Roger Moody has commented, "It is extremely costlyGCM has not provided any financial details as to who would cover the bill for such an environmental disaster"³¹. In addition, therefore, there would be and enormous amount of polluted water generated from washing coal if it is not properly treated.

Coal dust would be produced from dynamic explosion and, burning of coal. Other agents would also be produced such as nitrogen oxide, mercury, lead, etc,

26. Engr. AKM Shamsuddin, 'Phulbari Coal, Hydrological Environment not Favourable for open Pit mining', The Daily Star, 29 September 2007.
27. Environment Correspondent, 'Open pit Mining for coal', The Daily Star, 18 August 2006.
28. Engr. A K M Shamsuddin, Op.cit., 29 September 2007.
29. Environment Correspondent, Op. cit., 18 August 2006.
30. Kristan Deconinck, Op. cit.
31. 'Protracted struggle forces ADB to pull out of Phulbari', 10 May 2008, available online <http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/archive/1893>, date accessed 10 May 2008.

Dinajpur¹⁷. But the Chairman withdrew his 'no objection' certificate in July-August 2005¹⁸. That meant that local people were not able to express their opinion about open pit mining. Therefore, the company must think up and undertake welfare projects for the locals before developing the coalmine to win their hearts and mind.

Involvement of Civil Society. Civil society activists did not know the details of the agreement between the GOB & BHP. The Until Phulbari incident took place raised on the issue of the transparency of the contract deal. They differed with the deal and company geologists didn't say clearly why the open-pit method had to be adopted for Phulbari coalmine. They only said that the country needed to extract coal to produce electricity for the development of the country. Therefore, they needed to sit down with locals and experts to find out appropriate methods of compensation, and payments.

Role of Protection Committees. Both protection committees wanted to preserve the rights of the locals as well as the interest of the country. PPC could develop public opinion through weekly processions¹⁹. But local political leaders didn't allow the movement to get momentum. Later activists contacted NC for leadership and continued activities under the banner of PPC²⁰. However, the four-day long protest of Phulbari population ceased after signing of a deal with Government representative, the Mayor of Rajshahi Division and the Member Secretary of NC on behalf of the people. The Committee didn't want to allow open pit mining and was bent on eliminating AEC to protect the national interest. This became further clear once the General Secretary of NC said, "We will not allow GCM to turn a land of food for the people into a black hole for corporate profit²¹". But the committee wanted to extract coal for the use of the country only after the consent of the locals had been taken. But they didn't specify the method of extraction, which they should have done by mentioning the modus operandi of compensation.

Legal Aspect of the Agreement. The GOB has already fulfilled two points of the deal²². Branch offices of AEC were withdrawn from Phulbari and the families of the victims were paid compensation as fulfilment of the deal. Meanwhile the Law Ministry termed the Phulbari agreement 'illegal', and critiqued it. Legal experts

17. 'Ban: Phulbari Coal Project', <http://www.adb.org/Projects/project.asp?id39933>, Op. cit.
18. 'Phulbari Communities Write to ADB President and Executive Directors', 15.12.07, available online <http://www.phulbariresistance.blogspot.com/2007/12/phulbari-communities-writes-to-adb.html>, date accessed 29 January 2008.
19. Tanim Ahmed, 'In Phulbari Lives the spirit of liberty', New Age Independence Day Special, 26.03.07, available online <http://www.newagebd.com/2007/mar/26/independence07/607.html>, date accessed 11 March 2008.
20. Tanim Ahmed, Ibid., <http://www.newagebd.com/2007/mar/26/independence07/607.html>.
21. 'The South Asian, Protracted Struggle Forces ADB to Pull Out of Phulbari', 10 May 2008, available online http://www.theouthasian.org/archives/2008/adb_puuls_out_of_controversial.html, date accessed 11 March 2008.
22. Justice M Golam Rabbani, 'Govt is legally bound to cancel deal with Asia Energy', New Age, 31 August 2007.

reputed multinational companies and international funding agencies to come. Secondly, the company needs to get consent of locals by winning their hearts and minds. Answers to the field survey support the statement to the question, "Some of the earned money from Phulbari coalfield should be spent for the development of Phulbari. - What is your opinion?" most respondents answered positively. The Draft coal policy also makes locals share holders of the project.

Money should be spent to make provision of water, repair road, school, etc.	Yes, some money should be spent for the welfare of the people.	Money should be spent to make Industries so that locals can be employed.	Government couldn't do anything till now, therefore, she wouldn't be able to do anything in future	Money should be spent to provide electricity	No comment
50% (15)	13.33% (4)	20% (6)	3.33% (1)	6.66% (2)	6.66% (2)

However, initially open pit mining is to be done at Barapukuria on a small scale to see its effect. On successful management of the project, the Phulbari project may be undertaken.

The per-capita energy use in Bangladesh is 118 KgOE (kilogram oil equivalent)⁷⁹. The GOB wants to provide electricity to all citizens by 2020⁸⁰. The population is projected to reach 180 million by 2020. Bangladesh, therefore, will need to produce over 16,000 MW just to maintain the same per-capita level of consumption of energy⁸¹. Bangladesh relies heavily on natural gas to produce electricity. The total proven and recoverable reserve of natural gas is calculated to be between 5 TCF and 12 TCF. At the current annual rate of consumption, the natural gas will be depleted in the next 10 to 24 years. With a growth rate of 5 to 10%, even the higher estimated amount of gas reserve will be depleted between 2014 and 2020⁸². To provide electricity to its 180 million people, Bangladesh will need about 1.25 TCF gas per year beyond 2020. Higher growth rate will demand higher electricity consumption and more amount of gas. What would be an alternate source of energy on which Bangladesh can rely on? Coal plays a vital role in providing energy throughout the world. About 1.4 billion tons are recoverable out of three billions, which is equivalent to 37 TCF⁸³ of natural gas, and this can

79. Professor Md. Khalequzzaman, 'Same-side Coal', Forum, Vol-2, Issue-8, 3 September 2007, available online <http://phulbariresistance.blogspot.com/2007/09/same-side-coal.html>, date accessed 10 May 08.

80. Khondkar Abdus Saleque, 'Bangladesh: Power for All by 2020', Energy Bangla, 7 December 2007, p.1, available online http://energybangla-com.liteserver.com/label_list.asp?labelId=49, date accessed 03 February 2008.

81. Professor Md. Khalequzzaman, Op. cit.

82. Ibid.

83. 37 million tons of coal is equivalent to =1 TCF of gas equivalent.

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generate electricity for about 30 years beyond 2020. Bangladesh should exploit all her fossil fuel reserves to achieve national energy security for faster growth.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are the recommendations of this purpose:

- Coal policy is an important document of the government based on which concerned ministries, companies and other firms should formulate their plan. Therefore, the government needs to approve the policy document.
- 'Coal Bangla' should go for a joint venture project with Ergo Exergy to exploit UCG technology. The technology should be applied at Barapukuria coalmine before it is implemental at Phulbari coalfield.
- Open pit mining can be adopted if UCG is not be implemented. The challenges of open pit mining can be mitigated with available technologies but these need money. So, 'Coal Bagnla' should go for joint venture project for both funding and expertise/ technology acquisition. Motivational and welfare programs should be undertaken to win the hearts and minds of locals.
- Coal alone will not be able to ensure energy security of Bangladesh in the long term. Therefore, Bangladesh should go for both renewable and civil nuclear energy projects before its coal reserve is exhausted.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh has vast coal reserve in the North-West part of the country, which can supplement its gas fields in producing electricity. Gas can support us till 2014 or perhaps to 2020 at the latest unless no new gas fields are discovered. Bangladesh is one of least power consuming countries now but it has promised to provide electricity to all by 2020. Therefore, huge investment is needed in this sector. However, the GOB signed an agreement with BHP in 1994 for the exploration and mining of coal. But the company assigned the deal to AEC in 1998. AEC wants to extract coal utilizing the open pit mining method but this choice came under criticism along with the credibility of the deal. Subsequently, the GOB forced to suppress the movement of the locals and in the process three people were killed. Ultimately, representative of the GOB and people respectively signed an agreement. As per the agreement, government needs to scrape the deal with AEC and the GOB cannot undertake any open pit mining project in the country.

Initial awareness programme among the locals was conducted by the PPC but The subsequent movement was led by the NC. The GOB and the company failed to act responsibly. AEC didn't provide a correct picture to the locals. As a result, locals protested against open pit mining. The GOB wanted to contain public agitation through force, which aggravated the situation. Except the PPC, NC and the media and other stakeholders could not create pressure on the GOB. Most stakeholders seemed divided on the issue. Therefore, the fears of locals regarding open pit mining remained. Though open pit mining ensures higher amount of coal recovery, it has its disadvantages. Firstly, it might affect a huge area by lowering the water. Secondly, the river system and rain will make management of AMD difficult. Lastly, the environment could be degraded and even the echo system of the Sundarbans could be endangered. However, this project gives hope of GDP increase by 0.7% to 1% though some people disputes over the figure.

The Draft Coal Policy doesn't allow coal to be exported; coal can only be extracted to meet the country's need and the coalmine is to be developed by a holding company named Coal Bangla. People should be compensated appropriately. The Policy also suggests strengthening the role of BMD, and making MMR effective etc. The policy has kept coal royalty negotiable and has kept both mining options open. But deal conflicts with the coal policy and MMR in some ways. The deal was not ratified through a gazette notification. Many clauses of MMR were not followed, including the fifth and sixth schedules. In fact, there are more dissimilarities than similarities with the existing MMR of the country.

There are two methods by which coal can be extracted. These are the open pit method and underground mining method. The coal can be utilized through gasification process without mining. This process is known as UCG. The coal extraction method is critical and technical in nature. The Geology structure of Phulbari coalfield indicates that underground mining could be difficult. Again, open pit mining would pose problems in the management of water, AMD and the protection of the environment would be difficult. However, coal can be utilized by UCG. Though UCG ensures more of coal utilization few countries have used this technology. Considering all factors, the paper suggests utilizing UCG technology with the help of a solvent multinational company. If such technology is not suitable for Phulbari then open pit mining becomes the option. Challenges of open pit mining can be overcome through technology. Here also the company to be formed to go for joint venture both for expertise and fund, such a company needs to win the hearts and minds of the people through some great work and by making them shareholders. Coal Bangla needs to provide good incentive package to draw the attention of solvent multinational companies and financial institutions.

To maintain the same amount of per capita energy consumption the country needs to produce more than 16000 MW. Bangladesh's, Gas reserve is likely to be

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exhausted by 2020 if new gas fields are not discovered. Therefore, the country needs to discover sources of energy other than gas. Coal is widely used around the globe to produce electricity. Bangladesh has extractable coal almost equal to 37 TCF Gas, which can produce electricity for next thirty years. So, coal can be a good energy solution for Bangladesh. But our coal will also be exhausted and country will need both nuclear and renewable energy options to produce electricity for the energy security of Bangladesh.

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process starts by using repentant JI members to give a series of lectures based on their confessions which affirm the existence of JI and exposes its intentions. Through such confessions, audience are to be exposed to a lot of information on how religion is being used in order to hoodwink Muslims into supporting their causes.³¹

As an alternative, the administrator has found another means of drawing them away from radicalism by offering them jobs, and the possibility of a return to society, offering amnesty and so on.³² It is much more effective, according to Rohan Gunaratna who supports this idea, "to fight terrorists militarily, it may take many decades. Yet we have seen military weakness when the US failed to target Osama bin Laden and *Al-Qaeda*".³³ There is a need to address this issue from ideological and political perspectives and not just by military approaches.

MARITIME TERRORISM AND OTHER AGENDA

Since the current security environment in the Straits of Malacca is far from ideal, given the presence of threats such as marine environmental pollution, sea robbery and piracy, smuggling of weapons and other contraband and illegal immigrants, it is felt that the major powers have been persisting in trying to link criminal offences committed in the Straits to maritime terrorism to further justify their GWOT. However, there are also expert opinions disputing linkages between piracy and any crime committed in the Straits and terrorism. The perceived threat of maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca was perhaps created to fulfill other political agendas. Even the Amnesty International has announced on May 28, 2003 that US GWOT policy is non-humanitarian and has been designed for political gain and profits.³⁴

Maritime Terrorist Attack in the Straits of Malacca

According to a study published in October 2003 by Aegis Defence Services, a chemical tanker known as Dewi Madrim had been hijacked, and its crews had been tied down while the hijackers had piloted the vessel for some distance through the Straits.³⁵ Such incidents have been used by Aegis to make the situation look bad and such kidnapping without ransom and in exchange for hostages have been utilized to acquire expertise for the terrorist to carry out future maritime attack. The

31. Personal interview with ACP Dr Mohd Shah Hussin Shah, Director of Planning and Training, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCT), Kuala Lumpur, on 12 October 2006.

32. Rohan, p. 10

33. *Ibid.*, p. 21

34. Amnesty International, BBC One news on May 28, 2003.

35. Barry Desker, Protecting the Malacca Straits, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Commentaries, 3 March 2008 www.idss.edu.sg. (visited 13 June 2008)

Pressuring Littoral States to Enhance Security in the Straits

An earlier statement by the London insurance market's Joint War Committee (JWC) was aimed at putting pressure on littoral states to take up immediate security action to ensure uninterrupted commercial shipping and safe transit of US naval ships through the Straits of Malacca. The US and its allies are worried about the safety of their investments, especially after 9/11. At the same time the US is making use of the issue into an excuse to assert pressure on the Muslim countries namely Malaysia and Indonesia which have been quite reluctant to support the U.S's GWOT from the very beginning. This issue has provide another good reason for the US to lead international users in sending powerful naval ships to control the Straits of Malacca.

However, the London insurance market has removed the Malacca Straits from the list of vulnerable areas according to its press release dated 11 August 2006. The Joint War Committee (JWC), which includes marine hull war underwriters from Lloyd's and company markets, has removed the Straits of Malacca from its hull, war, strikes, terrorism and related perils-listed areas.

CONCLUSION

Maritime terrorism is unlikely to affect the Straits of Malacca in the near future due to the situation existing the Straits of Malacca. This is evident from an evaluation of the capability of 'would be' maritime terrorist groups who have been identified as most likely to conduct attacks in the Straits. The possibility of any of them to conducting any 9/11 style of attack is very remote. As long as the littoral states are capable of implementing consistent measures such as the EIS, the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols and the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code along with other domestic measures in combating local and foreign terrorist groups, most of the vulnerabilities of the maritime industry can be addressed. If this level of cooperative activity continues, the result would be a further reduction of the threat of maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca.

However, the littoral states should be vigilant about attempts of other foreign powers to dominate the strategic SLOCs clearly spelled out by UNCLOS 1982. They should insist on the jurisdiction and sovereignty of littoral states. As discussed earlier in this paper, many excuses could be advanced to undermine the rights of littoral states. Foreign powers however, should forgo their egos and behave as good users and allow littoral states to exercise their jurisdiction in their waters.

41. Market Removes Malacca Straits from the list http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/Market_removes_Malacca_.... (18 June 2008)

Economist linked the takeover of the Dewi Madrim to "the equivalent of the Al-Qaeda hijackers who perpetrated the September 11 attacks by going to flying school in Florida."³⁶ However, the International Maritime Bureau says that its Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur has received confirmation from the owners of the Dewi Madrim that the attack was not what it was made to be by Aegis.³⁷

Even though the nexus between piracy and terrorism remains a worrying factor, its existence is still unproven. Thus far, there has been no hard evidence to prove its existence. While the possibility of such a link cannot be totally disregarded, there are indications that this nexus could be used as a political tool by foreign powers eagerly looking for pretexts to take over partially, if not totally, the control of another vital SLOC of the world.

Potential for Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca - Non-governmental Organization's and Civil Society Perspective

As for maritime terrorism, there has been no case in the Malacca Straits known to be connected to any terrorist organization. Security analysts such as JANES have suggested that there is a need to examine maritime terrorism closely and see the issue in the proper context. In a February 2006 article, haves noted, "terrorists would need to overcome significant logistical obstacles in order to carry out attacks involving the use of large container ships as weapons or as a delivery device for other weapons." It goes on to suggest that LPG and LNG tankers are difficult targets and small explosive laden boats are the weapon of choice for 'would be' terrorists.³⁸

The Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) had prepared a detailed report commissioned by the Singapore Maritime Foundation (SMF) in December 2005 which suggests, the trend globally suggest reduction in piracy and that the Straits of Malacca is in particular likely to show a falling in the number of piracies though its pirates are relatively better armed and organized. The IISS report summed up the situation nicely when it suggested that JWC had over-estimated the potential of terrorist threats and concurrently under-appreciated the wide range of measures undertaken by littoral states to improve security in the Malacca Straits.³⁹

36. Michael Richardson, p. 33

37. *Ibid.*

38. Jeffrey Chen, Reversing the Joint War Committee's (JWC) War Risk Decision in the Malacca Straits: An Interim Review http://www.siiainline.org/reversing_the_joint_war (10 June 2008), p. 2

39. *Ibid.*

The Reality - ASEAN, Japan, China and United States Views

The bulk of Middle Eastern oil to China passes through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda. Given its importance to China's economic survival it comes as no surprise that Beijing has indicated that it is prepared to protect shipping routes indispensable to China's economy. China in fact has stated that it has strategic interests in these important sea routes and would use its naval power to ensure that these sea lanes remain open. Zhao Yuncheng, an expert from China's Institute of Cotemporary International Relations has gone so far as to suggest that whoever controls the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean can threaten China's oil supply route.

The initiatives of the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) also indicates Japanese contribution to enhance maritime safety and security in this region. JCG has been strengthening regional cooperation and collaboration since it co-hosted the international conference titled: "The Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships" (April 2000 in Tokyo). The variety of initiatives suggested in it for the purpose of information exchange and assistance to capacity building includes visits of JCG patrol vessels/aircraft and combined exercises among coast guard agencies; providing hands-on training aboard JCG patrol vessels; providing training courses as well as acceptance of overseas students at the JCG Academy; and hosting regular experts meeting.

To deal with possible threats, the U.S. has undertaken three major unilateral initiatives, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) directed specifically at the Straits of Malacca. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify "high-risk" containers and use technology to screen them according to U.S. specifications in the originating ports rather than in the destination ports in the U.S. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aims to seize "shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile-related equipment and technologies" by sea or air before they fall into the hands of terrorist organizations or their state sponsors.

Possible Hidden Agenda

The US's overwhelming concerns about the threats of maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca are believed to be linked to a hidden agenda. The US at present exercise control over many major 'choke points' in the world's sea lanes in a way that shows the superpower would like to have a firm control of global power resources, especially oil and gas from the Middle East. At the same time US would like to ensure that the rest of the SLOCs remain safe for their navy to pass through in peace as well as war time. Their ability to control all of the SLOCs in the world

will ensure its path towards absolute hegemony in line with the American 'Grand Strategy'⁴⁰

US Hegemony

According to Joseph Nye in his book entitled The Paradox of American Power, the US has used a number of options to go about the task of establishing power globally. Nye identified 'hard power' (military and economic power) that works because it makes people do what you want them to do. "Soft power is on the other hand cultural power that is to say the power of idea and ideals that one can co-opt for one's purpose. By globalizing the war against terrorism through GWOT, the US has indirectly exercised its hegemony to the fullest".

As pointed out by the Amnesty International. The US GWOT is politically motivated. Therefore, its perception of maritime terrorism in the Malacca Straits is just another excuse to garner support from this region. If the US is really serious about safeguarding the Straits, it should have contributed to its security effort long time ago in accordance with Article 43 of UNCLOS 1982.

China Containment Policy

Another obvious issue that is more logical for continuous security concerns about the Straits of Malacca is to enhance US's China 'containment policy'. China is acknowledged as a rising power in the region economically, politically and militarily. No doubt, it is the only power that can eventually challenge US hegemony in this region. The US now is trying to flex its military muscle as well as its ability to deploy 'soft power' in its efforts to check China's growing influence in the region. That is why the US has been inviting India to join in filling up the power vacuum in Southeast Asia to forestall Chinese exerting influence in the Straits of Malacca.

The US proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in another of its attempts to place the Straits of Malacca under its total influence. China opposes the move since it sees it as a bid to present the free flow of much needed oil from the Middle East. Terrorism is just and excuse to provide an opportunity for the US and its close allies to expand its influence in Southeast Asia and control its strategic waterways. In the event of war between the US and China over Taiwan, the US could blockade and easily deny China's supply of oil and other necessary materials normally being shipped through the Straits of Malacca from suppliers in the Middle East.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CMAP	Coordinated Maritime Patrol Operation
EIS	Eye in the Sky
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ISA	Internal Security Act
IISS	Institute of International and Strategic Studies
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMSS	Integrated Maritime Security System
JI	Jemaah Islamiah
JWC	Joint War Committee
LNG	Liquid Natural Gas
LPG	Liquid Petroleum Gas
MALSINDO	Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
MCSBMs	Maritime Confidence and Security-Building Measures
MMEA	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
MMEC	Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Coordination Center
MSIS	Malacca Straits Identification System
MSCP	Malacca Straits Coordination Patrol
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
SLOC	Sea Line of Communications
SMF	Singapore Maritime Foundation
TSS	Traffic Separation Scheme
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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Colonel Effendi bin Hj Abd Karim was born in Kedah, Malaysia on 18 February 1961. He started his carrier on 01 April 1979 in the Malaysia Royal Military College and commissioned as Second Lieutenant to Malaysia Special Service Regiment on 24 April 1981. Enhancing his military carrier, he attended Special Forces Young Officers' Course - Special Warfare Training Centre, Malaysia in 1985, Junior Staff Officer Course - Army Management Institute, Malaysia in 1986, Company Commander Course - Army Training Centre, Malaysia in 1987, Special Forces Qualification Course, Jumpmaster, Pathfinder and Air Assault - JF Kennedy Special Warfare, USA in 1989, All Arms Tactics Course - Army Training Centre, Malaysia in 1990, Staff Course Malaysia Armed Forces Staff College, in 1992 and National Defence Course, Malaysia Armed Forces Defence College in 2001. He served in different capacities in both command and staff, some of his major appointment were: Adjutant at Special Warfare Training Centre, Squadron Commander at 21 Commando Regiment, Staff Officer Grade-2 at Special Forces Directorate, United Nation Military Observer at Angola, Commanding Officer at 22 Commando Regiment, Chief of Staff at 5th Malaysia Infantry Brigade and 21 Special Forces Group Headquarters. Prior to attending NDC in Bangladesh he served as the Director Special Forces Directorate. He has visited USA, France, England, South Africa, China, Japan, Angola and Turkey. His hobby is playing golf. He is a Muslim and the name of his wife is Norihan bt Jusoh.

DISTRICT LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN: PERSPECTIVE FOR BANGLADESH

Brigadier General Abul Muksid Md Wazed Thakur, ndc, psc

INTRODUCTION

During the last one and half decades, there has been wide scale debate and discourses on policy on the issue of decentralization and development. Theorists and practitioners combinedly argued that a truly designed decentralization policy can ensure and provide much expected public goods and services to decentralized units in an accountable, transparent and participatory way (Shotton, 2004). Decentralization will also create an institutional structure to test how policy options and procedures can be developed in creating direct partnerships with national government and policy-making bodies with the local government units at the periphery (Aminuzzaman, 2006). Researchers further argue that a well-designed decentralization scheme will further ensure growing and nascent democracies in various third world countries (Siddique, 2001, Aminuzzaman, 2007). However, it is unfortunate that a comprehensive model of decentralization is yet to emerge. Various international agencies like World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) have been researching and piloting various models across continents. Pakistan is one such country where under the initiatives of the World Bank a 'Big Bang' approach of decentralization was implemented in the early 2000. The 'Big Bang' model of Pakistan installed a radically different model and institution set-up at the district level administration and governance system. This study therefore aims to explore the experiences of Pakistan with particular emphasis to district level decentralization exercises and institutional building. The prime purpose of the study is to examine and analyze whether Bangladesh can learn about building institutions in designing her decentralization scheme with particular reference to district level administration and local government. It is to be noted that other tiers of decentralization has not been covered in this study.

Pakistan's decentralization plan addresses major issues of good governance and local democracy and introduces a model described as SDs i.e. **Devolution** of Political Power, **Decentralization** of Administrative Authority, **De-concentration** of Management Functions, **Diffusion** of the Power-Authority Nexus and **Distribution** of Resources. The new Local Government System (LGS) was installed on 14 August 2001, after holding of elections. It has a three-tier structure: District Government (DG), Tehsil Government (TG) and Union Government (UG). The new system has concentrated on moving from a bureaucracy to a political

hierarchy and has been designed to reorganize polices for political culture in order to create political ownership of institutions and augment their outputs (Khan, 2006a, Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir, 2005). This has also changed the formal administrative structure by assigning responsibility and power to the elected representatives of the people and had laid the foundations of a genuine and sustainable democracy that has accountability to citizens for all their decisions.

DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

Authority

Local Government Ordinance (LGO) has defined the authority of the DG, which comprises the operation, management and control of the offices of the departments, which have been decentralized to it. The DG exercises such authority within the district in accordance with the general policy of the Government. The DG is responsible to the people and the Government for improvement of governance and delivery of services within the ambit of the authority decentralized to it under the LGO (GOP, 2006). The Zila Nazim (ZN) as the head of the DG performs such functions and exercises such powers as have been assigned to him under the Ordinance. He has to ensure that the business of the DG is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the LGO and other laws in force for the time being.

District Political Structure and System

Zila Nazim. The ZN provides political leadership for the development of the district influences the politics that can improve both the current quality of life and the future development prospects of a district. The ZN has to create a development vision for the district, integrating the roles and resources of the administration, private sector, civil society organizations and local level institutions (GOP, 2006). The vision is realized through the development plans and budget that the ZN is required to submit to the Zila Council (ZC) for approval.

Naib Zila Nazim (NZN). As the speaker of the ZC The NZN has to co-ordinate between the Council and the ZN. The NZN deputize for the ZN in his absence.

District Government Structure and Staffing.

District establishments are composed of federal and provincial civil servants, the employees of defunct ZC, and staff of all group of offices devolved to the DG. A District Coordination Officer (DCO) who is a civil servant coordinator has been coordinating the activities of the District Administration (DA). The administration

consists of 11 to 13 groups of district offices each to be commanded by an Executive District Officer (EDO). A District Officer (DO) is heads sub-offices at the District Headquarters, while Deputy District Officers (DDO) are in charge of specific functions located at Tehsils (GOP, 2006). The EDOs are primarily responsible for coordinating the work of sub-offices. There is also an internal audit office under the ZN. In addition to overall coordination responsibilities of various groups of offices, the DCO has the responsibility for human resource management and civil defence. Provincial government is to post the DCO, District Police Officer (DPO) and DOs to the district.

Functions and Powers of Zila Nazim.

Fundamental functions of the ZN are as follows:

- Provide vision for district-wide development, and leadership and direction for efficient functioning of the DG.
- With the assistance of the DA develop strategies and timeframe for accomplishment of the relevant goals approved by the ZC.
- Perform functions relating to law and order in the district.

Functions and Powers of the Zila Council.

Legislative. The Legislative functions include:

- Levying of taxes as per list of district taxes given in the LGO 2000.
- Raising or lowering existing taxes.
- Making bylaws, rules and procedures applicable to DG.

Monitoring. The ZC has to monitor the DA through a specialized committee system, which entails constituting as many Monitoring Committees as the number of offices in the DA. In addition, there is an Accounts Committee, an Ethics Committee, a District Public Safety Committee (DPSC), a Sports Committee and a Cultural Committee (GOP, 2006).

Approval of Budget and Development Plans. The ZC has to approve district annual development plans as well as the budget presented by the DA under the direction of the ZN.

Functions of the District Administration.

The DA has to perform the following functions:

- Prepare plans and budgets for submission to the ZN, and upon approval by him or her and passage by the ZC, and implement them.

- Formulate district rules and regulations for approval by the ZC.
- Apply federal and provincial laws, rules, and regulations in areas covered by the administration.
- Undertake executive oversight of the execution of district policies.
- Provide information and co-operate with the legislative monitoring of the ZC, Tehsil and Union Monitoring Committees (TUMC) and Citizen Community Boards (CCB).
- Use the information collected through the information and evaluation system from all levels of monitoring.

Citizen Community Board

CCB has been created to enable the proactive elements of society to participate in community work and development-related activities in both rural and urban areas. ZC and its relevant committee have facilitated the creation of such CCB, or in some cases the citizens themselves have created them. In addition, the existing Community Based Organization (CBO) has also been continuing their work. CCBs have been able to mobilize communities and raise funds to solve local problems, (Alam, 2004). The role of CCBs has been recognized through registration at the district level. CCBs have kept their door open to new entrants to obviate negative competition and promote synergy. As voluntary organizations the CCBs have already organized themselves and have, determined their own form of functioning, creating their own leaders through the mechanism they have set. The CCBs have been seen to represent a powerful enabling environment for citizen participation Citizens of each community have taken advantage of this opportunity (Khan, 2006a). CCB has a general body of its members who elects a Chairman, an Executive Committee and a Secretary for carrying out its functions. Their term of the office is 2 years but it is extendable through election for a similar term or terms by the general body. The CCB decisions are made through its elected general body and the community. CCBs prepare their projects and after approval by the council execute them. The maximum share of the development funds for the LG cannot exceed 75% and the community share for CCBs must not be less than 25%.

Finance System

In the past, LGs used to receives 10 to 15 percent fiscal transfers from provincial sources. There was no formula for distribution of funds to districts and provincial budgets did not specify district expenditures. In order to accomplish a transparent, credible and fair system of transferring funds to the district level, a


Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) was been constituted under the new system. The principle of the formula for provincial to district transfer is that DG should generate its own resources to the extent possible.

DG has the tax collection machinery at its disposal. The specified schedule of local taxes has also come under the control of DG. A formula for provincial fiscal transfers i.e. population, under-development, fiscal efforts, areas, revenue generation capacity and expenditure requirement has been devised and implemented. The objectives of fiscal transfers are to provide baseline levels for essential services, to boost revenue generation efforts, to encourage spending in priority areas, and to provide efficient spending/expenditure. The model provincial formula has become part of the new provincial finance awards. The resultant formula developed in conjunction with the provincial government is subject to change in a similar fashion as the national finance awards (GOP, 2000, Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir, 2005). Fiscal autonomy was the critical part of devolution. Under the LGO, the ZC had the power to levy certain taxes. The council may increase, reduce, suspend, abolish or exempt the levy of any tax for such period as may be specified by it. The procedure for levying new taxes has been made transparent. No tax can be levied without inviting public objections (GOP, 2000). However, all taxes before being levied have to be vetted by provincial governments.

COMPARISON BETWEEN DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN AND ZILA PARISHAD IN BANGLADESH

Structure and Composition

Pakistan. The DG is the highest and most important tier in the new structure of LGS. The DG is composed of the ZN and NZN, the ZC and the DA. The Union Councilors of the district elect the ZN and NZN as joint candidates. An Union Nazim (UN) who is directly elected becomes a member of the ZC. Each union therefore, send one representative to the ZC. The number of general seats in the ZC varies depending on the number of unions in the district. In addition to the general seats, the ZC is to have 33% seats (33% of total number of Union Councils within the district) reserved for women, 5% (5% of total number of Union Councils within the district) each for workers/peasants and minorities (GOP, 2000, Ayaz, 2003). Members of the Union Councils of the entire district also serve as the Electoral College for the election of candidate to reserved seats. No ZN or NZN can hold the same office for more than two terms. The Structure of the DG is shown below in a flow-chart:



Source: http://www.decentralization.org.pk/images/figure_2.gif, 12/2/2008

Bangladesh. Out of three tier LGs structure for rural areas in Bangladesh, ZP stands at the apex. It has been subjected to many changes in terms of its structure and composition. Now a ZP comprises a Chairman, 15 members and 5 women members in the reserved seats (Siddiqui, 2005). The Chairman and members including women members, are elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of the Mayor and Commissioners of City Corporation, Upazila Parishad (UZP) Chairmen, Pourashova Chairmen and Commissioners, Union Parishad (UP) Chairmen and members within the jurisdiction of the district.

Fundamental Functions

Pakistan. The DG is responsible to the people and the Government for improvement of governance and delivery of services. The DG has to take the responsibility for agriculture, health, education, community development, information technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and services, finance and planning (Alam, 2004, GOP, 2006).

Bangladesh. ZPs have been given 12 compulsory and 68 optional functions. Compulsory functions of the ZPs are mainly concerned with infrastructure building while optional functions mainly relate to the promotion of education, culture, social development, public health, public works, local economy, religious institutions etc (Siddiqui, 2005).

Financial System

Pakistan. PFC has been constituted for allocation of resources from the provinces to districts, based on population, fiscal capacity, fiscal effort and specific needs etc of the districts (GOP, 2006). The DG has been provided a list of taxes in line with its functions. The funds are provided in accordance with the expenditure and revenue assigned to it and they are transferred as a single line item. Despite financial decentralization, DGs remain reliant on provincial and ultimately federal funds (Khan, 2006a).

Bangladesh. The ZPs are required to prepare their budgets annually and sanction their own budgets. The ZPs are empowered to levy taxes, rates and fees on 8 items. The ZPs are authorized to collect a community tax from adult males for the construction of public works of general utility (Siddiqui, 2005). The annual statements of account of ZPs are to be forwarded to the government which is the prescribed authority. These are to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in such a manner as he deems fit.

Personnel System

Pakistan. The DG is comprised of both federal and provincial civil officers and staffs as well as employees of respective council. The provincial government

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has created district service cadre comprising all posts of DG for decentralized functions with adequate monetary benefits and incentives for promotion and performance. As regards the employees of non-decentralized departments, DG is authorized to coordinate their functions (GOP, 2006).

Bangladesh. Every ZP has an organogram with two wings i.e. Technical wing that and Administrative wing that is approved by the government. It has 25 employees of 4 categories. A Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a senior-level government officer of the rank of Deputy Secretary (DS) and a Secretary, a mid-level government officer of the rank of Senior Assistant Secretary of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration), have been posted on deputation to run each of the ZP (Khalequzzaman, 1995, Ali, 2003). Employees other than Class I are appointed or promoted by the ZP after taking clearance and approval from the government.

Analysis of Zila Parishad of Bangladesh

Articles 9, 11, 59 and 60 of the Bangladesh constitution provide us an outline of a LGS with the elected representatives for effective participation of the people at each administrative unit of the Government. After independence, the Bangladesh Government renamed all the rural local bodies through the promulgation of President's Order number 7 of 1972. It has declared the Union, Upazila and Zila as administrative units for the purpose of carrying out constitutional provisions (Siddiqui, 2005). The district level LG has undergone major changes in terms of structure, composition, functions, financial resources and personnel system. The name District Council, was changed to Zila Board, and then to ZP. From the time of there inception, ZPs in Bangladesh have been placed under the DC and he/she continued to work as its Chairman. The term of ZP has been made 5 years but no election has been held for ZP so far. At present LGS in rural areas of Bangladesh provides three levels of structure: UP, UZP and ZP. People's perception about the role and functions of ZP, and their analytical/critical views in regards to its weaknesses are given in subsequent paragraphs.

Perceived as Threat. A strong urge to bring pragmatic changes in the ZP is lacking because a strong ZP is perceived by civil servants, political leaders and major political parties as a threat to their existing power. They do not wish to see a strong ZP due to the fear of losing their political power base (Siddiqui, 2005). On an average, in a district, there are four to five parliamentary constituencies. It is likely that an elected ZP Chairman would demand a protocol equivalent to that of a Minister that would bring the ZP Chairman into conflicts with the interests of the MPs of the district.

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Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1979). Under the reorganized set-up in the early eighties, each Upazila had an elected UZP that also generated tremendous amount of interests among the local people who considered it to be the focal point of all development activities. Rural people have a strong belief that both the UZP and UP as LGIs could serve them adequately and they therefore are very comfortable with the UZP and UP system. As the UZP and UP function at the grass root level, the problems faced by rural communities can be easily identified and Parishad members can take measures to resolve them. On the other hand, ZP covers a wide area, people in villages or rural areas cannot identify themselves with the ZP. According to them, it hardly qualifies as a rural LG body (Siddiqui, 2005). Moreover, national government organizations directly administer all technical and development services under the integrated administrative system at the district level. For this reason, there is scope for ZP to get effective control over government activities or development activities in an area. Since ZP members are usually from the upper strata of the society and have no connection with the masses, people have shown no urge to strengthen it. They firmly believe that district can prove, coordinating and supervisory roles for the development and welfare of the people of the district.

Lessons Drawn From Pakistan District Government.

The lessons procedural by the Pakistan experience/exercise is summarized below:

a. As head of the DG and elected people's representative, ZN enjoys supreme authority. Keeping in view 'Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely', the role and functions of ZN have been placed under scrutiny through various checks and balances.

b. ZC has been made truly representative, having the provision for elected women, peasants, workers and minorities' representations in the body, ZC has been working as people's mini-parliament at the district level, like the National Parliament at the national level.

c. ZC has a number of committees through which functions and performances of the elected representatives and officials of the DA are being observed, monitored and evaluated. ZC also ensures that the role, functions and activities of the ZN are much more democratic, transparent and responsive to the needs of the people.

d. People's rights to information and their active participation in the decision-making process to take up development projects and plans of the district have been institutionalized through the formation of CCBs and CBOs.

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'Development of the people, by the people and for the people', in view CCBs have been formed in all Districts of Pakistan.

e. In respect of coordination among LGIs of different tiers and intra-district coordination among the various departments/agencies, DG has got the authority to monitor and supervise activities of both elected representatives and officials of the administrations of the TG and UG. The Institution of ZMC is a unique idea and it has been very successful in ensuring proper resource management through mustering and coordinating limited resources for the balanced planning and development of a district.

f. Planning, mutual assignment of functions and fiscal transfers i.e. mutual adjustment of funds between and among the various tiers has been very effective in terms of facilitating/adopting a rational approach for the overall development of the district through linking different stakeholders of the society. As a result, complementary relationships between and among the various tiers have developed and a spirit of mutual respect, accommodation, better understanding, cooperation and above all a democratic culture has been established.

g. Allotment of adequate and fixed time-slot for extensive consultations and discussions prior to the preparation of the budget has been very productive, pragmatic and rewarding. This concept of draft budget has allowed the voice of the local people to be heard for the first time before the placement of the draft budget to the ZC for its review and final approval. Budgetary and fiscal transfers from the provincial government to the DG does not lapse or expire within a financial year and allotted funds can be retained by the DG until the completion of the development or project work (GOP, 2006).

h. Because of the bottom-up strategy instead of top-down approach for undertaking development plans and projects within the district, DG as a LGI enjoys much more authority and executive power to approve and allocate funds for the projects without being dictated and suffering interference from the national government (Khan, 2006a).

j. DA has been thoroughly reorganized and restructured, and dovetailed to meet the requirements of the common people and placed under the people's representative to ensure accountability and transparency. Grouping of various district offices under an executive has been found to be more effective and target-oriented in terms of achievements made against the target and timely delivery of services to locals.

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Lack of Political Commitment. ZPs have not been given the chance to act as a working organization even after the emergence of Bangladesh. ZPs, as wheels of democracy and providers of services and contributors to local economy, have been adversely affected by the broad-scale changes made in the administrative from time to time. During democratic governments no real effort was taken to restore the ZP, precisely because of the Members Parliament (MP), cutting across the political divide, did not want any rivals in their constituencies. Therefore, no government since independence has shown any genuine interest and commitment to revive ZP as a feeder institution to promote future national leadership from the local level and also to provide good governance to locals.

Considered as Part of Bureaucracy and Emergence of UZP. Elections to the ZPs have not been held for a long time even after the passing of the ZP Act, 2000. So long ZPs have been functioning under the executive orders of the government and have therefore turned into bureaucratic agencies (Siddiqui, 2005:299). With the emergence of the UZP system as a strong body within the LGS, the importance of the ZP has further deteriorated. UZP has also been carrying out many functions that used to be performed by the ZP. Now the question has been raised by people whether this tier i.e. ZP, is at all necessary.

Lack of Adequate Fund. ZP is expected to develop the communication networks that connect the growth centres, market places, etc for easy and early traffic of goods and commodities that is a vital precondition to economic growth. Unfortunately, the role played by ZP has been rather limited because of paucity of funds and lack of autonomy (Ahmed, 1979). ZPs have to primarily depend upon government grants, which have been mostly inadequate in meeting the overall needs (Quddusi, 2006).

Lack of Leadership. The ZP has never taken up many crucially important functions and services since its establishment. The reason behind this was not so much associated with financial constraints as it was with lack of leadership and initiative (Ahmed, 1984:83). It appears to that the absence of elected representation i.e. local leadership for years together, has been a major factor responsible for its poor performance.

Increased Role of Engineering Department vis-a-vis Diminished Role of ZP. After the independence of Bangladesh, the government established an Engineering Advisory Body (EAB) in each ZP. It was entrusted with the responsibility of assisting ZP and other LG bodies as well as evaluating the implementation of projects. Role of EAB as a provider of technical advisory services to the LG bodies began to increase. It was upgraded into the Local

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LOCAL GOVERNANCE AT DISTRICT LEVEL FOR BAGLADESH: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Description of Model A

Characteristics/Striking Features.

a. **Name.** Zila Government.

b. **Structure.** There will be three-tiered LGIs for rural areas. Zila Government (ZG) stands at the apex and is to be headed by a Zila Mayor (ZM) and to be deputized by a Zila Deputy Mayor (ZDM). Upazila Government (UZG) at the middle is to be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM) and Union Government (UG) at the bottom by a Union Mayor (UM). However, there will also be a Union Deputy Mayor (UDM) at the union level. Both UM and UDM will be elected on a joint ticket.

c. **Composition of Zila Government.** ZG will be composed of Zila Council (ZC) and Zila Administration (ZA). ZDM will be the speaker of the ZC.

d. **Composition of Zila Council.** UZMs, UMs and Mayors of all Municipalities within the district will be members of the ZC. The number of seats in the ZC will vary, depending on the number of the Upazilas, Unions and Municipalities in the district. A Number of seats will be reserved in the ZC for representation of disadvantaged groups (women, peasants, workers and minorities) from various Upazilas within the district.

e. **Election.** ZM, ZDM and all the members of reserved seats will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.

f. **Electoral College.** The Mayor and Councilors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councilors of Municipalities, UMs and members of Union Councils within the district will constitute the electoral.

g. **Zila Administration.** The post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created to work as co-ordinating head of the ZA abolishing the existing post of DC. There are more than 50 offices functioning at the district level (Ali, 2003, Khalequzzaman, 1995). These may be grouped suitably to bring synergy in their activities and each is to be headed by an Executive District Officer. ZA will be placed under the elected representative i.e. ZM and ZC.

h. **Functions and Funds.** Fundamental functions of the ZG will be legislative. He will monitor, and approve the budget and development plans. Adequate funds should be earmarked and allotted for the ZG to reduce dependence on the national government, to enable it to promote good governance and become an effective service delivery system.

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Government Engineering Bureau (LGEB) and later on, turned into the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED). Its responsibilities/ roles began to expand from technical services to construction and maintenance of feeder roads, most of which previously belonged to ZP (Siddiqui, 2005). ZP had a large Engineering Set-Up, with the District Engineer (DE) at the top, which basically provided engineering services within the district. This moribund situation of ZP has provided the opportunity to LGED to expand rapidly and work at the nook and corner of district. At present, some amount of local level planning is also going on under the auspices of LGED. The involvement of local elected functionaries in this planning is generally of token nature.

Absence of Physical Presence of ZP in Local Areas. Beside LGED, almost every development ministry has got its line Engineering Departments (Public Works Department, Education Engineering Department, Public Health Engineering Department, Roads and Highways Department, Water Development Board Engineering Department etc) at the District and Upazila level. There are involved in infrastructural development activities in rural areas such as construction of educational institutions, roads, culverts, bridges, embankments, hospitals, health clinics etc. All these departments of the national government have become very well-established and sustainable departments with huge technical personnel and branches/wings stretching all over Districts and Upazilas (Siddiqui, 2005). At the moment instead of ZP, various government-engineering departments are performing the tasks of infrastructure and communication development at the district level. As a consequence, ZP is becoming less effective and people are getting fewer opportunities to participate in the development activities of their districts. For a long time, people have not seen any infrastructure and communication development works being undertaken by ZP. In other words, presence of ZP through its physical activities and through the eyes of the rural people has been conspicuously missing. As a result, people have lost interest in ZP.

Number of Tiers. Political analysts and researchers firmly believe that the number of tiers of government has important financial, administrative and political implications an underdeveloped country like Bangladesh cannot ignore (Siddiqui, 2005). Having three or more LG tiers in Bangladesh can impose great constraints on the government budget and restrict funds and grants, and result in stiff competition among the tiers for money, resources or taxes. Researchers also opine that confusion in regard to the roles of the LGIs, functional overlaps, or overlapping of responsibilities, lack of coordination and strained relations among the tiers are most likely to develop if there are three-tiered or more LGs. It is worth mentioning here that the UP has a long heritage and has acted as a LG for over a century in

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j. **Employment of Personnel.** The personnel management system is to be placed at the hands of the ZG and there should be a separate service called the Local Government Service for employees of the ZC.

Analysis

a. The ZG will be functioning as a more authoritative and empowered LGI than any other LG. It will also work as a democratic LG at the district level headed by an elected ZM.

b. ZC will be truly represented by various sections of the society thus making it a focal point/hub of all activities of the district. ZDM will become the speaker of the ZC.

c. ZA will be regrouped and reorganized under an executive officer and the post of DC will be renamed as ZNO who will have a coordinating role to perform.

d. ZG will be composed of ZM, ZDM, ZC and ZA. It will have the planning and coordinating functions for the socio-economic and infrastructure development of the district. In addition, it will also have monitoring and supervisory roles over the UZG and UG.

e. ZG can only be effective if other LGIs at the Union and Upazila level are restructured simultaneously. A holistic approach/view to decentralize the total LGS has to be considered. Otherwise restructuring only one tier will not bring about the desired results and changes in terms of providing good governance and essential services to locals.

f. With its three tiers, LG would create a greater burden on the national government exchequer in providing grants and financial resources. This will create stiffer competition among the tiers for the limited resources derived from taxation or revenue collection. With three tiers, functional overlap, lack of coordination and strained relations among the tiers are most likely to develop.

Description of Model B

Characteristics/Striking Features.

a. **Name.** Zila Parishad.

b. **Structure.** There will be three-tiered LGIs for rural areas. Zila Parishad (ZP) will be the highest tier to be headed by a Zila Mayor (ZM). Upazila Parishad (UZP) will be the second tier and will be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM). Union Parishad (UP) is to be the lowest tier and is to be headed

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by a Union Mayor (UM). However, ZA will be placed under the administrative control of the ZM.

c. **Composition of Zila Parishad.** All UZMs and Mayors of Class 1 Municipalities within the district will be members of the ZP. Number of seats in the ZP will vary, depending on the number of Upazilas and Class 1 Municipalities in the district. Few seats will be reserved in the ZP for representation of disadvantaged groups (women, peasants, workers and minorities) from various Upazilas within the district. Zila government officials will also be official members of the ZP.

d. **Election.** ZM and all members of reserved seats will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.

e. **Electoral College.** The Mayor and Councilors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councilors of Municipalities, UMs and members of the Union Councils within the district would constitute the college.

f. **Zila Administration.** The post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created. He will work as head of the ZA and he/she will also act as Member-Secretary of the ZP. ZA will be made accountable and responsible to the elected head i.e. ZM and the elected body i.e. ZP.

g. **Functions and Funds.** A major function of the ZP will be to prepare a Zila Development Plan, reflecting the potentials and needs of all Upazilas within the district. The ZP will also ensure the implementation of projects by concerned departments and coordination among departmental activities. Other functions of the ZP will be as follows:

- (1) Monitor the activities of the UZP.
- (2) Supervise and monitor the activities of colleges and other educational institutions located at the district level.
- (3) Identify and implement projects for inter-upazila connecting roads and bridges in the Zila Plan, etc, through concerned departments.
- (4) Supervise and monitor government hospitals and clinics at the district level.
- (5) Assist in the implementation of programmes undertaken by the national government and maintain contact with different ministries.
- (6) Provide assistance for expansion of trade and industries.
- (7) Maintain law and order, and formulate measures for prevention of terrorism and supervise the activities of the Police.

h. The staffs and employees working at present in the ZP may be retained and should continue to function under the new system. There should be a separate service for the staffs and employees of the ZP to be called Local Government Service.

Analysis

a. Elected ZM will head the ZP and it will be comprise of both people's representatives and nominated government officials. For balanced representations in the ZP, disadvantaged groups of the society like women, peasants, workers and minorities will also be members of the ZP.

b. On the other hand ZP will enjoy more authority and exercise power over the administrative, operational and management aspects of various activities within the district.

c. Although ZA will not be the part of the ZP, ZM and ZP will have absolute administrative control over the functionaries/officials of the ZA. ZNO will be the coordinating head of the ZA. Through him/her, all district officials will be made answerable and accountable to the ZM and ZP. ZNO will assist the ZM and ZP and work in the capacity of Member Secretary of the ZP.

d. ZP will have monitoring and supervisory roles over the activities/functions of the UZP and UP and their relationships will be complimentary to each other.

e. Because of its three tiers, LG will undoubtedly increase the administrative cost of the national government. Too many tiers create confusions and most of the time result in overlap of activities, jurisdictions and responsibilities of respective local bodies. There is a saying 'everybody's job is nobody's business' and this could happen if too many tiers exist in the LGS.

Description of Model C

Characteristics/Striking Features.

- a. **Name.** Zila Development and Coordination Committee (ZDCC).
- b. **Structure.** There will be two-tiered LGIs for rural areas. Upazila Parishad (UZP) at the top will be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM). The Union Parishad (UP) at the bottom will be headed by a Union Mayor (UM). However, a ZDCC at the district level will be established. This is to be headed by a ZM, abolishing the existing ZP.
- c. **Composition of Zila Development and Coordination Committee.** All UZMs and Mayors of Class 1 Municipalities will be members of the ZDCC.

The number of seats in the ZDCC will vary, depending on the number of Upazilas and Class 1 Municipalities within the district. Zila government officials will also become official members of the Committee.

d. **Election.** ZM will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.

e. **Electoral College.** The Mayor and Councilors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councilors of Municipalities, UMs and members of the Union Councils within the district will constitute the Electors College.

f. **Zila Administration.** The new post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created to work as head of the ZA. He/she will also act as Member-Secretary of the ZDCC.

g. **Functions.** ZDCC will plan, coordinate and review development projects and maintain communication between UP and UZP as well as UZP and the Zila Administration. The ZDCC could be assigned following functions:

- (1) To plan, identify and coordinate development projects and fix area-based priorities for development.
- (2) To resolve inter-upazila and inter-sectoral conflicts.
- (3) To coordinate and consolidate area planning at the district level in accordance with the national plan.
- (4) To plan, prepare and recommend development projects for their own areas and send these to the Ministry or Local Government Commission (LGC).

h. **Employment of Personnel.** The Existing ZP has 25 staff members and employees divided into 4 categories that have been approved by the government. These staff members and employees could continue to work under the ZDCC to provide administrative, technical and secretarial facilities and support.

Analysis

a. ZDCC will mainly plan, supervise and coordinate all development activities within the district.

b. Administrative and management costs of the national government will come down significantly or will be much less if LG is two-tiered instead of three-tiered.

c. Relationships between the two tiers will be much more congenial and effective. Confusions in regard to functional jurisdiction and lack of coordination that have been prevailing among the three layers are likely to be removed.

Since 1971, LGS has kept on changing with every change of government. Unfortunately, the ZP in Bangladesh has always been in a moribund state and has been dysfunctional in terms of its democratization and delivery of good governance and essential services to locals (Siddiqui, 2005). The ZP's fact credibility has declined so much that people have shown much more interest in UZP and UP than in ZP.

From the in-depth analysis of the administrative and governance structure existing at the district level in Pakistan and Bangladesh, three alternative models of administration and governance structure have emerged which could be fitted into our system, provided we undertake decentralization and restructuring of our prevailing local governance at the district level. Having studied at length the comparative advantages of each model on the basis of the political, constitutional and administrative structure and character of the government, socio-political and economic realities of Bangladesh, this paper recommends, Model C, i.e. Zila Development and Coordination Committee for active consideration for Bangladesh.

GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	Meaning
CBO-	Community Based Organization
CCB-	Citizen Community Board
CEO-	Chief Executive Officer
DA-	District Administration
DC-	Deputy Commissioner
DCO-	District Coordination Officer
DDO-	Deputy District Officer
DFID-	Department for International Development
DG-	District Government
DM-	District Magistrate
DO-	District Officer
DPO-	District Police Officer
DPSC-	District Public Safety Committee

DS-	Deputy Secretary
EAB-	Engineering Advisory Body
EDO-	Executive District Officer
GOB-	Government of Bangladesh
GOP-	Government of Pakistan
IPPT-	Immovable Property Transfer Tax
LG-	Local Government
LGC-	Local Government Commission
LGEB-	Local Government Engineering Bureau
LGED-	Local Government Engineering Department
LGI-	Local Government Institution
LGO-	Local Government Ordinance
LGS-	Local Government System
NZN-	Naib Zila Nazim
PFC-	Provincial Finance Commission
PSC-	Public Safety Commission
RWP-	Rural Works Programme
TG-	Tehsil Government
TMA-	Tehsil Municipal Administration
TMO-	Tehsil Municipal Officer
TN-	Tehsil Nazim
TRO-	Technical Reporting Officer
TUMC-	Tehsil and Union Monitoring Committee
UA-	Union Administration
UDM-	Union Deputy Mayor
UG-	Union Government
UM-	Union Mayor
UNCDF-	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP-	United Nations Development Programme
UN-	Union Nazim
UP-	Union Parishad
USAID-	United States Agency for International Development
UZG-	Upazila Government

UZM-	Upazila Mayor
UZP-	Upazila Parishad
ZA-	Zila Administration
ZC-	Zila Council
ZDM-	Zila Deputy Mayor
ZDCC-	Zila Development and Coordination committee
ZG-	Zila Government
ZM-	Zila Mayor
ZN-	Zila Nazim
ZNO-	Zila Nirbahi Officer
ZP-	Zila Parishad

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d. As the number of LG tiers will be two instead of three, so LG will be in a better position to receive more funds and grants from the national budget. Therefore, the allotted funds and resources could be utilized in a the best possible manner for the infrastructural and socio-economic development of the district.

e. Tendency of the national government to reach the local community by-passing the LGIs is likely to be curbed and the role/function of the national government could be taken over by committee members through their active engagement and participation in the development planning, supervision and monitoring of development activities within the district.

f. An elected ZM is going to head this ZDCC and the senior most-civil servant in the district i.e. ZNO would act as its Member-Secretary. ZDCC will work as an excellent interfacing institution where elected representatives, bureaucrats and technocrats can meet to formulate the development vision and plan of the district.

g. As ZM would not represent any particular constituency within the district, it is most likely that he or she is not going to challenge the existing power/political base of a MP. Therefore, it could be logically presumed that ZDCC is unlikely to face any resistance and opposition from stakeholders (political leaders and political parties and, top bureaucrats of the administration).

CONCLUSION

Over the decades, it has been seen that the provincial bureaucrats of Pakistan were the designated 'controlling authorities' of the LGs, and tended to undermine and over-ride them. This bred a colonial relationship of 'ruler' and 'subject' (Alam, 2004). It has been empirically proved beyond any doubt that these structural and systemic disjoints, coupled with the absence of horizontal integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional coordination between the line departments, lead to inefficiency, corruption, lack of transparency, and was the root cause of the crisis of governance at the grass root level. Current reforms have changed the formal administrative structure by assigning responsibility and power to elected representatives of the people (Ayaz, 2003). A reorganized and restructured district administration has been tailored with monitoring to be done through specialized committees of the ZC and citizens (GOP, 2006). An effective and transparent system of distribution of resources between the provincial and district governments has been one of the cornerstones of the new system which has removed disparities and inequalities regarding resource allocation (Khan, 2006a).

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**EXTERNAL FORCE PROJECTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY: ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN
MILITARY**

Captain Andrew Adebowale Dacosta, ndc

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War was assumed to usher in an era of peace, stability and development. However, such hopes had been dashed. The post - Cold War era has been confronting a highly dynamic security environment far more complex, uncertain and threatening than anything nations had experienced before. While this is a time of promise and developing partnerships, it is also an era of irregular and increasingly intermittent conflicts. Adversaries unable and unwilling in some cases to face nation states have increasingly resorted to whatever means available to wreak havoc and destruction, physically, economically and psychologically, unhindered and unconstrained by conscience and civilized norms.

The changing security landscape that has emerged since the end of the Cold War continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen just a few years ago. An increasingly inter-connected world is shaping our economic, political, and social realities in a manner that is in stark contrast to the previous century. The wide scope and unpredictable nature of this new landscape has compelled nations to develop new strategies that require the harmonization of the full spectrum of national power.¹

Regional co-operation has acquired increased importance with the end of the Cold War. The need to strengthen regional co-operation in Africa has also become imperative. While pursuing the goal of strengthening overall co-operation in Africa, priority may be accorded to the prospects for sub- regional co-operation. The Gulf of Guinea Commission by the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) states and the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are examples.

Today, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) states require the capacity to respond to threats to their maritime environment. Their ability to achieve optimum success in this security environment requires three essential elements: timely intervention to unanticipated challenges that will help mitigate or prevent crisis that are harmful to the nations' interests; the need to work closely with sub- regional partners to

¹. Ayoob,M, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and The International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p.8

60. Report on the Devolution in Pakistan: *An Assessment and Recommendation for Action* (A Study Conducted by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Department For International Development jointly), Islamabad, 2004.
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62. Dr Abdul Moin Khan, Former Minister of Bangladesh Government in Charge of Planning, Science and Information Technology Ministries, Dhaka, 24 May 2008.
63. Mr Aamir Shouket, First Secretary, Pakistan High Commission, Dhaka, 31 July 2008.
64. Mr Harun-Ur- Rashid Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet District, 3 March 2008.
65. Mr Khalilur Rahman, Upazila Nirbahi Officer, Golapgonj Upazila, Sylhet, 5 March 2008.
66. Mr Muzir Uddin Chaklader, Chairman, Dhaka-Dakshin Union Parishad, Golapgonj Upazila, Sylhet, 5 March 2008.

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71. <http://www.un.org.pk>
72. <http://www.lgd.gov.bd>

enhance regional security; and institutional innovations that contribute to comprehensive coordination throughout the interagency and within the framework of the international community².

The geo-political area referred to as the GoG lies between latitude 20°N and 45°N on the African coast. The region is a diverse mix of eight energy-rich South Atlantic littoral states. They are: Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo Brazzaville, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. These countries form the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). This wide expanse of water has, on the one hand, facilitated the free movement of vessels but it has, or the other, also enabled drug and small arms trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, and kidnapping and armed attacks on coastal oil facilities. In addition, asymmetric attacks on oil facilities, hostage taking and infiltration of terrorist cells and mercenaries into the area have tarred this region of relative peace and security into a cauldron of instability.

It will therefore, be instructive to find out if any instability in the region negatively impact on the economies of not only the countries of the region, but also the economies of the industrialized world that has made the oil of the region part of their wider national security objectives.³ As global demand for energy continues to rise, major players like the United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan are facing a new competitor in the race to secure long-term energy supplies China. China is intent on getting the resources needed to sustain its rapid growth and has thus turned to Africa to look for oil and other raw materials.

Given this, situation it can be argued that the security of the GoG will guarantee the economic survival of member states. This implies that security in the GoG is of paramount importance not only the member states, but also to the United States and its allies in the western world as well as some Asian countries. However, the GoG has to cope with numerous challenges, both exogenous and endogenous, before it can fully benefit from its riches. One of these problems stems from the weak institutions and governance seen in the countries of the reqr which add to the risks of "natural resource curse" which fits the theory of the Paradox of Plenty.⁴

². Dokubo, C, Africa's "Security in the 21st Century" in Akindele, R, and Bassey, A, eds Beyond Conflict Resolution: Vantage Publishers, 2000, p.84

³. East and Central Africa Division, Africa 1 Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Gulf of Guinea and the Challenges Ahead, 2008, p.1


⁴. Damian Ondo Marie, Emergence of Gulf of Guinea Economy: Prospects and Challenges, IMF Office of the Executive Director, 2005.

The paper will give an overview of the GoG states, including the geo-strategic importance of the region, analyse the maritime threats they face and the challenges and vulnerabilities of the GoG. The paper will also examine what constitutes external force projection and the implications of external interests necessary in the GoG and outline the strategies to meet the challenges on the GoG.

OVERVIEW OF THE GULF OF GUINEA REGION

Geo-Strategic Importance of Gulf of the Guinea

Figure 1: Map of the Gulf of Guinea



Source: Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.

The geo-political area known as the GoG results in different responses in different experts. Indeed whatever meaning or definition is ascribed to the area depends largely on the perspective from which it is being looked at, as well as the person attempting to define it. Once disregarded as the sweaty armpit of Africa and

hated by colonial bureaucrats as the kind of place where even paper clips get rusty on the desktop from the humidity of the air, the GoG has suddenly become the place of tension. It is limited to the geographic area created by the Treaty establishing the GGC on 3 July 2001. The countries of the area have a total coast length of about 1,320 nm and a combined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of about 2,740,000 sq nm (See Figure1). Within this vast maritime domain lies the offshore asset of these countries, which the countries' military forces are required to protect. Today, the region offers caves for both hope and trepidation.⁵

The lack of maritime safety and security in the GoG is having a negative impact on stability and human security, and economic development of region. Countries in the sub-region continue to lose millions of dollars to fish poachers and are being subjected to, rampant criminal activity, trafficking in drugs, violence pollution and crude oil thefts. Through improved security, the countries will be able to manage these natural resources better for the benefit of both present and future generations. African countries' collaborating on issues relating to their shared coastal waters will have a significant impact on future prosperity and job growth in the continent.⁶

The Treaty establishing the Commission is intended to provide a framework for cooperation and development as well as for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts that may arise from the delimitation of maritime borders. As well the treaty will help the economic and commercial exploitation of natural resources within territorial boundaries, particularly in the case of overlapping EEZ of member states. Other provisions include the strengthening of cooperation in the areas of maritime security and communication among member states.⁷

In addition to oil reserves, the GoG also offer political advantages to the US and Europe as none of the member states except Nigeria belongs to OPEC. The other attraction is that most of the oil fields in the GoG are offshore and therefore protected from the vagaries of civil and border wars, coups, rebellions and revolution.⁸

Another aspect of the GoG, apart from its influence on the global energy system, is that it is also a medium for international trade. Unlike other oil-supplying regions, the GoG benefits from the absence of transit chokepoints, narrow maritime

5. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development. Chapter 1 – Johannes, D. Frankfurt, R: The Gulf of Guinea and the Global Oil Market: Supply and Demand, p.33
6. Jendayi, F. Keynote Address: "Maritime Safety and Security"- Gulf of Guinea Ministerial Conference, Cotonou, Benin, 2006, p.1
7. A Defence HQ Committee Paper on "The Proposed Gulf of Guinea Guard" 2007, p.3
8. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Op Cit, p.33

also reasons to fear that such a policy would not work. The weakness of the member states' armed forces is a problem that will be solved only with a paradigm shift in most of the GoG states' priority from regime security to human security and economic development of the region. Exerting effective and sustained governance over the vast maritime domain is a daunting task facing each country the countries in the GoG and the newly established Commission. It therefore, becomes imperative to pay more attention to the role of naval forces and to re-position fleet to provide credible power in securing the Gulf. Member states have to take into account the initiatives of extra- African actors who have seized the opportunity of the vacuum to foray into the region with a wider security implication, coupled with renewed American interest in the region. For now this interests is strong and the GoG states can do nothing to oppose the American hegemony. It is therefore, imperative that member states come together and put in place a collective security mechanism in the sub-region.¹⁰

EXTERNAL FORCE PROJECTION IN THE GoG

What is force projection? According to Wikipedia, power projection (or force projection) is a term used primarily to refer to the capacity of a state to conduct expeditionary warfare, i.e. to implement policy by means of force, or the threat thereof, in an area distant from its own territory. Power projection can also be defined as; "the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability".¹¹

This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in international relations. Any state able to direct its military forces outside the limited bounds of its territory might be said to have some level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to armies that have a worldwide reach. While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on hard power assets (tanks, soldiers, aircraft, naval vessels, etc.), the developing theory of soft power notes that power projection does not necessarily have to involve the active use of military forces in combat. Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses; deployment for humanitarian response to disasters and as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states' behaviour.

European Union Force Projection in the GoG

Presently, only four EU member states are carrying out substantial military activities in Africa and can be considered to have a real African policy. The states are France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal. However, unlike the US, the activities and military posture of these countries are predominantly on training and humanitarian support. The pursuit of which does not overtly pose any serious threat to the region. Consequently, rather than involving into the force projection policies of these EU states, the paper will concentrate on the establishment of AFRICOM and look at China whose foray into Africa has re-ignited America's interest in the continent in the last decade.

China's Force Projection

As mentioned earlier China in pursuit of massive economic development has become a new competitor in the race to secure long-term energy supplies.¹² For which China has turned to Africa a viable source of energy. A cursory look at China's power projection abilities reveals that China has embarked on a nuclear carrier project which is aimed at enhancing her force projection capability throughout East Asia, into Africa and Latin America. A nuclear aircraft carrier will give the Chinese military the ability to back up its forces that now are discreetly training in African and Latin American countries. U.S. officials claim that part of China's force projection efforts is to contain the US.¹³

However, evidence shows that like other global players in Africa - the British, the French, the Japanese - the Chinese level of political and economic engagement are still so modest that it does not constitute a threat as is the case with the US.

United States Africa Command

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest Command of the Department of Defense, that is responsible for US military operations and relations with 53 African nations. Indeed, its - an Area of Responsibility (AOR) cover all of Africa except Egypt. The Africa Command was established on 1 October 2007 as a temporary sub-unified command of US European Command, it became fully autonomous and operational by 30 September 2008. The Center for Contemporary Conflict of the US Navy notes that US policy towards Africa, at least in the medium-term, is to be largely defined by international terrorism, the

12. Stephanie Hanson, China, Africa and Oil (www.cfr.org) 2008.
13. China Navy (www.merit.ndu.edu/archive/china/dod/chinamavy2007).

lanes such as, the Panama Canal, the Straits of Hormuz or the Suez Canal. Therefore, oil carried in tankers is less susceptible to blockades, attacks, hijacking and other accidents. These advantages notwithstanding, the region faces varying degrees of challenges.

Challenges to the Development of the Region

The major challenges include but are not limited to the following lack of development strategies and public expenditure frameworks based on over-optimistic assumptions, overspending and inefficiencies.

Another pertinent question that comes to mind is whether GoG member states can create a regional oil policy that can promote their security and development? Although they differ in many ways, the countries of this region share several common characteristics besides their oil. They all have weak governments, underdeveloped economies and a shortage of qualified human capital. Their populations suffer from poverty, hunger, endemic diseases, illiteracy, unemployment etc. These are not very promising ingredients for successful integration.

The arguments in favor of a regional oil policy include the need to defend common interests against the major multinational oil corporations, possibility of collective bargaining with the Americans, existence of regional organizations, and the absence of major conflicts among the states of the region. The arguments against such a regional policy include the chronic weakness of their state institutions, their under-developed economies, heavy foreign debts, poor social conditions and widespread poverty. All of these would undermine their ability to negotiate advantageous conditions for their resources.

THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA'S MARITIME DOMAIN

There is growing awareness that the vast resources and potential of the GoG are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in this sub-region, pervasive insecurity in this resource-laden maritime environment has resulted in huge financial losses and significantly constraining investment and economic prospects resulting in crime and potentially adverse political consequences. It may be noted that concept of security which has two broad characteristics in many African countries. First, security has been associated with the perpetuation of a regime and not necessarily the welfare of a country and its inhabitants. Secondly, the focus has been primarily land-centric, because regime security seldom had a maritime dimension.

increasing importance of African oil to American energy needs, and the dramatic expansion and improvement of Sino-Africa relations since the turn of the century.¹⁴

Scope of AFRICOM Operations

The focus of AFRICOM's missions will be diplomatic, economic and humanitarian. It will be aimed at prevention of conflict, rather than at military intervention, according to Theresa Whelan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.¹⁵ General Ward has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that AFRICOM would first seek "African solutions to African problems." His testimony made AFRICOM sound like a magnanimous effort for the good of the African people.¹⁶ This is, to an extent, misleading because all US combatant commands have the same responsibilities in general; to plan, direct and execute US military operations in their assigned AOR. AFRICOM is only different in that the situation on the continent, US officials believe, would be better served by the military.

Objectives of AFRICOM

The White House states that the objective of AFRICOM is as follows:

"AFRICOM will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."¹⁷ While the U.S. Department of State stated that:

"The U.S. military's new command center for Africa, (AFRICOM), will play a supportive role as Africans continue to build democratic institutions and establish good governance across the continent. AFRICOM's foremost mission is to help Africans achieve their own security, and to support African leadership efforts."¹⁸

These seemingly noble objectives notwithstanding, the idea did not receive widespread acceptance by African governments. This resulted in a series of controversy. Since the February 2007 announcement of AFRICOM's creation, there have been numerous reports on growing African resistance to the new US military command. In August 2007, Dr. Wafula Okumu, a research fellow at the Institute

14. Gen William "Kip" Ward, USA African Command, AFRICOM Dialogue (www.africom.mil) 2007.
15. Theresa Whelan, Creation of US African Command - Department of Defence Bloggers Roundtable, 2007.
16. Gen William "Kip" Ward, Op Cit.
17. Danny Glover and Nicole C. Lee, TransAfrica Forum (www.transafricaforum.org/tafstaff.html),

Consequently, maritime security arrangements in the GoG are under-resourced. However, a number of recent national and regional initiatives suggest a paradigm shift. As African countries, commercial entities, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders have increasingly come for recognize the wide-ranging benefits of enhanced maritime security. The emergence of GoG as one of the strategic regions of the world, especially in terms of energy requirements and supply, has set about a beehive of activities and competition amongst the world's superpowers as well as between mega oil companies.⁹

While there may be varied factors that could lead to security threats in the GoG, the following constitute some of the major threat and vulnerability factors: competition amongst the super-powers, internal conflicts, criminal activities, lack of maritime domain awareness, inadequate legislative and judicial arrangements and weak infrastructure amongst others.

Armed Forces of GoG States

From the foregoing, it is clear that member states are capable of monitoring activities in the maritime domain to deter and/or stop the security threats as the case may be. It is therefore, apt at this point to briefly look at the composition of the armed forces of the member states, noting in particular their maritime component.

The table shows the commonality in the weakness of all the GoG states' navies. In the light of the argument, so far it can be concluded that there are many reasons to develop an oil policy for the GoG by member states. However, there are

TABLE 1. ARMED FORCES OF GULF OF GUINEA STATES AS ON 2007

	Army	Navy	Air Force
Angola	107,000	1,000	6,000
Cameroon	12,500	1,300	300
Congo RC	8,000	800	1,200
DR Congo	46,000	1,000	4,000
Equatorial Guinea	1,100	120	100
Nigeria	67,000	8,000	10,000
Gabon	3,200	500	1,000
Sao Tome & Principe	NA	NA	NA

Source: Military Balance 2007

9. Raymond, G. "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea" Strategic Insight, Vol.VI, Issue 1 (www.ccc@nps.edu) January 2001.

for Security Studies in South Africa, testified before congress about the growing resistance and hostility to USA on the African continent. She quoted a State Department official as saying, "We've got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the US, they just don't trust the US."

Many Africans have voiced a resounding "no" to AFRICOM. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has publicly denounced AFRICOM and has said it will not tolerate the presence of an American military structure on its soil. Nigeria, Libya, Botswana have made similar statements. The only government that has offered to host the headquarters is Liberia.¹⁹ Findings show that the Department of Defence failed to adequately consult with African governments and regional bodies before announcing the establishment of the command, though now it appears to be in continued consultation with African governments.²⁰

Analysis of the Activities of China and the West in Africa

China's growth and close economic ties with Africa are affecting the ability of the US and the EU to influence politics on the continent. The reason African countries can now stand up to their former colonizers is the option they have of more attractive Chinese market, which has been offering African countries better prices and more investment.

"The EU most certainly overlapped its hand in trade negotiations," Erixon observes. "They pushed Africa into China's hands. They just asked for too much. They demanded reforms from African nations that they would never be able to do." Beijing's policy of non-interference compared to the EU's big demands is what makes it such an attractive alternative, according to Erixon. The EU clearly got it wrong and upset a number of African nations.²⁰ "China doesn't demand any corruption or human rights reforms. The non-interference policy applies as long as they can see results from the investments that they are making." However, "the U.S. is not pleased with the investment in Sudan," Setser has said. "The U.S. development community is worried that China's unconditional support is displacing conditional support."²¹

19. Resist AFRICOM, A Project by Hip Hop Caucus, Africa Faith and Justice Network, Foreign Policy in Focus, African Action, Trans-Africa Forum (www.salsa.democracyinaction.org), (www.concernedafricascholars.org).
20. Ibid.
21. Fredrik Erixon, ECIPE Policy Brief, an EU-China Dialogue: A New Policy Framework to Containing Deteriorating Trade Relations, No 3/2008 (www.ecipe.org)

The Implications of External Interest in the GOG

The current scramble for resources in the Gulf of Guinea is essentially for economic reasons. However, it connotes equally, if not more dangerous challenges to the GoG states and have underlying political, military and other socio-political implications that would necessarily affect the interests of all member states sooner than later.²³ There are implications that would become manifest when these external interests begin to outbid one another.

For instance, prior to the establishment of AFRICOM, America's strategic policy towards Africa had been inconsistent, driven by emergencies and crises and differing in priorities, rather than by a considered strategy. Viewing the project with a clinical lens, 2007 one believes that AFRICOM is an expansionist tool aimed at defending the vast economic interest and empire of the US. It has no long term benefit for Africa. From the statements issued so far, it is clear that AFRICOM is being perceived by US as a strong military companion through which it can intervene in any part of Africa where there are real and imagined threats to US economic interests. With this view, "AFRICOM will be used to promote policies of imperialist assimilation" (Danu 2007). He further posits that through it, the formulators of AFRICOM intend to be in a position to tell Africans what to do and how to do it including whom to trade with.

Another critical issue raised against it was the rationale behind US developing a security outfit for Africa without its critical input this African leaders need to be more critical and analytical in appraising the concept of AFRICOM to know where they stand on it and must ensure that they can optimize the gains of the new developing relationships.²⁴

AFRICOM could create divisiveness among African states between those for and against it and can have negative implications for African solidarity. AFRICOM would also pose serious challenge to Nigeria's position in Africa as a regional power. Nigeria's role in the maintenance of regional peace and stability would diminish as weaker African countries may feel a greater urge to seek assistance of a far stronger and richer global power. Nigeria's influence in Africa may diminish as a consequence. The proposed establishment of a military base as part of AFRICOM could negatively affect relations among African countries, particularly between the host country whose territory would be used for launching military strikes and the victim states of such strikes Moreover, the presence of US troops in Africa would affect the sovereignty of any African country or countries hosting AFRICOM.

22. Leander Schaeffkens, Analysis: China beats West in Africa (www.api.com) 2008.

23. A.G. Adeyemi, "The Strategic Imperatives Confronting Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea". A Report submitted to DHQ Abuja, August 2004.

24. Report of Inter-Ministerial Committee on AFRICOM, Ministry of Foreign Policy Affairs, 2007.

Enhanced Security Awareness

The Nigeria military in collaboration with other stakeholders in the GoG must evolve policies that would ensure increased security awareness within the maritime sub-sector.³²

Regional Maritime Domain Awareness

Regional maritime domain awareness capability is important to support the GGGF in improving regional security. Also vital is the creation of an information sharing network and establishment of a Regional Coordination Centre. The Regional Coordination Centre will coordinate the activities of the national centers. The National Operating Centers are to be established by the member states, with each country controlling the sharing of information from its own sensors. Local sites could also be located along the coastline of member states. The Force Headquarters and Regional Coordinating Center are proposed to be located in Nigeria.³³

Level of Force Contribution

The current strengths of the armed forces of member states were taken in consideration in determining the level of force contribution. The relative size of Nigeria's armed forces bestow on her the responsibility to contribute 50% of the Force requirement while the remaining countries are to jointly contribute the balance of 50%.³⁴

Formula for Burden Sharing

In order to determine initial financial implications, it was proposed that a technical committee be set up to assess the cost of the Force structure and types of mission. Meanwhile, to determine the formula for the burden sharing, it was considered to use the percentage output of member states' crude oil production.³⁵

Developing a Strategic Approach for Enhanced Maritime Governance

Apparently in response to Nigeria's unenthusiastic reaction to AFRICOM, a US delegation came to Abuja on 28 November 2007 to lobby for the support of the country for the initiative. Consequently, an inter-Ministerial Committee on AFRICOM was set up. The Committee observed that the US has already taken a

32. O.O. Biobaku "Maritime Power and Strategy", Lecture Delivered To National War College, Course 14 on 16 October, 2005, p.27

33. DHQ Committee Report Op Cit.

34. A DHQ Committee Report on the Modalities for the Establishment of a Gulf of Guinea Guard Force, 2008.

35. Ibid.

The presence of the U.S and its Western allies will attract the attention of terrorists who would follow the U.S presence anywhere it goes.²⁵ Therefore, terrorism, which is one area that the US claims to be a major reason for its presence in the GoG, for the protection of oil exploration activities will surely be attracted to the area.

Perhaps the gravest concern engendered by the obtrusive scramble of the U.S for the region is the military bases that America has determined to establish in some of these Gulf's states. The establishment of US military bases in Sao Tome and Principe, for instance, could embolden Sao Tome against Nigeria or any other state of the zones. This could lead to an expose of the border skirmishes, which sometimes occur in this Gulf, into intractable local conflicts that could fuel be local arms race. The thesis that forms the centre piece of this page is that the pervasive entrenchment of American interests in the 'armpit of Africa' is a menace to the natural growth of the political and cultural interests of the states domicile within this Gulf. In concluding this analysis thus, the question that has to be asked is: What should the states of the GoG do to protect themselves?

In replying to this question, we will borrow a leaf from Lobengula when he said "Did you ever see a Chameleon catch a fly? Lobengula, King of Ndebele, asked of the missionary Helm. "The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains motionless for some time, then it advances very slowly and gently, first putting forward one leg and then another. At last, when well within reach, it darts its tongue and the fly disappears: England is the chameleon and I am that fly."²⁶

In like manner, the U.S would become the chameleon while any of the GoG states could become the fly. Therefore, they cannot afford to be caught unawares. They must thus put in place mechanisms to counter any menace to their security. To avert threats, member states would have to change their perception that the US is a huge charitable organization, always willing to be magnanimous. These states should note that Americans have their own pressing national interests, which they are out to satisfy. Furthermore, these states should ensure that their socio-political sectors are kept free of foreign intervention.

Since Nigeria believes, it has a manifest destiny as a leader in the comity of African states, and is expected to assume a decisive role in African politics, a role which the world seems to have taken for granted because of its size and population", it behoves on Nigeria to invest in the development of an alternative

25. T. Makarenko, "Terrorist Threat to Energy Infrastructure Increases" in Janes Intelligence Review, 1 June 2003, pp1-2.

26. Sidney Shippard to Sir Hercules Robinson, 24639/65: March 1889. Africa (South) No 369, quoted in Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia, London: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 105.

basis of national security within the framework of integrated policies among the states of this Gulf. Although, it has been stated that "there comes a time when a sovereign and independent country has to decide, for better or for worse, that her national interest must take precedence over good neighborliness."²⁷ Nigeria should "in the pursuit of this objective, not consider any sacrifice too great."²⁸

Hence, Nigeria along with any willing GoG state should embark on the development of technological, economic and military capacity that would satisfy the urgent needs of other states in the region through complex horizontal and vertical links: financial, technical, trade, investment, development assistance, military cooperation and the likes. By and large, therefore, there is need for a long term perspective planning by Nigeria which should ultimately seek to integrate factors of defence, economic development and transnational exchanges within a broader context of security management relations amongst these states. This suggestion is necessitated by the fact that the security of any state can no longer be see as an isolated concern.²⁹

In other world, member states must come together and evolve a collective security mechanism that would ensure security of lives and investment. It is to this end that Nigeria has proposed the formation of the Gulf of Guinea Guard Force (GGGF), which will ensure security in the region.

STRATEGIES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Establishment of Collective Security Mechanism

The establishment of a collective security mechanism within the provisions of the GGC treaty is the most viable option for the defence of the sub-region. The collective security mechanism would entail the creation of a robust, highly mobile and integrated GGC Rapid Reaction Force. The proposed force shall have a maritime component as well as land and air forces made up from member states. This would facilitate adequate defence of the political and socio-economic interests of the member states. Apart from the benefit of peace and security, the regional defence arrangement would also ensure combined force planning, collective intelligence effort, burden sharing and aggregation of resources. It would also include combined training, policy coordination and clearly defined command and control measures. The arrangement would negate likely suspicion as to the intent of

27. See Gray L. Cowan, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy", in Tilman and Cole (eds), The Nigerian Political Scene, Durham, N.C Duke University Press, 1962, p.124

28. Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldering: Nigeria Foreign Policy 1975-79, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987, p.20

29. Ibid, p.102

Finally, as evidenced by their active participation and policy commitments at various regional programs, countries in the GoG should recognize the importance of maritime security in the sub-region. Already many governments are taking steps to formulate and implement national and regional strategies to address the growing challenges they face. GoG leaders now need to move from good intentions to tangible results. It is also clear that no single country will be successful on its own. The benefits of the region's abundantly endowed maritime domain could be derived through the declaration of firm commitment to collective action. A shared investment in maritime security (which is a "public good") would have far-reaching human security benefits, and positive global implications.³⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above analysis, the following recommendations can be made to address the challenges in the GoG:

- GoG member states should expedite action to ensure immediate settlement of all boundary disputes.
- Joint Development Zones should be establishment among concerned member states to ensure equitable resource control in the GoG.
- GoG member states should present a common front in negotiating with the USA and other foreign powers on the control and development of the GoG.
- GoG states should expedite action on the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Guard Force (GGGF) and a Technical Committee to work out the cost of the Force structure and the types of mission the GGGF would engage in.
- In addition, respective GoG member states should ensure the actualization of the underlisted strategies at their national level: Demonstrable Political Commitment, Increased Operational Efficiency, Transparent Regulatory Systems and Heightened Public Awareness.

CONCLUSION

In recent times, the Gulf of Guinea has become the subject of interest for a myriad of constituencies. The reason for such interest is the presence of untold wealth, in the form of oil deposits underground and under the sea. The new relevance of the require has led US to re-evaluate its regional commitments and counter long-standing French and British influence and rising Chinese stakes there,

38. Communiqué on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea - Ministerial Conference, Cotonou, Benin, 2006.

a member state increasing its level of military capability, as it would be seen to serve a common purpose.³⁰

The proposed GGGF would be a mixed force to be led by the Navy. It would be used as an instrument for regional and collective security to monitor and protect the common maritime interests of member states of the GoG. The structure of the propose force is as follows:

Size and Composition of Force

Size. The size and composition of the force is to be decided by the vastness of the sea area to be patrolled, the nature of future tasks; such as, oil rig protection and rescue of hostages. It can be usened that mixed force that would require army elements. The need for sustained aerial surveillance of the maritime environment will necessitate the use of maritime patrol aircraft.³¹

Composition

Army Elements

The army elements that would be required by this Force would essentially form the Special Boat Sections (SBS). The proposed GGCF would thus consist of 1 x Battalion of Special Forces with full complements.

Naval Component

Against the backdrop of the characteristics of the desired ships (such as speed and endurance) for patrol, a total of 9 x Offshore Patrol Boats (OPVs) with integral helicopters would be required. Additionally, about 20 x Inshore Patrol Boats and 50 x Flat Bottom Boats would also be required to enhance the policing duties of the naval component.

Airforce Component

The number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) required to conduct aerial surveillance of the maritime environment under consideration was calculated based essentially on aircraft time on task of about 8 hours per aircraft and equipment borne onboard. A total of 9 x MPAs and 4 x shore based helicopters would therefore be required.

The GGGF would be a standing force with members that will be expected to rotate at specific intervals. The proposed Force would also have both operational and administrative headquarters in designated countries.

30. L. Du Plessis & Hough, M, Protecting Sub-Sahara Africa: The Military Challenge (Pretoria: HSRC Publishers 2000), p.251

31. A DHQ Committee Report on the Modalities for the Establishment of a Gulf of Guinea Guard Force 2006.

This led the US for establish an African Command and plan a regional military base, and restate its views of the GoG as an area of "national strategic interest" Cloaked in "humanitarian" guise, AFRICOM, poses an imminent threat to self-determination on the continent compared to the activities of other powers in the region. Rather than accepting a US - imposed order, Africans should "develop Africa's own strong, effective and timely security capacities."

AFRICOM is a dangerous reminder of US military expeditionary policies around the globe. Such foreign-policy priorities, as well as the use of weapons of war to combat terrorist threats on the African continent, will not achieve Amerce national security. AFRICOM will only inflame threats against the United States, make Africa even more dependent on external powers and delay responsible African solutions to continental security issues.

There are many reasons to develop an oil policy for the GoG by the member states. However, considering the commonality in the weakness of all the GoG states' naval and air forces, there are also many reasons to apprehend that such a policy might not work. The weakness of the member states' armed forces is a problem that will be solved only with a paradigm shift in most of the GoG states' priority from regime security to human security and economic development of the region. Exerting effective and sustained governance over the vast maritime domain is the daunting task facing countries in the GoG and the newly established Commission. It is therefore, becomes imperative to pay more attention to the naval forces and re-position the fleet to provide credible punch in securing the Gulf. The member states have to also revere the initiatives of extra-African actors who have seized the opportunity of the vacuum to foray into the region. They must resist American interest in the region. Since this interest is strong and the GoG states can do nothing to stop the American hegemony; it is imperative that member states come together and put in to place a collective security mechanism. Hence, the establishment of the proposed Gulf of Guinea Guard Force is an idea of the time. The GoG states would have to expedite action on immediate commencement of operation.

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Reintegration with Family

Children who leave the family due to abuse or fear and take to the street can be reintegrated with their parents through counselling. Counselling and advocacy for the children as well as family members help both parties to make adjustments, which have proved to be instrumental in solving these problems.

Education and Training

Education and training, especially night schooling and vocational training can help these children to gain confidence in building their rightful place in society. Some NGOs like Building Resources Across Community (BRAC) and Aparajeyo Bangla have already taken steps to help such children and dropouts from regular schools. Practical and flexible programs with friendly teachers like those employed by the ARISE project will induce street children to learn useful skills and obtain employment in future. This requires greater mobilization of resources both by the government as well as the private sector.

Motivational Programmes

Street life makes young children courageous, independent and freedom loving. They prefer to roam about instead of taking advantage of Drop in Centres. So motivational programs should be taken to persuade street children to leave the streets. Budgetary allocation for addressing programmes targeted at these children should be increased.

Healthcare Facilities

The unhygienic and disease prone environment of the streets, slums and public places as well as pollution from smoke, noise and chemicals adversely affect the growth of street children. There flight is worsened by lack of knowledge about healthcare and sanitation. The healthcare facilities that have been provided to these children is not sufficient. As most organizations have resource constraints program intervention and strategic planning, they are unable to address the multifarious problems. There is an urgent need for wider coverage through concerted efforts of the government, society and the community as a whole.

Planned Urbanization

To minimize unplanned urbanization and rural urban migration, the rate of migration should be slowed down by creation of employment in rural areas in agriculture and agro- based industries. Simultaneously, satellite towns and growth centres with adequate facilities must be made to provide alternative destinations for

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inadequate. Considering that the children of today are our future citizens, coordinated initiatives should be taken to aid the children to overcome their problems so that they can contribute meaningfully to society, and ultimately to the nation.

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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY AND ROLE OF THE POLICY MAKERS: OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

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INTRODUCTION

The influence of power on the history of mankind cannot be overemphasized. Both land and sea theatres are important. However, in the post-cold war era geo-strategy is increasingly being replaced by geo-economics as a measure of National Strength. Since nearly three-quarters of the world is now covered by seawater. This great common area provides the opportunity to both good and evil in accessing different parts of the world. On the one hand, maritime trade is responsible for almost 95 per cent of the total world trade. On the other hand, many security concerns have also emerged in the maritime domain, affecting the states' security. Sea based resources such as oil, gas, and fish have become crucial for the economic success of littoral states and hence must be supervised and administered. Besides, the extensive use of sea as the cheapest and easiest means of mass transportation has contributed to the internationalization of world trade and commerce. Maritime security is that component of national security which deals with sea and matters related to it.

The concept of security has undergone a paradigm shift as globalisation and developments of information and communication technologies obliterated much of the geo-political boundaries of the nation states. Unfortunately, the spread of asymmetric conflict have emerged as the defining paradigm in the changing contour of politics, economics, military strategy and technology. The exploitation of sea resources plays an important role in the economic prosperity and the development of a nation and ultimately contributes to its defence. Every maritime state acknowledges the significance of its maritime assets and exploits the resources optimally.

Despite having direct access to the sea, Bangladesh has not been able to use it and its resources fully mainly due to lack of maritime awareness. Bangladesh's maritime sector is a vital component of the national economic and military power. But Bangladesh's security considerations continue to be dominated by developments on land; maritime affairs are perceived merely as an extension of these activities. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has opened up opportunity of having 1, 03,000 square kilometres of sea space as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for Bangladesh. This is nearly two-thirds of her land area, which is only 147,570 square kilometres. The EEZ is

12. " Pothshishuder bank", Shaptahik Obokash, Naya Digonto, 30 March 2008.
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23. http://www.rib-bangladesh.org/p_details.php?p_no=121, accessed on 15 September 2008.
24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Bangladesh, accessed on 12 September 2008.

rich with living and non-living resources. According to UNCLOS III, Bangladesh has the right to possess 350 miles of Continental Shelf for exploration and exploitation of non-living resources. Preservation and exploitation of all these maritime resources are major challenges for Bangladesh in affecting its total security environment.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to identify the maritime security challenges of Bangladesh, highlight the role policy makers should play and recommend viable options for Bangladesh.

Maritime Interests of Bangladesh

Maritime security has gained a strong foothold in the overall security paradigm of Bangladesh mainly due to its dependency on the sea. The increasing sea dependence of Bangladesh emanates from its pressing need of generating more wealth for benefit of its huge population. Given limited resources in the land area, optimum exploitation of the marine resources is very important in the national interest. The two Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) connected with the two seaports are the lifelines of the national economy. Since the country land-locked by only two countries on three sides, the Bay of Bengal provides direct access to the outside world and facilitates vital trade links. Any disruption of these activities and SLOC whether in peace or war will have a disastrous effect on its economy. Along the long coastal belt, millions of people survive on fishing, forestry and salt production. Thus, Bangladesh needs to secure its maritime interests from all kinds of threats. The maritime interests of Bangladesh are briefly described below:

- a. **Sea Areas.** Under the Law of the Sea, Bangladesh has an Exclusive Economic Zone² (EEZ) extending up to 200 nm from the baseline³. The area of her EEZ is approximately 40,000 square miles. Bangladesh has a long coastline of about 710km (385 nm). The legal provision for the extension of the continental shelf is up to 350 nm by the year 2011. If the preliminary settlement of the extended area is completed, it will provide an additional area of about 30,000 square miles to the country.

1. M Khurshed Alam, Commodore (Retired), Bangladesh's Maritime Challenges in the 21st Century, Pathak Shamabesh, Dhaka, 2004, p. 481
2. The Law of the Sea, United Nations Publication (Sales No E.83.V.5, Printed in USA 1983) P. 18
3. The normal baseline is the low-water line along the coast as marked on the large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.

b. **Living Resources.** The marine waters of Bangladesh are rich in fish and fishery resources. Fishery sector is playing a very vital role in employment generation, animal protein supply, poverty alleviation and exports. According to the report of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 2006, marine fisheries are contributing 4.86 percent to the GDP and 5.90 percent to the total country's export earnings.⁴ About 12 million people are directly or indirectly dependent on this sector. Labour employment in this sector has been increasing approximately by 3.5 percent annually. About 10 percent of annual export earning comes from the fisheries sector and it ranks 3rd among the export-oriented industries.

c. **Non-Living Resources.** The offshore gas-fields at Shangu have already contributed the country 89 TCF (trillion cubic feet) gas and more gas fields of similar type are being drilled in the Bay of Bengal and should go into production soon.⁵ The Government and the Bangladesh Oil, Gas & Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla) *Under Offshore Bidding Round-2008*⁶ has invited International Oil Companies (IOCs) to bid for acreage for exploration of Oil and Gas. Twenty-eight offshore blocks designated for Gas/Oil exploration by the government are currently available for exploration by the IOCs. Besides hydrocarbon, Bangladesh extracts salt and silica sand from sea. But due to technological backwardness Bangladesh cannot extract many other minerals like ferro-manganese, iodine, magnetite, garnet, zircon, retile, limonite, monazite, wave, tidal and generate hydrothermal energy etc.

d. **Maritime Trade.** Maritime commerce has been on the rise since independence and will continue to grow in the future with the gradual social, industrial and economic development of the country. Since 1976, on the average the sea has been accounting for 93.14 percent of total exports and imports where air and land have been accounting for 3.73 and 3.13 percent respectively. Another statistics shows that maritime commerce rose to 2,76,29,235 tonnes in 2007 as compared to 2,14,41,889 tonnes in 2003. The yearly average current growth rate of maritime trade is 11.66 percent.⁷ During the period between 2003 and 2007, the number of vessels handled per year increased from 1720 to 1945 at Chittagong Port of Bangladesh.⁸ The other port i.e. Mongla Port did not make any significant contribution due to existing navigational limitations of the Pussur river and berthing constraints of the Mongla port.

4. Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2006.

5. Petro Bangla official website at <http://www.petrobangla.org.bd/>, visited on Sep 04, 2008.

6. Bangladesh Oil, Gas & Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla) Offshore Bidding Round-2008.

7. Official Website of Chittagong Port Authority (CPA) at http://www.cpa.gov.bd/statistical_info.html#cargo visited, Sep 03, 2008.

8. Ibid.

Myanmar has declared its defence policy review in 1999 that it has essentially changed its threat perception from internal to external one. This policy shift has transformed Myanmar Navy from a constabulary one to an offshore territorial defence navy. Accordingly, it has displayed its naval might recently by placing an offshore rig in a Bangladesh claimed EEZ.

Together or alone, both these neighbours pose greater maritime security threats to Bangladesh. The growing size of the Indian fleet has capability to completely block both the SLOC of Bangladesh. Again, Myanmar's growing naval development would enable her to carry out merchant raids on our eastern SLOC. It may also launch aggression on mainland from the sea or even carry out operations denying Bangladesh's right to use the seas.

Societal Issue

Migration. Because of the growing economic disparity between Bangladesh and developed countries, people would naturally seek new opportunities abroad. But immigration laws are making land/air routes increasingly restrictive for the illegal migrants worldwide. Hence, illegal immigrants have already begun to exploit maritime transportation. Illegal boarding of merchant ships at outer anchorage has been experienced in the past in Bangladeshi waters. Thus, migration is adding to maritime security concerns and requires greater monitoring and law enforcement at sea.

Environmental Issues

Maritime Pollution and Oil-related Environmental Disasters. Pollution and oil-related disasters at sea may create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment and have the potential to affect maritime security.¹⁵ In Bangladesh, the product and transferee tanker used to import oil are mostly found not to have complied with the Maritime Pollution (MARPOL) 73/78¹⁶ requirements of equipment and operation. Again, external source of pollution, including nuclear dumping, is often suspected to take place in the Bay of Bengal.

Maritime Disasters. Marine casualties in Bangladeshi water are not uncommon. On July 24, 2006, for example, BSC oil tanker BANGLAR SHOURABH caught fire at the Chittagong outer anchorage, or events which could have had a catastrophic environmental impact.¹⁷ The Sri Lankan flag carrier

15. P K Ghosh, No.25.

16. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973/78 (MARPOL). The MARPOL Convention has six technical annexes dealing respectively with prevention of oil, noxious liquid substances carried in bulk, harmful substance carried by sea in packaged form, sewage from ships, garbage and oil air pollution.

ISSUES AFFECTING MARITIME SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

Political Issues

Maritime Jurisdictional Dispute. Bangladesh's unresolved maritime boundary with two of her neighbours poses threats to its maritime security. This can become more complex and serious because of years of delay in finding out a political resolution. Both the neighbors do not recognize Bangladesh's present claim of EEZ and these have not been resolved bilaterally so far and this impasse has virtually made Bangladesh a 'Zone Locked State'. Meanwhile, the exploration of offshore oil/gas has been started by Myanmar on the claimed EEZ of Bangladesh. Besides giving rise to conflict over sharing of resources in the EEZ, this issue also constraints Bangladesh in claiming an extended continental shelf and new-born islands. Four meetings have taken place with Myanmar in the last year and a three-day Bangladesh-India maritime boundary talks began after 28 years on the same issue and ended in Dhaka on 17 September 2008 without any concrete progress on the pending issues, although officials of both the countries claimed to have had "fruitful discussions."⁹ Virtually, there had been no decisions obtained so far from all three round of talks with Myanmar and a recent meeting with India on the issue. The submission of the maritime claim with required data to the International Sea Bed Authority by 2011 is the biggest challenge ahead of Bangladesh. This will subsequently work as a base for the claim of Continental Shelf of huge potential sea area to be brought in future under the maritime jurisdiction of Bangladesh.

Regional Disunity. Historically, countries on the shores of the Bay of Bengal have strong national sensitivities and disbelief among them. This sentiments has been exploited by the extra-regional powers in the past and at present. Building consensus and unity is still a great challenge for the nations.

Economic Issues

General. Bangladesh's failure to develop its maritime potential in the last 37 years has caused a serious dent in its economy, apart from rendering the security of the country vulnerable. The country will pay a high price for such failures in the future as it did in the past if the realization at this stage is not developed and appropriate measures are not taken to redress the situation. The sooner the nation manages to gain control over the prevailing environment, the better it will be for its economic stability and maritime defence.

9. Barrister Harun ur Rashid- Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva, Resolving the Bangladesh-India sea boundary issue. Article published in 'Daily Star', Dhaka, October 10, 2008.

Port Capacity and Security. Bangladesh is not isolated in the globalisation trend where its international trade is growing at 15 percent annually by value. At the current rate of growth, Bangladesh's maritime trade may triple in around 14 year's time. This increase will strain Bangladeshi ports and then intermodal transportation infrastructure. If the infrastructure does not keep pace with the trade growth, then maritime trade may be diverted to other countries reducing the prospect of economic growth. Hence, the growth of international trade will pose a infrastructural challenge to Bangladesh. Again, the growing volume of cargo traffic will lead to increased traffic congestion and related maritime accidents. The port infrastructure and facilities, equipments, rules and regulations and basic pattern of organisation, including management, are outdated. Bangladesh's present port handling capabilities could be boosted by adopting better management techniques, automation of the ports and by reducing corruption, labour unrest and political violence. Again, the requirement of a deep sea port is being very much felt in the context of increasing sea borne trade and the need for a substitute of Chittagong port in case of emergencies.

Exploitation of Sea-based Resources.

a. **Fisheries.** The marine fisheries sector in Bangladesh consists mainly of small non-motorized craft operating within 30 miles (48 km) from the shore. Illegal fishing activities are threatening the conservation as the rate of harvest exceeds the reproduction rate, particularly in near shore waters. Presently, 73 registered fishing trawlers and about 6,000 mechanized registered fishing boats are engaged in marine fishing. Another 5,000 to 8,000 unregistered fishing boats also operate throughout the coastal belt¹⁰. The total annual fish catch is 3,500-4,000 tonnes of shrimp and 10,000 tons of other fish. Even then, many of the available fishery resources in Bay of Bengal are yet to be explored. Fisheries resources have not been considered and managed as a renewable natural resource. This is mainly due to lack of appropriate fishing technology and technical awareness that is needed to avail the development opportunities on the one hand and the lack of management capabilities of the public sector agencies on the other. Fishing is done presently up to 50 meter depth in Bangladesh; this covers only one fourth of the water area under the EEZ. The fishery resources of leftover areas of the EEZ are naturally lost every year. Again, illegal fishing activities in Bangladeshi waters by both domestic and illegal foreign trawlers are threatening the conservation of living resources.

10. Mohd Khurshed Alam, Maritime Strategy of Bangladesh in the New Millennium, BHSS Journal, Vol. 20, No.3, Dhaka, July 2000. Pp. 219- 221

to perform necessary constabulary tasks in the maritime field. Bangladesh has approximately 710 kilometres of coast line and securing such a huge coast is a difficult yet critical task for it at this time.

CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

The maritime security of Bangladesh faces many challenges. Before addressing the maritime security strategy, these maritime challenges need to be identified. These are as follows:

a. Conventional Security Challenges.

- Challenges in Governance.** The biggest concern in the maritime theatre is the ignorance about importance of the sea not only among ordinary people but also the policy makers. Number of ministries, institutions and stakeholders are working on maritime fields without any common forum/platform to operate/cooperate towards a common objective. In parity with other departments in Bangladesh, maritime institutions have also fallen short in implementing rules and regulations. This is more pronounced in the absence of concerted effort between various ministries and autonomous bodies responsible for overseeing the maritime sector. This creates challenges to maritime good governance.
- Security Challenges.** Smuggling, maritime terrorism, piracy and arms trafficking constitute significant threats that affect adversely on the economy and maritime security of Bangladesh. In 2006, the International Maritime Bureau recorded an alarmingly high (47) incidents of piracy in Bangladesh. The majority of piracy attacks occurred around the port of Chittagong.
- Economic Challenges.** Lack of adequate resources and fund is the major challenge for development of maritime infrastructure. Almost every year accidents and sinking of ships inside the channel and anchorages severely interrupts port operation and affect the economy of Bangladesh. Besides, poor economy of Bangladesh does not allow her to exploit and utilise enormous offshore hydrocarbon potential.
- Maritime Sovereignty Challenges.** UNCLOS III has endowed Bangladesh with enormous opportunity. Because of lack of adequate technical and appropriate knowledge or inability to appreciate the urgency Bangladesh, as yet, could not place its case before the United Nations regarding the maritime demarcation, although it ratified the UNCLOS in 2001. Bangladesh has not yet carried out necessary survey to decide about

18. The Daily Independent Bangladesh, August 21, 2008.

b. **Offshore Oil and Gas.** Gas/ oil exploration in offshore areas are increasing. The nation's power supply is now largely dependent on the offshore gas being added to the national grid. More offshore blocks have been put under international bidding for exploration, which will again be a matter of security concern. On the other hand, the Indian government launched the sixth licensing round in early 2006. This included two blocks right below block 21 of Bangladesh.¹¹ Meanwhile, Myanmar has also started the exploration on the claimed EEZ of Bangladesh from December 2007, which is again on the overlapped claim area by Myanmar.

Military Issues

The Indian national budget of 2008-09 has allocated Rs. 105,600 crores (US \$ 30 billion) for India's defence which accounts for nearly 14.1 per cent of the total central government expenditure.¹² For fiscal year 2008-09, India's defence allocation increased by 10 per cent over the previous year's allocation of Rs.96,000 crores(US \$ 27 billion). In the last five years, the Indian defence budget has increased by nearly 37 per cent from Rs. 77,000 crores (US \$ 21 billion) in 2004-05, which represents over 8 per cent growth per annum. The Indian Government is fully cognizant of its strategic maritime interests and has recently earmarked a sum of US\$ 4.5 billion for the Indian Navy (IN) under a new strategy of which the guiding principle is ' naval assets are the most suitable platforms for India's growing nuclear arsenal'. All efforts are in progress to transform the Indian navy into a Blue-Water Navy.

Indian Navy's (IN) blue water aspiration has led for a far reaching naval modernisation programme for her fleet. "By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication," Indian Naval Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta said while delivering a lecture on Navy's vision for the future on 10 Aug 2008.¹³ IN is getting a completely new look and will soon be able to project its world-class superiority in Indian Ocean. IN is focusing its strategy on the terms like 'from the sea' and "Forward from the Sea", and augmenting its access to events ashore¹⁴. On the other hand

11. Khurshed Alam, Commodore (Retired), Importance of sea floor nautical charts in delimiting maritime zones and boundaries. Article published in 'Daily Star', Dhaka, 01 September 2007.

12. Integrated Defence Staff official website at <http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/LaxmanBehera190308.htm>, visited Sep 04, 2008.

13. Associated Press of Pakistan website www.app.com.pk, visited 04 September 2008.

14. Malik Mustafa, Maritime security: The role of PN, Lecture held in Pakistan National Defence College, Islamabad, summer 2005, p.167

the extent of its continental shelf. The control points of its base line have been contested by both India and Myanmar. Bangladesh is likely to get 'zone or sea locked' if the issue is not resolved. Hence, asserting its maritime sovereignty in the Bay of Bengal will require concerted legal, political and institutional effort by the country to solve the maritime demarcation dispute with India and Myanmar as early as possible.

(5) **Infrastructural Challenges.** The maritime infrastructure of ports, shipping, fishing, oil and gas rigs, and other resource exploitation and conservation are to this point inadequate, posing a greater developmental challenge for Bangladesh.

(6) **Technological Challenges.** Bangladesh's political commitment and will power will face the challenge in harnessing the benefits of technology and ocean monitoring assets. The pace of technological development and dual use by both licit and illicit agencies challenges Bangladesh's ability to maintain technological edge over its competitors.

(7) **Environmental Challenges.** Sea level rise, tsunami, cyclones etc challenge Bangladesh's ability to forecast and provide shelter to its coastal communities. The country's sea area is experiencing pollution from land and vessel-based pollutants. Indiscriminate use of harmful chemicals and oil spills are the main causes. Any fire onboard merchant ships at outer anchorage could be fatal and will cause catastrophic oil spills. BD lacks in technology and equipment/resource to contain damage from such accidents and pollution.

b. Unconventional Security Challenges.

- Piracy.** Piracy has become the bane of the modern seafarer. Numerous cases of reported and unreported piracy have led to considerable concern and multinational efforts to control this violent menace.
- Narco-Terrorism.** An important adjunct to maritime terrorism is drug trafficking. The nexus of these two phenomena is so deep that they are often analyzed under the same parameters.
- Gunrunning.** The symbiotic relationship between gunrunning and drug trafficking is well known. It is extremely difficult to control one without controlling the other.
- Maritime Terrorism.** Maritime security has assumed a new dimension in the post 9/11 era. The fight against this old and persistent issue has received a boost with the backing of the international community.

Maritime Awareness and Role of Policy Makers

The biggest challenge to maritime security in Bangladesh is maritime unawareness. The reasons for such lack of awareness spans over a broad spectrum ranging from demographic and socio-economic features on one hand and the non-availability of a technological base on the other. These are further compounded by the lack of understanding and attention paid towards the maritime sector. Bangladesh has not yet to exploited her maritime potential to her advantage due to the unawareness of its of policy makers about its maritime affairs. The main causes for lack of maritime awareness are discussed below:

a. **Exposure to Sea.** Unfortunately, whole coastline is desolate and scantily populated. Most of the people of the area have shifted towards the capital or the urban areas due to non-availability of better livelihood in coastal areas. Out of 140 million people of Bangladesh, very few are exposed to the sea, because of being miles away from it.

b. **Maritime Knowledge.** The history taught in the schools and colleges deals mostly with the exploits of man on land and seldom deal with the role of sea power in shaping the destinies of various empires. Thus the general mass is unaware of the importance of the sea and its potential. The civil bureaucrats dealing with or deciding maritime issues have no or inadequate understanding on the importance of maritime security. Therefore, when they take up positions in practical life at different levels, they cannot appreciate the importance of the sea fully, and automatically their thinking becomes land-locked. There is no formal education on the maritime interest of Bangladesh in the basic education system of the country. There is no training on the maritime issues for the bureaucrats and the policy makers dealing with maritime affairs.

c. **Representation by Maritime Experts.** Most maritime organisations and regulatory bodies, namely the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not have any representatives with maritime background/expertise. This does not allow the policy makers to appreciate the problems and prospects of maritime interests and maritime security.

d. **Lack of Interaction.** There are not enough interaction with the policy makers and the maritime institutions. As such, the policy makers who decide the future development of the maritime security forces do not always appreciate their functional capabilities. This situation demands closer interaction between the policy makers and the maritime operators on ground.

e. **Lack of Publicity.** The interests and the potentials of the nation on the maritime sector have not been well publicized to the people by the media. The maritime institutions and the maritime security forces do not project

adequately their activities in guarding the maritime security of the country. This situation really keeps the people and the policy makers either in the dark or in doubt about the maritime actions and huge maritime potentials of the nation; this is quite open and projected in other developing nations.

f. **Financial Constraints.** This has been a major factor, which has denied the country its right to grow as a maritime nation, even if the will to do so was there. Right on the outset, Bangladesh has faced a tremendous pressure due to financial constraints. Financial austerity measures have always been enforced restricting the ability of the country's defence forces to ensure the security of Bangladesh. The defence budget in Bangladesh is inadequate and the trend of the defence budget is declining, though an enhanced defence budget is needed to develop a modern and sophisticated defence force. Table 1 below shows the defence budget for the last four years:

FY	Revenue	Development	Total
2004-05	4610	48	4658
2005-06	4330	74	5404
2006-07	6466	115	6581
2007-08	6865	187	7052

Source: Ministry of Defence

Out of the defence budget, BN receives 12.5 to 16 percent share on average which is quite inadequate being the most expensive among the three Services due to its capital intensive structure. The cost of naval hardware is very high and the meagre budget does not permit to acquire the required assets. Besides, BN needs to spend most of its budget on revenue head. Acquiring ships, constructing harbours and ports need huge resources. Unfortunately, the people at the helm of affairs failed to realize the situation from true perspective. Thus financial constraints have always played a role in slowing down the progress of the maritime sector.

g. **Bangladesh's Maritime Policy and Defence Planning.** Defence is not achieved by physical force alone; it is secured through sea power. There is a need to have a national maritime policy, which should be constantly reviewed

in the light of an ever-changing geo-strategic and geopolitical situation. No policy will succeed unless there is a change in the attitude of our people, especially those in positions of power and influence. The nation should be made aware of the extent of its hidden maritime resources, which has not been exploited so far. Our defence is based on territorial aspects based on the notion that the sea will defend itself. Resultantly, the attention accorded to this aspect of our defence has been inadequate.

h. **Absence of Shared or Joint Objectives.** Several government agencies are working on maritime affairs but they have no shared or joint objectives. Ministry of Shipping, Department of Shipping, Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (BSC), Marine Fisheries Department (MFD), Bangladesh Inland Water Transportation Corporation (BIWTC), Chittagong Port Authority (CPA) and Mongla Port Authority (MPA) are all working on maritime affairs but have no shared or integrated objectives. Number of ministries, like Ministry of Water Transportation, Ministry of shipping and Ministry of Fisheries & Livestock are also need to be reorganized for effective maritime co-operation.

j. **Low Private Investment in Maritime Affairs.** There are ample opportunities and avenues in maritime sector, but a negligible portion of investment is attracted into this sector. Even the existing investments on fish industries are not well planned and technologically advanced or in line with the other industries of the country.


k. **Lack of Patronage of Maritime Activities and Industries.** Government, non-government and private level patronage is less forthcoming on maritime activities than on the land. Building of maritime based industries are not duly financed and backed by business and financial communities.

l. **Non-Accountability of Maritime Operators and Policy Makers to Government and People.** There are a number of maritime institutions to ensure the maritime security of the country. The development of these institutions have not taken place adequately for the last thirty seven years. But the policy makers of these institutions were never held responsible for their inactions by the government or the People. No central monitoring has been done to get the necessary feedback to suggest remedial actions.

m. **Planning and Budgeting-Working Relations.** Importance of the planning process in relation to budget allocation has always been considered as the decisive factor in the overall 'Decision-Making Tool'. However, in Bangladesh, long-term planning of forces' goal has so far not been done on the basis of yearly budget allocation. In India's case, this budget allocation is done

at five-year intervals. The approved forces goal is followed to meet the defence contingencies and the budget is allocated on the basis of the priority being set by respective services headquarters on a yearly basis.

n. **Non Progressive End State.** All the above factors make maritime institutions non-progressive and ineffective in performing the assigned tasks. The case study reveals that even the meager amount which has been finally allocated could not be utilized and has been returned ultimately due to the incompetence of policy makers, complexities of finance and procurement regulations. Graph-2 below shows the state of last eight years fund management in BN:



The case study above regarding the return of budgets reveals that all of the institutes involved in the process are somehow responsible for the existing problem. These are summarized below:

- (1) During budget allocation, the Navy gets a lump sum allotment much below the planned requirement due to lack of maritime awareness and scarcity of financial resources of the government.
- (2) Time and bureaucratic complexities do not always permit to plan and go for acquisition within the same budget year. As such acquisition programs are often shifted to next financial year. So, occasionally allotted budgets are surrendered or cannot be utilized.
- (3) There are several types of mind-set towards the procurement process found in the policy makers. Firstly, absence of firm stance on the right choice leads them to shift the goal/ plan too often. Secondly, the fear of being entangled in complexities in the critical procurement system delays the process

and thirdly, being extra careful to avoid any future consequences make no new procurement or acquisition possible. Finally, and usually, being wrongly influenced by any interested group, the whole process at times falls into an undesirable situation.

OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

General

The nature of challenges requires a multi-layered approach to ensure maritime security. Some challenges that are predominantly located around the Bangladeshi coast require a unilateral approach. These deal with policing and constabulary functions. Other challenges require a bilateral approach. The most desirable format would be a multilateral approach toward solving transnational crime and maintaining maritime order.

National Response Strategy

Maritime Consciousness. Bangladesh can only exploit the opportunities offered by the sea if there is maritime consciousness among the decisionmakers, thinktanks and as a whole the general mass. Constant endeavour to this end is required by the maritime stakeholders. The Navy and Coastguard can take the lead in this regard by emphasising the maritime domain in economic and security aspects. Equipping policy makers with adequate maritime knowledge and maritime background shall provide impetus in maritime activities and enhance the capabilities to ensure maritime security.

Credible Deterrent Force Structure. The navy is the state's instrument of maritime power. Although navies are primarily designed for war, they find their main utility in peace time also. Bangladesh has a small navy equipped for operations within the northern Bay of Bengal. For effective protection of the country's maritime interests, there is a need to have a balanced navy capable of contesting the sea. This will call for surface, sub-surface and aerial capabilities to match the responsibilities of maritime safety and security. There is a need for replacement of old frigates, and add few with appropriate weapons and gazette configurations. There is also the need to go for aerial surveillance and strike capability. A combination of missile armed frigates and corvettes, large patrol craft together with fast attack craft missile(FAC -M) and torpedo (FAC-T) will form the nucleus of "Striking Force" to provide protection to the country's merchant ships/ fishing fleet/ commerce protection on the high sea. On the other hand, general

purpose frigates, OPV, fishery protection vessels and fast attack craft guns (FAC-G) will form the "Surveillance Force". The mine sweepers, patrol craft and harbour boats will form the "Coastal Protection Force" to safeguard ports, harbours, waterways, coastal installations, offshore gas rigs and island territories. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and helicopters will be a great force multiplier and will enhance the surveillance capability of the navy. Shore radars along the coast also need to be installed to enhance the surveillance capabilities. At the same time, the country should also augment the capability of its Coast Guard and convert it into a fully capable maritime constabulary force. The country needs to find more funds even out of its weak economic base for its maritime forces expansion and modernization for our national economic interests. This would result in enhanced surveillance and protection capabilities of the national navy and coast guard enabling it to safeguard maritime interests.

Integrated 'National Maritime Policy'. Contrary to the integrated maritime scenario, there is currently a fragmentation of organisations, policies, and legal and enforcement measures relating to maritime security issues. This results in overlapping of jurisdiction and inability to provide quick decisions or respond effectively to fast evolving situations. Till to date, Bangladesh does not possess a 'National Maritime Policy'. Adopting such a policy will be essential for the management of its entire oceanic and coastal affairs, and has significant security implications. The policy encompasses issues like transportation, exploitation of resources, maritime services, seaborne trade, ports, maritime threats etc. Without having an appropriate maritime policy, the country can neither identify maritime related issues nor achieve maritime security. It is, therefore, necessary to formulate an appropriate integrated maritime policy for Bangladesh.

Integrated Maritime Governance. Integration of organizations, policies and adoption of legal and enforcement measures relating to maritime security issues. Particular attention needs to be paid to the maritime dimensions of national security as they are linked to our political stability and economic prosperity. A specialized division for the much-neglected study of maritime security is also required. To deal with such a situation, a formal mechanism for coordination among the multiple users of the sea is urgently required. A standing committee may be formed integrating all agencies working directly and indirectly on the maritime affairs. The proposed committee shall sit quarterly in Ministry of Defence where Bangladesh Navy will be the lead organization and discuss the issues relating to the maritime affairs in order to assess the maritime security situation and take appropriate measures for maritime governance.

Maritime Multi-agency Information Base. Policy makers, operational commanders and deployed forces need extensive knowledge of all events and activities that can impact on the maritime security and safety. Though Bangladesh can achieve information with its ageing fleet but lack of shore-based over-the-horizon radars, MPA etc hinder this function. Again, this is a national task requiring multi-agency flow of information between the navy and other agencies. This would foster coherent civilian-military partnership.

Capacity Enhancement. The capacity of marine infrastructure needs urgent overhaul and enhancement to deal with increased economic activities. Port turnover periods and efficiency also needs to be improved. Establishment of deep seaport, automation, dredging, container handling, privatisation etc are important steps in this regard.

Delimiting Maritime Boundary. In order to maximise interests at sea and effectively manage the fast paced technological development, Bangladesh should adopt a proactive strategy to settle issues such as, maritime boundary, South Talpatty, declared sea gas-blocks etc. Bangladesh should also submit its claim to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS). If the progress in this respect is not satisfactory, then the government should be pursued again and reminded about the horrific consequences of non-submission or half-hearted submission which will not be good enough for substantive claims of CS. Right now the government should appoint a team of experts, allocate money and give them the responsibility for carrying out whatever is required to be done by February 2011 latest. Taking the lead from the countries that have already submitted their claims to the CLCS, it is suggested that it would not be possible to accomplish such lengthy technical tasks by officials prone to change desks frequently or through foreign trips and consultations with foreign experts. So far the government has hardly made any attempt to identify persons responsible for failure to carry out the delimitation tasks of the maritime boundary in the last 38 years and the government's claim of "preparations for CS claim are OK" must not turn out to be a "paper umbrella getting dissolved in rain".²⁰ The recent diplomatic maneuvers to negotiate with both neighbors are definitely a good start but this start should progress with the objectives of solving maritime boundary dispute favourably and in time.

Co-Operative Security

Co-Operative Security is a system of security to be practiced with, rather than against adversaries. Such cooperative measures may turn a historically unstable

area into a stable one by providing a vehicle for dialogue. It seems many countries are now harnessing the fruits of co-operative maritime security arrangements. ASEAN, EU and a few other countries of Asia-Pacific have already undertaken such schemes.

Bilateral Response Strategy

Bilateral Cargo Security Initiative. In order to ensure cargo security, detailed surveillance is required at the point of origin, in transit and at the point of destination. Bangladesh can cooperate with the ports used by Bangladesh-bound ships in this regard. Besides, implementation of International Ship and Port facility Security (ISPS) code and CSI etc may also be better implemented through bilateral cooperation.

Confidence Building Measure (CBM). To transit to regional cooperation, Bangladesh should undertake CBM with neighbouring nations. This would alleviate national sensitivities and prepare the regional nations for more constructive engagements.

Regional Response Strategy

Integrated Regional Maritime Governance. Only stand alone national maritime policy may fall short of achieving the broader security challenges due to the nature of the sea. Hence, an internationally integrated maritime governance approach is required. This will particularly help to address the issues of hot pursuit, pollution control, straddling fish stock management etc.

Regional Cooperation. This is the intermediate approach and can ultimately leading to regional governance. Bangladesh, Myanmar and India may share maritime intelligence, carry out combined/coordinated maritime patrol, undertake oceanographic research, develop common fishery zones, organize seminars on marine ecology and seabed exploitation etc. Advance maritime cooperation may encompass the use of combined forces for disaster relief, environmental protection, surveillance etc. A broader view would take account of joint development of maritime technology, development of eco-tourism etc. The regional forums already existing may be exploited in this regard to pioneer such cooperative approaches.

21. ISPS Code requires vessels and port facilities to conduct security assessments develop security plans and hire security officers.
22. CSI is an awareness and prevention programme which requires screening of containers that pose a risk of terrorism. CSI inspection requires host nation participation as it is joint inspection.

20. M Khurshed Alam, Commodore(Retired), Scramble for Continental shelf rights in the Arctic and snail's pace of Bangladesh, Article published in 'Daily Star', Dhaka, August 16, 2008.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is evident that the challenges posed by the sea are vast, complex and uncertain. This calls for a coordinated, centralised and sensible development response by all sea related organisations of Bangladesh. A realization of the significance of the maritime sector requires a pragmatic approach and is an important national requirement for protection of our vital maritime interests. Unfortunately, the wealth that could accumulate with the development of Maritime Sector, have been denied to Bangladesh due to land-oriented mindset and maritime unawareness of the policy makers. Now, the time has come to pay immediate attention to this sector and to make up years of neglect. It requires the understanding of the subject from the right perspective and adopting a positive attitude for the promotion of maritime awareness in the policy makers. Accordingly, the following measures are recommended:

- a. The country needs to settle the problems of fixing its maritime boundaries with its neighbours and should prepare to face and convince international authorities in this regard. Concerted effort should be initiated immediately prioritizing this in the national agenda and not aiming to merely hold talks or arrange visits by the officials but making substantial progress towards the delimitation of maritime boundary and maritime zones e.g. EEZ and CS.
- b. Increasing threats of illegal exploitation e.g. smuggling, piracy, drug-trafficking, pollution, terrorism etc. demands a comprehensive approach to surveillance and monitoring the limits of the country's maritime zones for effective law enforcement. But at present, neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard is capable of effective surveillance in the entire EEZ. As such, Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Coast Guard need to be modernised to keep parity with the state and non-state threat scenario as per the 'Forces Goal'.
- c. The maritime infrastructures and organisations of the country need to be appropriately augmented by people with maritime knowledge and maritime awareness. The capacity of various maritime infrastructures including seaports should be upgraded.
- d. Bangladesh should formulate an integrated maritime policy covering all domains of maritime aspects. A standing committee on Maritime Security Affairs should be formed and should function with common objectives under an integrated maritime policy.
- e. The common people of Bangladesh need to be made conscious of the

importance of the maritime security through extensive public relations and using mass media. Media needs to be more focussed on the maritime activities. The maritime institutions should form a media organization of permanent nature to project maritime activities, crimes state, action and the potentials to the mass. This will ultimately sensitize the people and policy makers and help in strengthening national maritime security.

- f. Officers joining the civil service through Public Service Commission should undergo maritime orientation program with the Navy during their training period.
- g. Lessons on maritime interest should be added in national education syllabus to inculcate knowledge on maritime issues to the future generations. Seminars may be organised on regular basis by the maritime institutions to highlight the problems and promote the prospects on the maritime affairs.
- h. Policy makers of maritime institutions and regulatory bodies need to address the above issues sincerely.

CONCLUSION

Maritime security is multidimensional and multi-faceted involving both military and non-military issues. The origin of these issues is again rooted in the perceptions of a nation's maritime interest. Being a coastal nation, Bangladesh's maritime interest revolves around asserting territorial integrity and using the resources of the sea for sustained development of the country. Various issues affect the maritime interest of Bangladesh. Firstly, the modernisation drive of neighbours' navies and increasing involvement of extra-regional powers in the maritime scenario have been posing greater naval challenges than before. Secondly, growing international trade is posing infrastructural and safety challenges on the economic front. Bangladesh's seaports are suffering because of inefficiency and inadequacy. Numbers of FOC vessels ply at the ports, which creates a security concern. Infrastructural weakness of sea-based resource exploration and exploitation challenge Bangladesh's ability to pursue economic emancipation strategies. Besides these, technological development and environmental disasters also affect maritime security of Bangladesh.

Free access to the sea is the gift of nature to Bangladesh. It can safely be said that maritime affairs must be given a very important place in the national policies. The present economic situation of the country has also been compelling us to

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enhance the maritime awareness amongst the people of our country and in particular the policy makers of maritime affairs. Unfortunately, the riches that accumulate in the maritime sector have been denied due to land-oriented mindset of the decision-makers. Bangladesh's failure to develop its maritime potential over the last thirty seven years has caused a serious dent in the economy. The country may continue to pay a high price for such failures in the future if the realization on this issue is not developed and appropriate measures are not taken to redress the situation. It is needed to lay down a positive maritime policy workable within the available financial resources and to develop maritime infrastructure along the coastline. The sea can provide us much needed economic prosperity with much less investment and ultimately, it can contribute to building strong defense for the country.

A multi-layered approach is necessary to ensure maritime security. As a national response strategy, Bangladesh should maintain deterrence capability, create maritime multi-agency information base, generate maritime consciousness, formulate integrated maritime policy and enhance capacity of various maritime infrastructure to implement the integrated maritime policy. Coupled with these responses, the focused presence of naval and coastguard can tackle the hardcore threats both from the state and non-state actor. It must also be recognized that the indivisible nature of the seas demands both bilateral and regional cooperation to address the translational issues. On the bilateral side, various trade protection measures like CSI, ISPS Code, ship alert system etc should be implemented. Again, bilateral CBM will reduce sovereignty sensitivities paving the road to regional cooperation. Regional cooperation can start with sharing of intelligence, joint patrol etc and may land up in cooperation in oceanographic research and joint fishery exploitation. Once such a congruent environment is created, regional governance can take place.

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: MYTH OR REALITY FOR BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES?

Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Quamrul Islam, afwc, psc

INTRODUCTION

In today's information age, the rapid development of technology has necessitated the concept of sharing information easily. With the worldwide expansion of information technology, the military warfare too has stepped into a digitised battlefield environment particularly in command, control and decision making. 'Network Centric Warfare' (NCW) has thus added a new dimension in the spectrum of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems. NCW can be simply explained as the means of quick flow of information to assist in making quick decisions to execute a mission. In the Bangladesh Armed Forces, however, the concept of NCW has not yet been materialized. Nevertheless, it is indeed very useful for any force likely to get involved in future warfare. NCW enhances fighting power and acts as a force multiplier in the battlefield. The basic fundamental of NCW is to generate shared battle space awareness through synchronization of battlefield operating systems.

To build a military network centric scheme, reliable, robust and secured communication infrastructure is essential. In developed countries, NCW is based on the sensors, satellites and modern equipment. Though Bangladesh does not have its own satellite system, the information structure for NCW may be developed with the available communication facilities such as, fibre-optics networks, micro-wave links, hired satellite links etc. The key move would be to establish a network between all the agencies to transfer data, voice and video through interfacing links. NCW has significant implications in conducting military operations as it provides unique opportunities in command and control and self-synchronization by commanders at all levels. Many countries, including USA, UK, Canada, Australia, India and Pakistan, have introduced NCW to enhance the synergetic effect in the battles pace. Currently, the Bangladesh Armed Forces may not be able to operate fully in the NCW environment; however, an effort may be taken to introduce the concept of NCW on a limited scale. A well-thought out programme should, in fact, be undertaken to transform the concept of NCW into reality.

Aim

The aim of this study is to throw some light on the necessity of conducting NCW and suggesting options for implementing NCW by the Bangladesh Armed Forces in the future.

What is NCW?

NCW is the emerging theory of war in the information age. It is defined as the information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by use of networking sensors, enabling decision makers and field commander to achieve greater shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability and a higher degree of self-synchronization.¹ NCW is the combination of Network-Centric Operations (NCO) which is enabled by the networking of the forces.² It provides a force with the access to new and previously unreachable information domains. It is a process which correlates information sharing and situational awareness; therefore increases the speed of decision making. NCO also focuses on the tactical and operational levels of warfare, but its impact spills over all levels of military activity starting from the tactical to the strategic. At the operational level, NCO provides commanders with the capability to generate precise war-fighting effects to maintain operational tempo. NCW offers the following advantages:

- a. A robustly networked force that improves information sharing.
- b. It enhances forces' capability for shared information awareness.
- c. It augments speed of command.
- d. NCW increases mission effectiveness.

A Conceptual Framework of NCW

A military leader should understand the correlation between information and combat power. To analyze this relation, a conceptual framework is required to be drawn describing how the information network can be leveraged to increase combat power. A conceptual model has been developed recently that focuses on characterizing the relationships between shared information, shared situational awareness, and highlighting the processes of collaboration and synchronization.³ A key element of the model is the focus on three domains: the physical domain, the cognitive domain, and the information domain.

a. **Physical Domain.** The physical domain is the traditional domain of warfare. It is the domain where strike, protect and manoeuvre takes place across the environments of ground, sea, air and space. All the physical elements of a force are robustly networked with secured connectivity. The important metrics for

1. David S. Alberts, John J Garstka, Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare- Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, CCRP, USA, 1999, p.2
2. Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-centric Warfare, US Department of Defence 2005, p.3
3. Alberts David, Garstka, Hayes Richard and Signori David, Understanding Information Age Warfare, CCRP, 2001, p.8

measuring combat power in this domain are lethality of weapon, extensive use of sensors and survivability of the forces.

b. **Cognitive Domain.** In the cognitive domain, a force has the capability to develop a high quality of awareness and share it. The forces have also the capability to develop a shared understanding, including commander's intent. It helps the force to increase their self-synchronised capability in any operation. The objective of the NCW is that a force with their attributes and capability should be able to generate increased combat power by:

- (1) Achieving better synchronization effects in the battle space.
- (2) Achieving greater speed in command.
- (3) Increasing lethality, survivability and responsiveness.

c. **Information Domain.** In the information domain, a force must have the capability to share access and protect information to a degree that it can establish and maintain an information advantage over an adversary. The force must have the capability to collaborate in the information domain which will enable it to strengthen its intelligence collection process.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of NCW (Source: John J. Garstka, NCW: An Overview of Emerging Theory)

Capability of NCW

When warfare is represented in the information, cognitive and physical domain, the application of a multi-domain approach can assist in identifying complex relationships between shared information, shared situational awareness, and increased combat power. The power of NCO overrides existing concepts of platform-centric operations. In the following models, the power of NCO over platform-centric operations is illustrated:




Fig-2 Own Aircraft Detects Enemy Aircraft and Radar Station Fig-3 Platform-Centric Display (Source: Department of Defence Report to Congress- Network-Centric Warfare, 27 July 2001)

a. **Model 1.** To describe the performance of platform-centric operation in Figure 2, it is shown that one of four own aircrafts has detected two of the enemy aircrafts and another own aircraft has identified an enemy mobile radar station. Individual pilots with the voice communication would pass the information which may not be observed by others. In the display panel the information sent by the single platform is shown which presents information sharing in the physical and communication domain only.




Fig-4 Own Aircraft Detects Enemy Aircraft and Radar Station Fig-5 Network-Centric Display (Source: Department of Defence Report to Congress- Network-Centric Warfare, 27 July 2001)

b. **Model 2.** In Figure 4, enemy aircrafts and mobile radar station detected by own aircrafts is digitally displayed by the NCO; the information is then shared by all the platforms. The inputs of the information are based on direct observation in the physical domain, indirect observation by onboard sensors and voice communication; that is to say a combination of physical and information domain and decisions taken to neutralise targets in the NCO-cognitive domain. In network-centric display, all can observe integrated target acquisitions. Thus the process enhances the capability of NCO in terms of sharing information and faster decision making.

Implication of NCW in Conducting Military Operations

Combat power at the tactical level provides greater opportunities to operational commanders in employing their forces with increased flexibility. NCW can offer a commander enhanced capability in deciding the sequence of battle and the nature of engagements. It accelerates engagement cycles and operational tempo at all levels of a war fighting system. A high speed network permits error free transmission at the fraction of time required for voice transmission, and permits transfer of a wide range of data formats.

The faster the information is collected, analyzed and disseminated; the faster decision can be taken. A well-coordinated networked-force can contribute to improving effectiveness in many ways. One of the ways that can be adopted is 'self synchronization' that permits 'directive control'. Instead of micromanaging operations with close control via command links, commanders are given significant autonomy, defined objectives, and they are allowed to take the initiatives necessary to neutralize the objectives in directive control. A fighter pilot who receives continuous updates from an Air Defence Operation Centre over a network can then take his own tactical decisions and exploit the situation instantly.

NCW as Practised by Advanced Military Forces

USA. When the US Military conducts operations worldwide its C2 system is connected with a robust network to monitor the global situation so that it can employ its forces with economy of effort. The NCO of the Military of US spreads over the globe and its system works on 'Global Information Grid (GIG)'. Basically the network operates with sensors and actors broadcast through satellite, and cable and radio communications. The sensors of different platforms are interconnected with data-link; all information is received and processed through command centres and the platforms are then diverted to engage their targets. This concept of NCW provides the opportunity of information sharing and increases the capability of the force. The NCW capability was tested by the US Central Command in 'Operation

Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan and 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' and proved to be very effective during operations.⁴

India. The Indian Army's principal modernization initiative has been to move into digital battle space, thereby opening its doors to NCW⁵. The Indian Army doctrine, following certain key concepts, provide these basic NCW guidelines:⁶

- a. A virtual sensor grid that provides a 'grid of capabilities' overlaying the battlespace instead of a series of independent single sensors. This grid is termed as the 'Surveillance Grid'.
- b. To leverage the strength of worldwide telecommunications infrastructure, all communication networks are viewed as virtual grids overlaying tactical, operational and strategic areas. This grid is referred to as the 'Communications Grid'.
- c. An abstract grid that comprises weapons available, sorted by suitability and availability against a hostile order of battle is termed as the 'Tactical Grid'.

The Indian Armed Forces have adopted the concept of NCW fully. The connectivity of the forces is maintained by satellite and fibre-optics backbone through voice and data link. The forces share real time information collected by various sensors fitted with aircrafts and ships, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and radars.

Feasibility to Conduct NCW- Bangladesh Armed Forces Perspective

By looking at the rapid adaption of NCW by advanced armies and understanding the necessity of information sharing in the battlespace, we can conclude that the Bangladesh Armed Forces should develop NCW capability as soon as possible. If the Armed Forces are to be involved in future war, its operations must be characterised by domination of battle space with increased situational awareness, more use of electronic devices and precision weapons and by extending its range of operations.⁷ In the Bangladesh Armed Forces, the information is generally passed following the hierarchy of command, i.e. Battalion Commander to Brigade Commander, Brigade Commander to Division Command to Land Component Command and to Joint Force Commander. This process of disseminating information is time-consuming and complex. That is why NCO are required to be updated for increasing speed of command.

4. Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-centric Warfare, US Department of Defence 2005, p.33
 5. Lieutenant General Davinder Kumar VSM Bar, Signal Officer- in- Chief, Indian Army, Seminar on Infrastructure for Network Centric Warfare, Delhi, 2004.
 6. Headquarters Indian Army Training Command, Indian Army Doctrine, Shimla, 2004, p.21
 7. Christopher J Bowie, Robert P Haffa, Jr. and Robert Mullins, Future War: USA: Grumman Corporations, 2003, p.4

System (GIS) where the data of own and enemy will be plotted on the digital map. Division headquarters will be connected with the central server of the Army Headquarters. Thus the information can be shared within the services. It may be mentioned that Division Headquarters will have the prerogative to add or delete required data in the digital plot map. In case of satellite connections, brigades may use FCB2 to send data, voice and video via satellite transceiver directly to the division and Army Headquarters. At the tactical level, for collecting information, battalions should have ground surveillance radar system (GSRS) and the required data is to be sent to the brigade.

A Naval platform which has sensors and is connected to the bases via satellite is the best option for the maritime components. At sea, communication can be established between the flag ship and the other ships through various radio wave links. The flag ship can directly communicate to Naval Headquarters. Bangladesh Navy has a few platforms capable of carrying out limited scale of NCW. All ships may be fitted with tactical data link-Y and Tele-Type Writer (TTW) data link facility. The Link-Y terminal transmits tactical information to all other units through radio transmitters.

The air platform may be equipped with sensors to send real time pictures. Preferably, 'Airborne Warning and Control System' (AWACS), 'Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System' (JSTARS), surveillance aircraft and UAV should be used to acquire a real time battlespace scenario. Since these platforms are expensive, the option of airspace surveillance seems to hold little hope for us. However, sensors like ground based and platform radars may be utilized for gathering information.

Requirement of Software and Hardware to Integrate the Network

To establish integrated connectivity of NCW, GIS may be used. It is an integrated hardware, software and data that can create, manipulate, and analyze a geographically referenced database to produce new maps and tabular data. It is used to digitally reproduce and analyse the features present on the earth's surface.¹³ In GIS, a relationship between the graphic map data and the tabular database is maintained so that the changes to the map can be reflected in the database. GIS allows automatic determination of the relationships between maps, and can create new maps out of those relationships.

By integrating sensors like UAV and ground surveillance radar with GIS, the real time scenario of the battlespace can be sent via microwave link, fibre-optics, and VSAT or satellite phone. Thus forces can be brought into the integrated

13. A GIS is integrated system of hardware, software and data, <http://www.gis.com>

network system. For the land forces, satellite transceiver mounted on vehicle is more useful to sending and receiving data, voice and video. The position of own and enemy forces can be determined by the global positioning system and the FCB2. Aircraft fitted with aerial surveillance radar or UAV will be required to identify enemy locations. Movement of the enemy can also be acquired through real time satellite picture.

Options of NCW Connectivity

For the Bangladesh Armed Forces, there are mainly two options available in establishing the connectivity:

- a. **Option 1.** Using the existing micro-wave and fibre optics, the forces can be connected in a scheme of virtual collaboration. The terminal end of this network should be brigade headquarters, all radar stations and naval bases, as shown in Figure 6. In exercising this option, it would be difficult to bring a battalion within this network as its location will be frequently changed during battles. Brigade staff will collect all information and put the data in computer's customised software that is connected to the nodes and the central server.




Figure 6-NCW Connectivity-Option 1
(Source: Prepared by Author)

This is how information could be shared between all networked forces.

- b. **Option 2.** Option 2 is to establish connections among the forces using the satellite system. In this option any force having satellite transceiver can be connected to the network. Brigade and division headquarters, bases, flotilla and ships possessing it, would be able to transmit and receive data through satellite. There are two ways of using satellites: firstly, BTRC can launch its own satellite and the Armed Forces can use its channels and secondly, Bangladesh Army may rent a satellite channel from friendly countries. A proposed network of option 2 is shown on Figure 7.




Figure-7 NCW Connectivity-Option 2
Source: Prepared by Author

satellite and this is likely to be implemented within 5 years.¹¹ This project is under consideration. However, hiring a satellite channel for military use is also a probable solution. If Bangladesh launches its own satellite, a few channels may be dedicated for military use. Satellite connection is most suitable to conduct NCO. The networked forces need to have satellite transmitters and receivers. It would cover a wide range in land, air and maritime space.

NCW Architecture for Bangladesh

NCW is highly dependable on the interoperability of communication equipment, data and software to enable networking between forces, and between manned and unmanned platforms. For Bangladesh, part of the NCW technology will rely on line-of-sight radio transmission through microwave links while the other part of the technology will aggregate information for transmission through fibre-optics backbone. Therefore, the structure will be a combination of microwave link and fibre optics backbone until satellite support is available. The designs for this technology must enable stable communications between the services and rapid sharing of data and information between mobile platforms and sensors. In the future, the connectivity may be established via satellite through satellite phone, VSAT, global positioning transmitter and receiver or Forces Command Brigade and Below (FCB2), FCB2 and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) are the electronic devices which give the location of own and enemy forces in the digital map which are generally fixed in any type of military vehicles.¹²

Network-Centric Connectivity and NCO of the Armed Forces

To establish the communication network, the components of Armed Forces need to be connected with the communication nodes and terminals. The nodes and the terminals will be connected with the central server which will enable all recipients to share information. The primary objective of such connectivity is to bring as many components to the same network system as is possible within the existing communication facilities.

Ideally, all levels of the Land Component should be connected with the satellite communications system to receive real time battlefield scenario, but this would be an expensive project for the Bangladesh Army. Initially, however connecting brigades and divisions with the central server by combination of fibre-optics and micro-wave links may serve the purpose. At brigade headquarters, the information may be fed to a computer having software of Geographic Information

11. Mr. Mohd Moklesur Rahman, Senior Consultant, Telecommunication Engineer, BTRC interviewed on 24 June 2008.
 12. Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-centric Warfare, US Department of Defence 2005, p.36

Implementation of NCW In Bangladesh Armed Forces

NCW has the potentials to transform our approach to assigned missions and achieve worthwhile improvement in effectiveness and efficiency.¹⁴ However, making NCW a reality requires clear understanding of its implication. Bangladesh Armed Forces with its present communication resources should initially undertake small scheme of NCO to test its effectiveness.¹⁵ There are two key prerequisites for success; developing innovative NCW concepts and transforming them into real operational capability. Therefore the approach to NCW for Bangladesh Armed Forces should be as following:

a. Short-term Scheme.

- (1) **NCW Awareness.** Around 90 percent of Armed Forces officers are not familiar with NCW.¹⁶ Only a few officers of Army, Navy and Air Force from signal directorate / communication branch have carried out studies and undertaken small projects to test the interconnectivity of elements within the forces using existing communication facilities. Therefore, for general awareness, a full scale programme consisting of study periods, seminars and workshops should be organised.
- (2) **Training on IW.** To understand the IW capability, personnel of Armed Forces should undergo formal training on IW related subjects, particularly on NCW. Such subjects could be included in the military course curriculum.
- (3) **Integration of Communication Facilities.** Existing communication systems must be integrated and all forces should be placed under a common net. For that reason, an interoperable communication system may be procured for all the services.
- (4) **Test and Trial of NCW Project.** A small scale NCO may be launched to test its function and effectiveness. The communication instrument of all services should be able to work under same network.

b. Mid-term Scheme. If the result of the field test is proved to be successful, a mid-term scheme may be undertaken:

- (1) **Establishing a Robust Communication Network.** For NCW, a robust communication network needs to be established. The existing structure should be further strengthened by adding satellite communication and incorporation of GIS facilities.

14. Alberts David and Hayes Richard, Power to the Edge, Washington DC, CCRP publication, 2005, p.193
 15. Brigadier General Rafiqul Islam, ndc, psc, Director Signals, interview on 22 Jun 2008.
 16. A survey carried out taking opinion of 40 officers of different rank of Armed Forces.

(2) **Developing Software.** To share the information, a common software need to be used by all. A company may be hired to develop this software.

(3) **Conducting NCO.** Once the project is ready to be implemented a full scale NCO may be conducted by a joint force to finalize the concept and doctrine of NCW.

c. Long-term Scheme.

(1) **Improved Communication Facilities.** If Bangladesh launches its own satellite, the Armed Forces can share a channel or satellite, communication could be established between the forces upto battalion, squadron and flotilla level. However, the hired satellite channel could also be used for military purposes.

(2) **Articulate Doctrine on NCW.** Basing on the performance of NCW and its effectiveness, a doctrine can be developed on NCW.

(3) **Development in IT.** Since the information age is advancing rapidly, continuous update of technology will be required. Therefore, research and development in NCW must be pursued.

The Concept of NCO for Bangladesh. The basic concept of NCW is to have shared battlefield awareness through the network. NCW is therefore implemented for better synchronization of events for achieving greater speed in command and for increasing lethality, survivability and responsiveness. For Bangladesh, the available communication means need to be integrated through command nodes, and connectivity must be assured between battalion/frigate/squadron, brigade/division/bases and services headquarters. The central command node should be located in the Joint Operation Command Centre to enable it to receive all required information to predict battlespace situations. The joint forces operating dispersedly will share common picture of the battlespace, which knowledge will then assist commanders in making decisions. Customised software will collate all the information sent from the nodes and the central server will display the location and activities of own and enemy forces. The command control authority will remain with the respective commander; however, the higher commander can always superimpose his decision or modify his concept of operations based on the rapid development of situations.

Training for NCW

In the short-term scheme, the general awareness and training should get the priority. The objective of this training will be to familiarise the officers and soldiers with the NCW and to provide adequate knowledge for them so that they can operate in NCW environment. A group of officer and soldiers should be trained to

establish communication structure and maintenance. As the concept of NCW involves the relation between the sensors, shooter and the decision-maker, training programme should be organised for the soldiers to enable them to learn about the function of sensors and action taken after receiving the decision. The technical personnel will be trained in computer software, establishment of data-links, satellite functions and communication connectivity. At the decision-making level, the senior officers must understand the concept, procedure and techniques used to operate electronic equipment and in the decision-making process. The following training schemes could be organised:

a. **Basic NCW Training.** This common training programme could be organised for all soldiers to impart basic lessons on NCW. The terminal objective of this training will be to acquaint all soldiers with the NCW environment so that the method of NCO can be applied in the battlefield, i.e. the relation between the physical and cognitive domain of NCW should be taught.

b. **NCO Technical Training.** The training programme is for technical personnel involved in establishing communication network and maintenance. Knowledge and skill in computers, satellite connectivity, programming, data-link connections etc should be made prerequisites to undertaking this training. The objective of this training is to develop a skilful those technician who can operate communication networks.

c. **Officers Technical Training of NCW.** The objective of this training is to prepare qualified officers to establish and sustain network connectivity. Technical training will impart lessons in computer programming, developing software, planning and setting up the networks between the forces. This training may be conducted at Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST).

d. **Senior Officers' Training on NCW.** The objective of this training is to acquaint senior officers with the doctrine, theory and concept of NCO. The training will enable a commander to understand the procedure of sharing information in the battlespace and it will also allow them to understand the decision-making procedure involved in NCW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Bangladesh Armed Forces has already taken up some steps in the line of NCW. But the project is still in its infancy. If the Bangladesh Armed Forces agrees to develop full-scale NCO capabilities, the following measures should be taken into considerations:

a. A group of experts should further analyse the requirement of NCW, its concept, modalities, equipment and budgetary requirements.

b. A general awareness programme about NCW should be undertaken in the Armed Forces to familiarise all with the subject.

c. A perspective plan for integrating all communication resources and establishment of information structure should be undertaken immediately to bring NCW in reality within the next 5 years, which falls under short and mid-term schemes.

d. A Satellite channel including GIS hard and software should be hired to carry out field tests of NCO.

e. Local software engineers could be employed to develop software of NCW.

f. To implement the concept of NCW, a groups of personnel (military officers, technical persons and civil software engineers) could be sent abroad for training.

g. A doctrine on NCW can be formulated which will enumerate the modalities and application of NCO during peace and war.

CONCLUSIONS

As one of the important subjects of 'Revolution in Military Affairs', NCW has given the opportunity to the Armed Forces to better connect people and war fighting machines. It can contribute to reduce Clausewitz's 'fog and friction' in warfare. NCW helps the commanders to obtain and share information which ultimately can increase speed of command, control and execution in the battlespace. The concept of NCW is based on information sharing to develop the situational awareness during wars. The process acts as a force multipliers like other tenets and provides opportunity to self-synchronize commander's action that can enable him to maintain operational tempo.

NCW has not yet been fully materialised in many developed countries. But the value of conducting NCO in future wars is well understood by now. However, the perception and implementation of NCW will take time to bring it into reality. The necessity of information gathering and sharing in the thick fog and friction scenario can only be realised by a commander when he strives for the critical information required to make a decision. Therefore, efforts should be taken to provide all available information to a commander, which is only possible by adopting the concept of NCW.

14. John J. Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare Offers War Fighting Advantage, Signal Magazine, May 2003.

15. Dr. Carlo Kopp, Understanding Network-Centric Warfare, Australian Aviation, January/February 2005.

16. Clay Wilson, Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, March 2005.

17. Department of Defence, Network Centric Warfare, A Report to Congress, July 2001.

18. Robert Seymour, Daphne G Sands, Anne-Marie, Mark Unewisse, Jon Vaurghan and Ron Baumgart, Application of Network Centric Warfare Concepts to Land-air System- An Experimentation Approach, South Australia.

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19. Lieutenant General Davinder Kumar VSM Bar, Signal Officer- in- Chief, Indian Army, Seminar on Infrastructure for Network Centric Warfare, Delhi, 2004.

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20. Interactive session between Air Marshal Shah Mohammed Ziaur Rahman, ndc,fawc, psc, Chief of Air Staff and the course member of AFWC 2008 on 21 May 2008.

21. Brigadier General Rafiqul Islam, ndc, psc, Director Signals interviewed on 22 Jun 2008.

22. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafizur Rahman, psc, General Staff Officer- 1, Signals Directorate interviewed on 22 Jun 2008.

23. Mr. Mohd Moklesur Rahman, Senior Consultant, Telecommunication Engineer, BTRC interviewed on 24 June 2008.

24. Survey carried out taking opinion of 40 officers of different rank of Armed Forces.

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IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) ON REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA) IN BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Wing Commander Md Alamgir Hossain, afwc, psc

INTRODUCTION

The nature of war never changes; "war," after all, "is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," as Karl Von Clausewitz stated over a century and a half ago in his book "On War"¹. But the manner in which war is conducted has undergone considerable changes. Sometimes these changes are so dramatic that war itself must change its form. Indeed, a historical discontinuity or revolution can occur in the way war is fought. There were a number of revolution happened in military affairs in the history. But it is important to remember that independent technologies or innovations alone cannot bring the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA occurs when a combination of technological, organizational, social, doctrinal and politico-economic changes take place in conjunction and affect the way militaries plan, equip and train themselves to wage war.

The current RMA is driven by technology, namely Information Technology (IT). The often-quoted definition by Andrew Krepinevich says that RMA occur when "... the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of a conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase - often an order of magnitude or greater - in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces."²

Toady any topic on military, strategic, or national security invariably promotes the concept of emerging IT-based RMA. The essence of the IT-based RMA is that it provides increase in the combat capability of armed forces "orders of magnitude" over any potential adversary who has not mastered it.³ The current RMA includes different kinds of new tools and processes of waging war, like Information Warfare (IW), Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Integrated Command and Control (C4ISR), System of Systems, all of which are backed by IT.

Whatever else RMA is about, its primary emphasis is on the enhancement of military capability. But RMA has been neglected in Bangladesh Armed Forces because of many reasons. Considering the technological development of other

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, General, On War, translated by Colonel JJ Graham, Produced by Charles Keller and David Widger, published in internet <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm>, accessed on 13.04.08
2. Andrew Krepinevich, Cavalry to computer; the pattern of military revolutions, published in internet at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_n2751/is_n37/ai_16315042, accessed on 17.04.08
3. Maj Leonard G. Litton, USAF, The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War, published in internet at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Litton.html>, accessed on 24.04.08

countries in this region, we need to prepare ourselves to face the variety of warfare tools that might be employed against us in the future conflict. As such, it is time for the Bangladesh Armed Forces to focus on possible changes required in its doctrine, organization and training for operational adaptability with the development of IT and IW to derive all possible benefits of RMA to face the future challenge for the armed forces and for the national security.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of emerging IT on RMA, identify its implication on doctrine, organization and training, and suggest possible changes to address the RMA issues in Bangladesh perspective.

UNDERSTANDING THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)

Basic Understanding about RMA

A number of revolutions have happened in military affairs over the years. In the 20th century the development of the mechanized tanks, carrier aviation, submarines and strategic bombing have had a tremendous impact on military concepts and warfare. The induction of the atomic weapons in 1945 led to another military revolution. In considering past RMAs, it is important to remember that independent technologies or innovations are themselves not responsible for bringing about RMAs.⁴ The development of the tank did not produce an RMA. Only when the tank was wedded to supporting technologies (i.e., radios), organizational changes (combined arms formations and tactical air support), new operational concepts (air superiority and deep, knife-like thrusts), and command changes (mission-oriented tactics) did the 1940 German blitzkrieg mark an RMA.⁵ That means only the technology alone cannot bring a Revolution in Military Affairs. It is the other factors, like, organizational changes and operational concepts or strategies along with technology will bring the RMA.

Evolution of Current RMA

According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of US, "a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military

4. Andrew Marshall, 'Revolution in Military Affairs: A Primer', US DoD's Office of Net Assessment at <http://infowarrior.org>.

5. Singh Sandeep, Major, Impact of IT on RMA in Indian Context, a dissertation paper, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India, 2002.

doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.⁶ In recent history, the new technologies and processes of waging war like IW, network-centric warfare (NCW), integrated Command and Control (C4ISR), System of Systems have led to a major RMA. This is likely to broaden the parameters of thinking about National Security. The countries of the world are now on the brink of a major revolution on how they (will) conduct national security affairs. The ramifications of the RMA need to be understood not only by military officers but also by both military and civil strategy planners. The military has to contend with the 5th dimension of warfare, information, in addition to land, sea, air and space. Such an RMA is now occurring, and those who understand it and take advantage of it will enjoy decisive advantage in future battlefields.

INTERREL HIP BETWEEN IT, IW AND RMA IT and the Current RMA

In order to understand the interrelationship between IT and RMA, it is important to understand the various new information tools of the current RMA, which is powered by IT. The IT related to military affairs includes "Collection, Analysis, and Communication".⁷ The mastery over the satellite technology has enabled the man to obtain information from any part of the world to a resolution up to 3 cm. All the information gathered in the real timeframe can be processed through computers which today are capable of processing three trillion functions per second. In military affairs the important thing is the application of processing/analysis for discrimination of information. This integration of satellite and computer technology has greatly enhanced and facilitated the command and control and reduced the time and space dimension to an extent that it is now real time information gathering, processing and dissemination.

Various Information Tools and the Present RMA.

Some analysts believe that information is the single, all-pervasive and dominant element in the present RMA. In his paper on the subject Collin Gray explores the hypothesis that the entire revolution is IW warfare.⁸ He talks of the "I-War RMA" and notes that RMA is the process of transforming the character of war

6. Jeffrey McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill, The Revolution in Military Affairs, chapter 3.
7. Sharjeel Rizwan, Revolution in Military Affairs, published in internet at <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sep/military.htm>, accessed on 17.05.08
8. Ron Matthews and John Treddenick, Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs, published by PALGRAVE, Houndmills, New York, in 2001, p.59

by conduct of IW to precisely direct firepower simultaneously throughout a theatre of operations to impose systematic shock from which the enemy will not be able to recover. Due to development in IT, RMA is giving rise to these tools and processes of waging war. Some of these are discussed below:

a. **IW.** There are a number of definitions of IW, but most commonly used one is as follows "Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information systems." The intent is to control, manipulate, deny information, influence decisions, and degrade or ultimately destroy adversary systems while guarding friendly systems against such action. However, IW does not exist as a separate technique of waging war, but there are several distinct forms of IW, each laying claim to a larger concept.

b. **Network Centric Warfare.** Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an emerging theory of war in the information age. It is also a concept that at the highest level constitutes the military's response to the Information Age.⁹ The armed forces of the world are facing a paradoxical situation where they need to fulfill their tasks with decreased resources and decreased manpower. This necessitates working smartly and looking for force multipliers. The compelling logic for the shift in strategy from platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare is the opportunity for the armed forces to link their heterogeneous computing lines more effectively and provide increased value for their components. A soldier will now have real-time battlefield awareness, which will enable him to complete his task quickly and efficiently.

c. **C4ISR.** Today the advent of new forms of communication and imaging technology, incorporated into systems such as "smart" weaponry and digitised battlefield networks, have led to the rethinking of war making and strategy conceptualisation over the ages. These new methods have improved the battlefield awareness of our commanders and soldiers. Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) has enabled the integration of these new inputs. The resultant information superiority fundamentally changes the way operations are conducted.¹⁰ The use of C4ISR system has enabled the use of sophisticated weapons like "smart bombs" and precision guided munitions (PGMs) which are extremely accurate and reduce

9. The Implementations of Network Centric Warfare, Office of the Force Transformation, Department Of Defence (DoD), USA, January 2005, accessed in <http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/new/implementation-of-NCW.pdf> on 20.06.08
10. <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n86/wc4sr.html>, accessed on 24.04.08

civilian casualties. C4ISR has also led to the expansion of space and the compression of time on the battlefield. The use of these technologies in war led to far greater compression of time than before and signs of a new RMA have emerged.¹¹

d. **System of Systems Approach.** In order to further streamline the complex business of warfare, Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US has introduced the concept of "System of Systems".¹² The System of Systems Approach focuses on the integration of three sets of technologies that relate to precision strikes, communications and sensors on the battlefield.¹³ This approach is pegged on the application of IT to warfare with a view to integrate and network existing and emerging technologies that can look, shoot and communicate. System of Systems, in short is integrating the technical advances of ISR, C4I and precision force technology into a command and control platform at the national level.

e. **Jointmanship.** All future operations may not be joint, but having a standard architecture for all three services enables merging of architectures if and when the need arises. Merging of architectures is important so that information from any of the sources can be used to deliver maximum firepower on the enemy. In tomorrow's battlefield, loosely knitted joint organisations put into place just prior to battle will not be successful.

IMPLICATIONS ON DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

Whatever else the RMA is about, its primary emphasis is on the enhancement of military capability. The first priority must always be to defeat the enemy, but a more subtle and durable concern should be to change ideas and dogma. For joint forces to fight effectively, communication and coordination between horizontal and vertical battlefield supporting units, tri-service elements of the battle force and integrated source of other national force is a *sin qua non* for the effective operational deployment of RMA weapon technologies. All these encircle the impact on three important issues for militaries; doctrine, organisation of forces and training, which are discussed in subsequent paragraph.

11. Ajay Singh, "Time: The New Dimension in War", Joint Forces Quarterly, (Washington D.C: National Defense University, Winter 1995-96), p. 59
12. Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs, published by Chrysalis Books Group, London W 10 6Sp, p.80
13. Eliot A. Cohen, "American View of the Revolution in Military Affairs," Advanced Technology and Future Warfare, November 28, 1996, p.3

warfare, every soldier in the battlefield will be a system who would be linked with the command and control system to forward real time scenario to the commander to make decisions. This demands highest considerations of training of every individual in the system. It also demands to have a separate "Information Operations (IO)" branch in Army, Navy and the Air Force, distinct from the 'Signals' and 'Communications' branches. Training in Information Operations should be introduced at the military academy level. It is also imperative to introduce compulsory computer training for all cadets in the academy. More officers from the fighting arms of the armed forces should be made to do BEs/B Techs and officers from the engineering and signal branches will have to do specialist courses in IW.

EXISTING SITUATION OF BANGLADESH TO ADDRESS RMA ISSUES

According to defence analysts, system integration skills, capable science organization and creative software skills will determine the future of countries wishing to prosecute RMA successfully. Future defence operations are going to be based on multiple networks of Army, Navy and Air Force systems, where IT is going to be used in unprecedented ways. But this is the most neglected aspects of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. In comparison to our neighbour, Bangladesh has done little to address the RMA issues.

A lot of improvement has been made in IT in civil sector of Bangladesh in the last few years, but this has not impacted on the defence sector. Bangladesh has got a very comprehensive Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy which provides guidelines for the development of the ICT sector in Bangladesh. The policy encompasses the broad guidelines in the fields of data/information processing, transmission and communications by means of computer and telecommunication techniques and the use of these modern tools for organizational/personal information processing in all sectors of the economy and society.¹⁶ This policy also does not address the use of IT in national security perspective.

IT can works in the Armed Forces as a force multiplier, provided it can be exploited in right perspective but the Bangladesh Armed Forces do not have any institutional or organizational setup to address the issue of IT or IW. Our draft Joint Warfare Doctrine also does not address the IT and IW issues. We do not have any

16. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy of Bangladesh at <http://www.sdnbd.org/sdi/issues/IT-computer/itpolicy-bd-2002.htm>, accessed on 27.08.09.

IT Task Force or IW Dte/Wings/Cells either in the Armed Forces Division or in any of the services headquarters for the development of IT and IW capabilities in our defence forces. We also do not have any defence industry or laboratory to produce electronic equipment or to do research on IT/IW. Such an industry or laboratory could have played a major role in induction of RMA and could have influenced the organization in a revolutionary way. However, there are some minor developments in the IW scenario in Bangladesh Armed Forces that can be noted.

SUGGESTED CHANGES ON DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Due to some reasons or other, the Bangladesh Armed Forces has not given much focus on the development of IT and therefore, RMA has been neglected in its defence. The main reason for this neglect is the lack of integrating defence resources, agencies and non-availability of security strategies. Budgetary constraint is another factor which has delayed the modernization of the armed forces. However, the RMA provides a framework within which the Bangladesh Armed Forces can undertake and implement new ways of conducting the defence of the country. In the succeeding paragraphs certain core capabilities will be discussed that need to be addressed to face upcoming challenges.

Doctrine

National Security Concept. Till today, our national security concept has been centralized within the domain of the defence force. It is considered that the national security is the primary concern only of the man in uniform. But the concept of national security has changed. Now, the responsibility of national security must lie with every citizen of the country and must not merely be restricted to the man in uniform. So, this issue should be addressed by all levels of the society.

National Information Strategy. Our neighbours and other countries of this region have gone far ahead of us in terms of developing IT infrastructure and IW capabilities. It will possibly be too late for us if we do not start to give due importance in this sector, but we must do so in terms of a national system and not in isolation. In other words, it is necessary for us to take a holistic view of the information revolution and to devise a "National Information Strategy (NIS)". This strategy should be jointly formulated by representatives of the armed forces, bureaucrats, police, paramilitary, intelligence, IT industry and scientists. There should be a National Apex Body to monitor, evaluate, control and guide all the IT and IW related activities at the national level.

Creation of a National Security Net. The National Council for Security Affairs (NCSA)/ National Security Council (NCA) should be the advisory forum for security affairs for the whole nation. This forum needs mechanisms to fuse and access information both vertically and laterally. A security intranet could meet the needs of an information mesh with levels of security, access and redundancy incorporated in it. The national security net should be linked with important offices like, the PM's Office, important ministries, the intelligence agencies, defence services, paramilitary forces, defence industries and other important organisations. Besides, it would provide a forum for composing differences on perceptions; furthering development and recommendations of a coherent and unified policy, and for centralising activities to support national interests.

Doctrine for the Armed Forces. The draft Joint Warfare Doctrine (JWD) has not taken care of IT and IW aspects. A close look at the technological developments taking place in this region is hence essential to prepare us for the variety of warfare tools that would be employed against us in the future conflicts. The information revolution taking place in various armed forces compels us to think about the possible IW threats during peace and war time. As such, JWD and respective services doctrine should address all these issues.

Jointmanship. The age-old concept "Join where we can, single where we must" is no more an effective concept. In future battlefields, information sharing from a common platform will be a must to deliver effective firepower on the enemy. All future operations may not be joint but a standard architecture for all three services will be a requirement for effective operation of any service. In tomorrow's battlefield, loosely knitted joint organisations put into place just prior to battle will not be successful.

Unity of Command. Any future war will be joint in nature and unity of command is essential for effectiveness of any joint operation. In the Gulf War, the unity of command and the minimum requirement for coordination between many agencies allowed the coalition to fight a well-organized, coordinated campaign. The high-tech systems significantly eased the command and control functions of a lone headquarter. The advent of modern data transfer systems should allow us to focus its efforts better by combining all three services with the Joint Command Center (JCC) or Armed Forces Division (AFD).

Systems Integration. The role of IT in defence is now widely recognized as a force multiplier provided it is evolved, proliferated and absorbed from the right perspective. The induction of RMA in Bangladesh will require development of IT capabilities at the national level and their application and absorption in the defence forces. IT absorption in the armed forces will play a major role in supporting the induction of RMA and will influence the organization in revolutionary ways. As

such, the defence IT structure should be integrated with the national IT infrastructure to exploit for maximum benefit.

Development of Indigenous Technologies. Indigenous development in IT and IW systems is the ultimate answer. Constantly buying upgraded technology will bleed our economy. Most importantly, it will pose a great threat to the information security. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to develop indigenous technology including software development for the sake of national security. For initial development, we may contact friendly countries and then switch over to own technology.

Information Security and Encryption. IT market is dominated by civilians and therefore, the military has to satisfy most of its needs with off-the-shelf products. Doing system integration by relying solely on imported software is a security threat. Hence we have to depend on indigenously developed products to protect our networks and the traffic that passes through them.

Research and Development (R&D). It is necessary for us to enhance our R&D in the fields of communication, systems software, management and decision support systems, network management, simulation, war gaming, non-lethal weapons technologies, information security and cryptology. The issue should be harmonized with defence R&D, joint doctrines, force structure plans, maintenance philosophies and affordability with the new paradigm of war. It can be mentioned that the US allocates approximately 30 percent of its budget for R&D and acquisition to digitisation of the battlefield.

Organization

Highly Synthesized Command Organizations. Future fighting formations will mean more combined services and better integration of the army, navy, and the air force. The future campaigns will not only require multi-service systems, but all combat units need to be cooperative. The complexity of operational forces determine that the command structure must meet the requirement of integrating the operations of many services. Synthesized command organization with various combat arms, shared information, and compatible communication will certainly emerge, along with development of command theory involving integrated operations.

Information Warfare Directorate/Committee. All three services of Bangladesh Armed Forces are looking into IT and IW issues from different perspective. But this issue demands a combined and harmonized effort. As such, it is necessary to have IW Directorate at respective Services Headquarters with the same structure to develop IW capabilities and address IT and IW issues in a synchronized approach. An Information Warfare Committee (IWC) also needs to

be formed at the Armed Forces Division (AFD) as the apex body for monitoring IT and IW related activities of the armed forces. This committee will also make necessary liaison with National Apex Body for integrating national IT resources for the development of IT and IW capabilities of armed forces and to address any other national security issues. There may also be an IW Directorate at AFD to provide necessary directives for development and consolidation of IW capabilities in all three services.

Training

Human Resource Development. Human resource development is the prime concern for IW. Talented personnel from information science and technology need to be graduated for dealing with IW. Senior command personnel also need to have sufficient knowledge of IT to deal with IW.

Training of Specialized Group. Training of a specialized group of personnel will be required to understand the subject, to man IW cells in different locations and to make appropriate plan for its development. Specialist IW officers would be tasked to manage IW resources in the armed forces and over see its integration with National/Defence Information Infrastructure.

Induction of IT Professionals. A small group of IT professional may be hired/inducted in the armed forces initially for specialized IW tasks, software development projects and maintenance of networks etc, if required.

Involvement of the Civil Sector. To improve understanding on IW, the armed forces need to have close interaction with the civil sector and exploit the expertise of professionals. Officers of armed forces need to be trained in IT, for which they need interaction with various professional agencies. Interaction with private management firms, international banks and stock exchanges needs to be undertaken to learn how they manage computer security and deal with information overload, and other information related issues.

Software Development. The Armed Forces should be equipped with their own developed software for professional as well as for security reasons. Dependence on other countries will not only hinder our technological advancement but may lead to a breach of security. There are many high skilled software development firms in Bangladesh, who can develop software for our armed forces and also can train our personnel to handle those software.

CONCLUSION

The IT and its recent development have an integral connectivity with all national sectors including the military. Military need to work with other government agencies to develop information architecture which will be integrated in the national security paradigm. This necessitates a changed agenda in Armed Forces doctrine, which ultimately must be commensurate with the national security doctrine. Again, the technological revolution has guided the armed forces towards qualitative development rather than quantitative expansion, which advocates that the military to shrink in size. In future warfare, every soldier in the battlefield will be a system who would be linked with the command and control system to forward real time scenario to the commander to make decision. This recommends a change from the existing vertical and tiered structure into a networked command structure.

Till now, the Bangladesh Armed Forces has not paid much focus on the development of IT and therefore, RMA has been a neglected chapter in the armed forces. The reason behind this might be the lack of acceptability of the technological development due to our poor knowledge in IT, lack of conceptual fundamentals, inability to integrate defence resources and agencies for organizational benefits and also non-availability of security strategies. Considering the technological development of other countries in this region, we need to prepare ourselves to face the variety of warfare tools that might be employed against us in the future conflicts. The information revolution in various armed forces compels us to think all possible IW threats during peace and war time, which need to be addressed well by our armed forces.

Our security concept is centralized within the domain of defence force. But due to the emergence of RMA, the concept of national security has changed, which is now the responsibility of every citizen of the country. As such, it is necessary to take a holistic view of the information revolution and to devise a "National Information Strategy (NIS)" jointly formulated by representatives of all the relevant sectors. There should be a National Apex Body to monitor, evaluate, control and guide all the IT and IW related activities at the national level. The Bangladesh Armed Forces also should start with the formation of IW Directorate in the Armed Forces Division and in all three services to address IT and IW issues for adaptation of RMA. An information warfare committee also needs to be formed at the Armed Forces Division (AFD) as the apex body for monitoring IT and IW related activities of the armed forces and which can make necessary liaison with the National Apex Body for integrating national IT resources for the development of IT and IW capabilities of the armed forces. Such a body will also be able to address other national security issues. A National Security Net should also be established enabling important government offices to have a mechanism to fuse and access information for decision making for the security affairs for the whole nation.

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